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SUMMARY 
Traditionally, urban water services were characterised by local monopolies, where the incumbent 
was publicly-owned. This was explained by safety, health, economic, and technological reasons 
related to the sector’s specificities. However, in spite of this, the sector has undergone important 
reforms in recent years, triggered by efficiency, underinvestment, and environmental problems. The 
most important features of reform are competitive pressures, private sector participation, and more 
autonomous operators. These reforms have created a new environment for urban water management 
and regulation. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the role of regulation in the management of the risks 
created by the sector’s reform. The theoretical analysis is developed along two lines. Firstly, we 
present an extensive literature review of the theories of economic and social regulation, with the 
aim of clarifying the interactions between regulation and reform better. We conclude that regulation 
matters, even after reform. Secondly, we use contract theories as a framework for presenting the 
vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk because of reform, namely capital investments 
and the provision of the service of general interest. At the same time, risk-sharing regimes are 
identified for the most common institutional arrangement in the sector.  
The empirical analysis focuses on risk-sharing patterns and the vulnerability of the elements at risk. 
It is based on a questionnaire targeting management entities, five case-studies illustrating different 
institutional arrangements, and a study on operator’s strategies in a context of reform. In the new 
context, asset specificity and informational hazards are the most important factors increasing the 
vulnerability of capital investments. The lack of funding sources is also highlighted, specifically in 
developing countries. It also became clear that non-provision of the service may result from non-
capacity of the system or to non-affordability of the service. Along these lines, we propose 
regulatory governance mechanisms that tackle the problems highlighted in each institutional 
arrangement, involving different actors, for every step of the reform risk management process. 
Key-words: regulation, urban water sector, reform, risk management, capital investments, universal 
service provision, delegated management contracts 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Traditionnellement, les services de l’eau sont en situation de monopole naturel et sont gérés par des 
opérateurs publics qui possèdent les actifs d’exploitation. La spécificité de ces services est à la base 
de cette organisation. Néanmoins, le secteur a fait l’objet de reformes, justifiées par des problèmes 
environnementales, d’efficacité et de sous-investissement. Les principales caractéristiques de la 
réforme sont les pressions compétitives, la participation du secteur privée, et l’autonomisation des 
opérateurs. Ces réformes ont crée un nouveau cadre institutionnel pour la gestion et la régulation du 
secteur.  
Cette thèse concerne l’étude du rôle de la régulation dans la gestion des risques crées par la réforme. 
L’analyse théorique est développée à travers deux lignes. D'abord, nous présentons une révision de 
littérature des théories de régulation économique, avec le but de clarifier les interactions entre la 
régulation et la réforme. Nous concluons que la régulation est importante, même après la réforme. 
Par la suite, les théories des contrats sont utilisées pour identifier les facteurs qui affectent la 
vulnérabilité des éléments à risques  à cause de la réforme, à savoir les investissements durables et 
la fourniture universelle d’un service d’intérêt générale. Une analyse du partage du risque entre les 
partenaires dans chaque cadre institutionnel est présentée.  
L’analyse empirique se concentre sur le partage des risques et la vulnérabilité des éléments à risque. 
Elle se base sur un questionnaire aux opérateurs, 5 études-de-cas illustratifs de différents cadres 
institutionnels, et une étude sur les stratégies des opérateurs. Dans un contexte de réforme, la 
spécificité des actifs et les aléas informationnels sont les facteurs les plus importants augmentant la 
vulnérabilité des investissements. Le manque de sources financières est aussi important, notamment 
dans les pays en développement. Il est aussi devenu clair que la vulnérabilité de la fourniture 
universelle du service résulte d’un manque de capacité du système ou des prix non-abordables du 
service. Sur la base de ces résultats, nous proposons des mécanismes de gouvernance et régulation, 
impliquant de différents acteurs, qui leur permettent de résoudre les problèmes créés dans chaque 
cadre institutionnel, pour toutes les étapes du processus de gestion des risques liés à la réforme. 
Mots-clés: régulation, services d’eau et d’assainissement, réforme, gestion des risques, 
investissements durables, fourniture universelle du service, contrats de gestion déléguée 
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SUMÁRIO 
O sector da água, isto é as actividades de abastecimento de água e de saneamento de águas 
residuais, é tradicionalmente caracterizado por monopólios naturais de cariz local ou regional, e 
gerido directamente por entidades públicas. Na base desta organização estão factores de saúde 
pública, económicos e tecnológicos relativos às especificidades do sector. No entanto, o sector tem 
sido objecto de reformas motivadas por problemas de eficiência, sub-investimento e ambientais. Os 
aspectos mais importantes da reforma são a criação de pressões competitivas, a participação do 
sector privado, e a autonomização dos operadores. Estas reformas criaram um novo quadro 
institucional para a gestão e a regulação do sector.  
Esta tese tem como objectivo estudar o papel da regulação na gestão dos riscos criados pela reforma 
do sector. A análise teórica desenvolve-se ao longo de duas linha orientadoras. Por um lado, 
apresentamos uma revisão aprofundada da literatura relativa à Regulação Económica, com o 
objectivo de clarificar as interacções entre a regulação e a reforma do sector. Concluimos que a 
regulação é importante, mesmo após a reforma. Por outro lado, utilizamos as Teorias Económicas 
do Contrato para identificar os factores que afectam a vulnerabilidade do investimento e da 
prestação universal do serviço de interesse geral.  
A análise empírica centra-se na partilha do risco e nos factores de vulnerabilidade do investimento 
e da prestação universal do serviço. Esta análise é baseada num questionário aos operadores, em 
estudos-de-caso ilustrativos de diferentes quadros institucionais e tipos de contracto, bem como 
numa análise da estratégia dos operadores. Num contexto de reforma, a especificidade dos activos e 
os problemas de informação são os principais factores que afectam a vulnerabilidade do 
investimento. A importância da falta de recursos financeiros sobressai igualmente, especialmente 
nos países em vias de desenvolvimento. Relativamente à prestação do serviço, esta pode estar em 
risco devido à falta de capacidade da infra-estrutura ou à inacessibilidade dos preços. Com base 
nestes resultados, são apresentados novos mecanismos institucionais e de governância na área da 
regulação, capazes de enfraquecer os problemas identificados em cada quadro institucional, e para 
cada etapa do processo de gestão dos riscos criados pela reforma.  
Palavras-chave: regulação, serviços de água e saneamento, reforma, gestão de risco, investimento, 
prestação universal do serviço, contratos de gestão delegada 
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PART I. INCEPTION 
Urban water systems are essential for life and health, as well as for economic development 
(Green, 2003, e.g., Marvin et al., 1999, UNDP, 2006). For this reason, decisions about the 
urban water sector (UWS) are undoubtedly political in nature, yet they are also eminently 
economic. They refer to choices about the allocation of scarce resources - namely water, 
capital, and human resources - among competing uses in order to satisfy the needs of the 
community. This is particularly important for two reasons: (1) potable water resources are 
scarce, and (2) the UWS is highly capital-intensive, and capital is also scarce (Green, 
2003). 
Traditionally, the urban water services were characterised by local monopolies, where the 
incumbent was local authority-owned. This can be explained by safety, health, economic, 
and technological reasons related to the sector’s specificities. However, in spite of this, the 
urban water sector has undergone important reforms in the past decade, triggered by the 
search for efficiencies, by underinvestment, and by new environmental problems.  
These reforms have created a new environment for urban water management and 
regulation. This PhD thesis examines the main elements at risk in the new environment in 
the various institutional arrangements, with the aim to propose alternative regulatory 
governance mechanisms that tackle the problems highlighted in each arrangement.  
This General Introduction starts out by presenting the water-sector’s specificities, 
characterising the reform of the sector, and identifying the dominant institutional 
arrangements. It then defines the problem under study, and presents the objectives as well 
as the structure of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
1.1. The context: the Urban Water Sector 
Within the scope of this research, the urban water sector (UWS) is restricted to water 
supply and sanitation services. In particular, it excludes irrigation and the transfers of raw 
waters over long distances. Although both of these sectors depend upon the availability of 
water resources, and as such are competitors over their use, they have different 
characteristics that justify their separate analysis. These are, for example, different final 
users, quality standards, capital intensity, operators, and financing sources. 
The urban water sector is a typical network industry. As such, it displays economies of 
scale resulting from large fixed costs, as well as economies of system resultant from 
connections to an integrated network. However, the UWS displays additional specificities 
when compared to other network industries. These are specificities stemming from the 
nature of its technology, the nature of the good, and the nature of the resource.    
1.1.1 Specificities related to technology 
The urban water sector displays strong natural monopoly characteristics arising from 
special production/distribution features, which in turn are determined by the underlying 
technologies. Indeed, the water sector exhibits large economies of scale associated with the 
infrastructure network. The fixed (largely sunk) costs are very high in comparison with the 
variable costs (more than 80% in the UK according to Armstrong et al., 1994, and 70% 
according to Gee, 2004). Therefore, duplicating water networks (whether for raw water 
transfer or the delivery of potable water) is not realistic and is a real barrier to entry of 
possible competitors. 
Moreover, the production and the transport of water are costly due to high sunk costs and 
quality requirements. Given the fact that the transport of water in relation to its value is 
expensive, water services have traditionally been treated, and even sourced, locally. 
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Alexander Gee (2004)  has estimated that transport costs per 100 km represent about 50% 
of the wholesale cost of water (as compared to 5 percent for electricity, and 2.5 percent for 
gas). 
The natural monopoly characteristics thus determine that a single supplier tends to be more 
efficient than multiple, competing ones. This is the reason why the sector has been 
considered for long as intrinsically non-competitive. Therefore, the introduction of 
competition has been limited to so-called “competition for the market”, as opposed to 
“competition in the market”. However, new ways to introduce other forms of competition 
are currently debated, whether via benchmarking or third party access (Gordon-Walker and 
Marr, 2002). 
1.1.2 Specificities related to the nature of the good 
There are also specificities related to the nature of the good, namely merit and quasi-public 
good characteristics, and low price elasticity since there are few substitutes for urban water 
services. 
The existence of strong positive and negative externalities on the environment and public 
health are central to the nature of the good. An externality occurs when a decision causes 
costs or benefits to individuals or groups other than the person making the decision. In 
other words, the decision-maker does not bear all of the costs or reap all of the gains from 
his or her action. The provision of clean water and sanitation services actually provides 
enormous positive externalities to the environment and public health through the control of 
pollution and water-borne diseases.  
The urban water services have characteristics of a merit good in the sense that society 
considers these services as being important, irrespective of whether customers are willing 
to pay for them or not, and that the social benefits of these services exceed private benefits. 
Therefore, if water provision and sanitation are left only to the private sector, it is likely 
that these services will be undersupplied, especially for the low-income population. Public 
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authority often has a greater understanding than consumers themselves of the clean water 
and proper sanitation benefits to their health, well-being, and to the global environment.  
In theory, public goods display two particular characteristics: non-rivalry and 
non-excludability. When there is sufficient infrastructure capacity, urban water services are 
possibly transformed into a quasi-public good because the externalities and social 
objectives related to its provision may limit, in practice, excludability. These two 
characteristics, driven by the existence of strong externalities, and the fact that water is 
essential for life and economic activities, make water services a prime example of 
“general” or “public interest” activities. 
As for the elasticity of demand, i.e. the variability in demand resulting from a price change, 
it is close to zero for the primary uses of water since these are essential needs for the user, 
and few substitutes to UWS are available. For urban water uses in general, the price 
elasticity is low (see for instance Nauges and Thomas, 2000), especially for low-income 
customers. When the price elasticity is low, an unregulated monopoly provider may raise 
tariffs since users are captive (Garcia et al., 2007). 
1.1.3 Specificities related to the nature of the resource 
Finally, there are also specificities related to the nature of the water resources, which are 
scarce and with limited capacity for regeneration. This leads to the need to take a broader 
perspective than solely the one of the management of the infrastructure, i.e., to the need to 
consider the entire “water cycle”. Consequently, both quantitative and qualitative issues 
must be simultaneously taken into account when managing the water systems. The costs of 
supplying drinking water are indeed highly correlated with the pollution level of the 
sources, which in turn depends, among others, upon the quality of the water reintroduced 
into the cycle. 
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1.2. The reform of the Urban Water Sector 
The specificities of the urban water sector identified in the previous section determined the 
way the sector has traditionally been structured as a local public monopoly. However, the 
sector has undergone important reforms in many countries, triggered by the search for 
efficiencies, by underinvestment, and by new environmental challenges. 
1.2.1 Factors of change 
The main factors of change that have influenced the reform in the UWS can be separated 
into economic, financial, managerial, and ideological factors. The impact of these factors 
varies, in such a way that the reform processes have been taking place unevenly both in 
terms of time and scope, depending upon the specific economic, cultural and political 
context. Thus, the management of the urban water services varies greatly across countries, 
as there are numerous local (or even regional) types of solutions. This diversity of 
management modalities is a specific characteristic of the water sector. 
Economic factors 
In global terms, the Rio de Janeiro and Dublin conferences in the beginning of the 1990s 
reaffirmed the environmental concern in the sector, leading to a generalised consensus that 
water needs to be managed better, and that it should be treated as an economic good 
(UNCED, 1992, WMO, 1992). Managing water as an economic good is an important way 
of achieving its efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection 
of water resources. An important corollary is that water companies should be treated as 
commercial enterprises. 
The assumption that the urban water sector is a natural monopoly has also been recently 
questioned. Despite the fact that the structure of the sector is characterised by strong natural 
and local monopolies, which suggests a tendency towards monopolisation and vertical 
integration, various segments may be separated (i.e., unbundled) and exposed to some 
forms of competition. For instance, the separation between water production and water 
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distribution or between collection and sewage treatment is possible and different firms can 
operate each of these parts of the supply chain. Theoretically, the introduction of 
competition is meant to encourage greater efficiency, to the benefit of users.   
Financial factors 
Environmental and public health standards related to the urban water sector have become 
increasingly stringent in the past decades, for example in the European Union (Garcia et al., 
2007). These standards have consequently increased the cost of water and sanitation 
services.  
Moreover, in many developed countries, the infrastructure network is ageing in many 
countries and, thus, there is a considerable demand for infrastructure-renewal investments. 
Also, customers increasingly demand high quality and value for money services. As for 
developing countries, the need to invest relates primarily to new infrastructures. 
On the one hand, there is an upward pressure on costs. On the other hand, there is a crisis in 
public financing, which has made the traditional way of financing through the public 
budget less reliable. In developed countries, there are tighter budget controls and limits to 
indebtedness, such as the EU Stability and Growth Pact. In developing countries, there is a 
structural lack of resources and a low development of financial markets. 
The crisis in public financing is pushing for reform and contributing to increased private 
sector participation (PSP) in the sector. The trend towards increasing PSP may be 
accentuated in some cases by the lobbying power of water trans-national corporations 
(TNCs) to enter new markets (Finger and Allouche, 2002). 
Management factors 
Another factor of change is the failure of the traditional public mode of management. This 
is due to the conjunction of several aspects, namely the lack of resources (e.g., financial and 
technical), the difficulty to raise customer bills (e.g., demanded by cost recovery policies), 
and the political interference in operational management. Having said that, it does not 
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invalidate that water systems under public management can be very efficient (e.g., Shirley 
et al., 2000), provide accountability to the consumer, and borrow money at better rates than 
private companies do (Green, 2003). 
As mentioned above, in the beginning of the 1990s there was an international consensus 
that water needed to be managed better. There were two fundamental principles at the core 
of the reform, namely treating water as an economic good, and involving in water 
management both users, planners, and policy-makers, at all levels (Garcia et al., 2007). 
In addition, the increase in the technical complexity of water management (due to higher 
environmental and service standards1) might force local water managers to delegate 
decisions to professionals who possess the necessary expertise, be they public or private. 
Ideological factors 
There is also an ideological factor in water sector reform, namely the influence of 
neo-liberal ideology in policy definition (e.g., EU, international development agencies). It 
advocates for the virtues of competition and questions the role of the State as an operator 
(Finger and Allouche, 2002). Neo-liberal theories criticise state intervention in economic 
activities as being too costly and, in any case, counter-productive for the global 
competitiveness of a country. 
1.2.2 Features of the reform processes 
In spite of the above outlined specificities of the urban water sector, it has undergone 
important reforms in many countries, triggered by economic, financial, managerial, and 
ideological factors. Table 1 summarises the main trends in the UWS, before and after these 
reform processes.  
                                                 
1 This is one hypothesis tested by (Garcia et al., 2007) 
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Table 1 The main trends of the sector reform  processes 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
Owner of the infrastructure Public/municipality Mainly public 
Scale of infrastructure Local 
Local 
Local network linked to regional  
Operator’s characteristics 
Local operator 
(mainly municipalities) 
Local/regional/trans-national 
operator 
Increased private participation 
Operator’s  objectives 
Public services 
Public policies 
Public services under profit goal 
Financing Cross-subsidies Cost-recovery 
Operation versus regulation 
Integrated 
Direct public ownership 
Integrated 
Separated (e.g., regulatory agency) 
Main objectives of regulation 
Public health 
Public service 
Public health 
Environmental protection 
Public service (obligations) 
Market structure 
Type of liberalisation 
No liberalisation 
Local monopoly 
Competition for the market 
Comparative competition 
 
It is important to note that these reforms are not all triggered by the same causes. 
Nevertheless, there are main features characterising the majority of the reforms, such as 
(1) introduction of competitive pressures, (2) participation of the private sector, 
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(3) regionalisation, and (4) the increased autonomy of the management entities. These 
features are developed in greater detail below. 
Introduction of competition / liberalisation  
There are three different routes to establishing the conditions of market rules and 
competition (i.e., to liberalise): 
1. competition in the market (operators compete for the end-users),  
2. competition for the market (operators compete for obtaining exclusive rights to 
operate in specific segment(s)), and  
3. comparative or benchmark competition. 
As explained above, in the urban water sector, competition in the market is difficult to 
implement due to the strong network and economies of scale, and/or to the obligation to 
provide services of general interest (SGI).  
One alternative in these cases is to institute ex-ante competition, i.e. competition for the 
market. Competition for the market occurs when potential (public or private) operators bid 
competitively for the right to operate in the sector, i.e., for a delegation contract. 
International lending agencies, such as the World Bank, have been strongly promoting the 
competitive tendering for private sector provision of water supply and sanitation services in 
developing and transition countries. 
A delegation contract can take various forms depending on the types of rights and 
responsibilities that are transferred to the operator. It can be a: 
- concession,  
- lease, or  
- intermediary management contract (services, operation and management contracts).  
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The main feature of a concession is that the right and responsibility to invest in the 
infrastructure is transferred to the concessionaire (i.e., the firm who operates the 
concession). The concessionaire also operates the service.  
In lease contracts, only the rights to operate the system are transferred. These contracts are 
a means for firms to benefit from the income streams generated by publicly owned assets, 
in exchange for a fixed lease payment, and the obligation to operate and maintain the assets 
according to preset standards.  
Moreover, public authorities can enter into service contracts with a third firm for the 
completion of specific tasks. These contracts are well suited to operational requirements. 
They often focus on the procurement, operation and maintenance of a limited range of 
equipment. These contracts involve both service and management aspects, and are often 
useful in enhancing efficiencies and technological sophistication (Garcia et al., 2007). 
When direct competition (in and/or for the market) can not be created, a method currently 
used is the performance comparison of different companies operating in different 
geographical areas but on similar services. This is called yardstick, benchmark, or 
comparative competition. The comparisons can cover a range of variables, such as capital-
maintenance costs, operating costs, prices, and service quality. 
Private sector participation 
The private sector can be a source of capital, management expertise, and new technologies. 
One of the key features brought about by private sector participation is the shift in business 
models from the provision of a public service to the provision of a public service under a 
profit-goal regime. Even under the traditional public procurement model, public authorities 
rely on the private sector for design, construction and management of services. As seen in 
the paragraph on competition for the market, private sector participation is carried out 
through different types of delegation contracts. 
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Especially for higher degrees of private sector participation, such as divestiture, there are 
lower degrees of public involvement and public accountability. Private entities are 
accountable to shareholders rather than to the public. This also coincides with the passage 
from tax-paying citizens to bill-paying customers. 
Regionalisation 
Although the water network utility has been justly described as a natural local monopoly, 
some trends towards regionalisation are extending the geographic impact of the so-called 
local monopoly. Regionalisation of urban water services’ management refers to an increase 
in the scale of water services, often due to a grouping of municipalities. Its rationale lies in 
the fact that the very small size of several suppliers actually limits the benefits that can be 
derived from economies of scale. However, according to our knowledge, the impact of such 
regionalisation has not yet been analysed in the UWS. 
Increased autonomy of the management entities 
The drivers of change in the sector do not necessarily lead to increased competition and 
private sector participation. In many countries, the alternative approach to liberalisation lies 
in giving enough autonomy to public utilities, so that the business principles and practices 
can be adhered to.  
The increasing autonomy of water management in relation to politics and the outsourcing 
of specific tasks to experts are important trends in the sector. Local authorities remain 
generally the owners of the assets. One common example is the transformation of organic 
units within the local public authority structure into autonomous organisations possessing 
sole decision-making competency at all levels of operational action (i.e., corporatisation of 
utilities).    
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1.2.3 Dominant institutional arrangements 
The reform of the water sector corresponds to a change in the institutional arrangement 
coordinating the provision and regulation of water services. When there is a transfer of 
(property, management, or investment) rights and responsibilities, each institutional 
arrangement can be interpreted as a sequence of contracts ruling the transactions between 
the responsible authority for service provision and the operator. As for the regulatory rights, 
these may be taken by the responsible entity for service provision (normally the local public 
authority) or may be unbundled and delegated to a regulatory agency.  
The set of characteristics that distinguishes these institutional arrangements corresponds to 
the aforementioned features of the reform, particularly:  
- unbundling/ integration of functions,  
- private sector participation, and  
- type of competition.  
Based on the results of the Euromarket project (see major results in Finger, Allouche, and 
Luís-Manso, 2007), we have identified four institutional management arrangements2:  
- Direct Public (DiPu) 
- Delegated Public (DePu) 
- Delegated Private (DePri) 
- Direct Private, with Independent Regulation (DiPri) 
                                                 
2 Although important, Build-Operate-Transfer/Build-Operate-Own schemes are not considered because they 
pertain to special purpose projects and not to the entire water system. 
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Table 2 presents the institutional arrangements in relation to the main features of reform. 
Table 2 Dominant institutional arrangements in the UWS 
  Delegation of management   
  No Yes    
DiPu    No  
No 
  DePu   
   DePri 
Private 
Sector 
Participation Yes 
 DiPri   
Yes 
Unbundling 
of 
management 
and 
regulation 
  compar.  for the market   
  
No 
 Possible    
  
Competition   
 
Direct Public Management 
The traditional institutional arrangement is direct public management. There is no private 
sector participation and no competition. The public operator is both responsible for the 
regulation and the provision of the service, and is manager of the system (i.e., there is no 
unbundling of functions). There are several examples of this in Europe, such as: water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) services in Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, and 
Ireland; sanitation services in Germany; and sewage collection in the Netherlands and 
Belgium.  
Delegated Public Management 
In the Delegated Public Management arrangement there is no private sector participation in 
the provision of the service. The responsibility and management functions are unbundled 
and the responsible entity appoints a public management entity to provide the service with 
relative autonomy (increasingly a publicly-owned private law company). It is possible (yet 
still not very common) that the regulatory and responsibility functions for service provision 
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become unbundled, and that benchmarking becomes the key competitive pressure in the 
industry. WSS provision in Italy, Portugal and Greece, as well as German water provision, 
and Dutch and Belgium water and sewage treatment are dominantly organised according to 
this institutional arrangement. 
Delegated Private management 
Delegated management (mainly private) based on agreements between autonomous actors, 
such as delegation contracts, are becoming very important (hybrid) forms of coordination in 
the water sector. Under Private Delegated Management, the responsibility for service 
provision and management functions are unbundled, and the responsible entity appoints a 
private company for providing the service.  
The operator may be chosen after a competitive tender and, in this case, the key 
competitive pressure is competition for the market. The regulatory and responsibility 
functions may also be unbundled, and a regulatory agency created. French and Spanish 
WSS services are provided according to this arrangement (yet no independent regulatory 
agency was created in this case) and regulation in these two cases is said to be “by 
contract”.  
Direct Private Management 
Finally, there is direct private management. Responsibility and management functions are 
integrated and carried out by a private operator. On the contrary, the regulatory function is 
unbundled and it is implemented by an independent regulatory agency. The case of England 
and Wales illustrates this arrangement because water utilities were privatised and a sector 
regulator was created.  
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1.3. Problem statement 
The urban water sector reforms summarised in the previous section are creating new 
sources of uncertainty and vulnerability, resulting from the emergence of new actors 
playing an active role in the sector, as well as from “unbundling” of operational and 
regulatory functions. As a matter of fact, new issues are raised by the multiplication of the 
actors, as well as by new institutional arrangements diffusing responsibilities which were 
traditionally integrated in the publicly-owned utilities. 
In a sector characterised by strong economies of scale, as well as merit and “quasi-public” 
characteristics, one main issue is the sustainability of capital investment. Firstly, due to the 
merit good characteristics, if water provision and sanitation are left only to the private 
sector, it is likely that they will be under-supplied, especially for the low-income 
population. Secondly, the introduction of competitive pressure may reduce economies of 
co-ordination and incentives to invest. Moreover, a balance between introducing 
competitive pressures, the length of delegating contracts, and the return on capital 
investments is hard to achieve. 
Furthermore, an unregulated (monopoly) provider of water services may raise tariffs to 
socially unacceptable levels since users are captive. It may also carry out a selective 
expansion of activities to the most profitable segments, i.e. “cherry-picking” process (see 
for e.g., Marvin et al., 1999). Social concern thus increases in the event of privately-owned 
operators and assets. In this context, regulation appears inevitable for creating conditions 
under which firms can operate efficiently, as well as for protecting consumers and the 
public interest.  
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1.4. Objectives of the research 
The objectives of this research are to analyse the different risks that are created by the 
sector’s reform. These are aggregated as reform risks, and pertain to capital investment and 
universal provision of the service of general interest. 
The thesis focuses on the management of the risks created by the reform of the urban water 
sector, and the role of regulation. Thus, the main research questions pertain to the role of 
regulation in reform risk management. 
The research aims at verifying whether and how:  
1. the sector’s reform is affecting the nature and intensity of risks in the sector;  
2. the risks created by reform vary according to different institutional frameworks; and  
3. regulation can be a tool for reform risk management.  
The nature of the reform process depends, among other things, upon the developmental 
stage of the countries. In developing countries, the main impetus for reform comes from the 
need to invest in new infrastructures (Allouche et al., 2002). In developed countries, the 
main driving force for reform stems from financial pressures to respond to the needs of 
maintenance, to higher sewerage and water production costs due to increased pollution and 
water use, and to stricter environmental norms (Garcia et al., 2007). Therefore, the analysis 
of reform risks and their consequences differs in these two situations, a fact that we take 
into consideration throughout this thesis.  
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided in four main parts (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Structure of the thesis 
Part I comprises Chapter 1, which presents this General Introduction. We started out by 
identifying the main characteristics of the sector, and the features of reform, before defining 
the main problem and objectives set for this thesis.  
Part II is dedicated to the elaboration of the conceptual framework used to answering the 
research questions. Chapter 2 presents an overview of regulation in the urban water sector, 
starting by making reference to the larger literature on regulation of the network industries. 
It then focuses on the specificities of regulating the urban water sector, and the main 
regulatory objectives in a reform context. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of risk management 
in the UWS, focusing in particular on the types of risks accentuated by the sector reform. 
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Chapter 4 draws together the issues that influence the main elements at risk because of 
reform, namely capital investments and provision of the service of general interest. 
Part III presents an empirical analysis of risk-sharing patterns and the vulnerability of the 
elements at risk because of reform. In Chapter 5, we present the main trends identified by 
the questionnaire developed in the scope of this research. Then, in Chapter 6 we present 5 
case-studies selected to illustrate different institutional arrangements in 4 countries, 
corresponding to different degrees of operational and regulatory “unbundling”, 
participation of the private sector, and competition. In Chapter 7, we present one study 
developed by the author in the context of the Euromarket project about operators’ strategies 
in a context of reform with the objective of assessing the alignment of these strategies with 
the challenges posed by the sector’s reform. 
Part IV presents the main results and conclusions of this thesis. Chapter 8 synthesises the 
reviews, concepts, and empirical evidence into a comprehensive regulatory governance 
approach adapted to the new risks posed by reforms. It concludes by proposing new 
governance mechanisms to tackle the problems highlighted in each institutional 
arrangement. Finally, in Chapter 9 we present the main conclusions of this thesis, and 
suggest future areas of research. 
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PART II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The Urban Water Sector (UWS) is a typical network industry. As such, it displays 
economies of scale resulting from large fixed costs, as well as economies of system 
resulting from connections to an integrated network. However, the UWS displays 
additional specificities when compared to other network industries, which are related to the 
nature of its technology, the nature of the good, and the nature of the resource. These 
specificities determine the way the UWS has traditionally been structured as a local public 
monopoly. Nonetheless, the sector has undergone important reforms, such as the 
introduction of competitive pressures, the participation of the private sector, and the 
increased autonomy of the public utilities. 
Overall, these reforms are creating new sources of uncertainty and vulnerability for the 
management and regulation of water utilities. In this thesis, the focus is on the role of 
regulation in managing these new risks created by the reforms. It is therefore important to 
understand the main approaches and instruments of regulation in the network industries, 
and in the urban water sector in particular (Chapter 2). 
In parallel, we analyse the sector considering the transactions of (property, management, or 
investment) rights and responsibilities as the unit of analysis, with the view of presenting 
the most important risks in the urban water sector, as well as the main risk-sharing patterns 
per institutional arrangements (Chapter 3).  
Finally, two elements are identified in this dissertation as being particularly at risk because 
of reforms - investment in specific assets, and universal provision of the service of general 
interest. Using the literature on Transaction-Costs and Incomplete-Contract Theories as a 
starting point, a vulnerability analysis is made for each element at risk across the most 
common institutional arrangements (Chapter 4).  
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Chapter 2. Regulation of the Urban Water Sector 
To understand the regulation of the urban water sector one must make reference to the 
broader literature on regulation of the network industries (directly related to the regulation 
of natural monopolies). To start with, there are three main categories of regulation in the 
network industries, namely economic, social, and technical regulation.  
Firstly, economic regulation is about introducing competitive market structures in industries 
characterised by market failures, regulating the market (i.e., specific aspects of operating in 
the market, such as defining tariffs and fostering operational efficiency), and guaranteeing 
the sustainability of the system (i.e., to ensure asset service ability over time). The major 
instruments of economic regulation are price and access regulation.  
Secondly, social regulation refers to regulatory policies and practices designed to achieve 
social policy objectives that may not be met through competitive market forces or 
economic regulation alone. They aim at correcting other market failures, such as 
externalities and information asymmetries (Ogus, 2004).  
Service quality and public service obligations become major issues with regulated 
providers. Quality standards are the most important instrument of social regulation. They 
subject suppliers to behavioural controls and impose penalties to those who fail 
compliance. Standards are particularly important when there are price controls because 
these create incentives to reduce quality. There are several associated costs, which are 
borne either by the authority or the firms, such as administrative costs (related to standard 
formulation, monitoring and enforcement) as well as compliance costs (related to capital 
and other costs incurred to meeting the standards). 
The goods and services provided by the network industries are considered as being of 
general interest to society (because they are essential for achieving acceptable levels of 
quality of life and for the development of countries and regions). For this reason, providers 
of the service are subject to specific public service obligations, in other words to specific 
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requirements ensuring that certain public interest objectives are met. European institutions 
have developed the concept of universal service in the context of the liberalisation of some 
network industries, namely telecommunications, post, and electricity (Box 1).  
Box 1 Universal Service Obligations 
Universal service obligations (USO) refer to a minimum set of services of specified quality, to which all users 
throughout the European Community have access, at an affordable price (Garcia et al., 2007). USO have 
become an important instrument of social regulation in the newly liberalised network industries. By setting a 
USO, political authorities ensure a non-discriminatory provision of services of general interest, overcoming 
social exclusion and isolation. The definition of USO varies across industries and countries. The definition is 
not always clear, and it often gives rise to different interpretations. With the end of monopolies, the funding of 
USO have become a major issue. Usually, the burden of USO provision lies on the incumbent. 
 
Thirdly, externalities and informational asymmetries may also create technical problems 
related to interoperability and interconnection when the infrastructure is unbundled. In this 
event, there is the need to ensure the integrity of the infrastructure systems through 
technical regulatory instruments. In the situations of structural unbundling, the old 
vertically-integrated utility model is abandoned and it must be ensured that the physical 
material of the system does not fail when exposed to external and internal stresses.  
System’s integrity is essential for the overall quality of the service provided. It requires a 
regular assessment of the state of the overall infrastructure and requires frequent decisions 
concerning maintenance, replacement, and renewal of unreliable network elements. 
In this thesis we mainly focus on economic and social regulation. The reason is that, due to 
technological reasons, the infrastructure systems cannot be unbundled in the urban water 
sector. Therefore, the need for technical regulation is not as acute in the UWS as it is in 
other network industries.  
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2.1. Regulation in the Network Industries3 
Over the past decades, most network industries have evolved from integrated monopolies to 
restructured industries with private sector participation, and/or to (partially or almost 
completely) liberalised industries. The literature on regulation in the network industries has 
followed, and sometimes triggered, the restructuring processes in sectors that are normally 
characterised by large sunk costs and strong social, environmental, and economic 
externalities (e.g., Klein, 1996). These industries include telecommunications, postal 
services, energy (electricity and gas), railways and public local transport, air transport, 
water supply and sanitation. 
The reform processes and the evolution of the theories about regulation do not necessarily 
follow a specific order of events, and differ across network industries and regions. In fact, 
some sectors were and are being liberalised without having been privatised first (e.g., air 
transport in several European countries); while others were privatised, but not liberalised 
(e.g., water utilities in England and Wales).  
In geographical terms, the tradition in the United States of America (USA) is more liberal 
than in Europe. In the USA there has been a strong belief in the market and on ex-post 
intervention, while in Europe, public ownership was expected to protect the general interest 
against private interests, and interventions were mainly done ex-ante. Many developing 
countries present yet a different path, mainly due to the influence of World Bank policies. 
The Bank started by pro(im)posing privatisation, however lately it has focused on 
competition as the restructuring solution for these industries. 
Several theories have been developed over the past decades, suggesting different answers to 
the question why do network industries need to be regulated, even after being restructured? 
                                                 
3 Parts of section 2.1 were published in (Luís-Manso and Felisberto, 2006). 
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We differentiate a first group of theories, which have emerged in the context of 
privatisation, and a second group influenced by the liberalisation paradigm, which defends 
the virtues of competition and the power of its alternative forms. 
2.1.1 Privatisation and the need to regulate 
Traditionally, the default resolution of the conflict between consumer protection and 
investment needs used to be public ownership, thus providing both access to investment 
funds and political control over final prices (Newbery, 2004). This is still the case in many 
countries and industries in the world.  
However, in the early stages of the network industries restructuring process, there was a 
pressure to shift from public to private ownership. There were several reasons which 
explained the decision to privatise. One of the most important was the increase in 
operational efficiencies expected by means of a change in ownership. Neo-classical authors 
presented other advantages of privatisation, such as the reduction of the public sector 
borrowing requirement and of the government involvement in enterprise decision-making 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  
Together with the trend towards the privatisation of public utilities came the need for 
government regulation. State ownership was substituted by economic regulation, in other 
words by government intervention in the market. At this stage, the regulation was basically 
needed to ensure that the monopolist would not abuse of its privileged position in the 
market.  
There is a long tradition of regulating private utilities in the United States of America 
(USA), where several theories were initially developed in order to explain the reasons for 
regulation, and how regulatory agencies behave when they are created. Public Interest, 
Private Interest, and (New) Institutional Economic Theories are amongst the most 
important ones. 
  
25
A. Public Interest Theory 
The Public Interest Theory of regulation suggests that government regulation is justified by 
the pursuit of the public interest. It thus suggests that regulation arises from the need to 
protect and maximize social welfare. Public Interest Theory assumes that rational and 
disinterested expert regulators exist, and that they actually are the best means to identify 
and ensure the common goals of society.  
The theory is based on two main assumptions:  
1. markets are prone to fail if left alone, and  
2. regulation is costless.  
Thus, market imperfection justifies regulation, which has no cost (Posner, 1971). The 
objective of regulation is to achieve certain public desired results by rectifying situations of 
market failure, which make markets operate inefficiently or inequitably. The most relevant 
market failures in network industries arise in relation to natural monopolies, externalities 
(e.g. public good characteristics and pollution), and asymmetry of information in the 
market.  
This theory has been criticised4. Some authors argue that public interest is difficult to 
define and to be written down into specific policies. There are no complete informed and 
rational decisions, so critics to the theory say that it is preferable to rely on the market to 
solve market imperfections, than on government intervention. Moreover, in many cases, 
empirical research could not demonstrate that regulation solve market failures.  
The lack of clarity on how to balance economic and social efficiencies has been also 
criticised since these are frequently incompatible.  
                                                 
4 Some of these are general criticisms addressed to regulation in general. 
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Another drawback is related to the fact that Public Interest Theory assumes that 
government intervention is perfect and has no costs, which is not the case in reality (Posner, 
1974). Additionally, regulators are thought to have a disinterested expertise and to be 
efficient, which may not be always the case.  
Some critics of this approach also argue that regulation is extensively influenced by 
economic and political powers. Thus, it is claimed that regulatory policies and institutions 
are often influenced by powerful regulated parties, politicians or groups of consumers 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Finally, the Public Interest Theory is said to be incomplete since 
it does not specify where and how regulation should be introduced.  
Not all authors were convinced by the way Public Interest Theory justified regulation. 
Therefore, Private Interest Theories emerged as alternative theories to explain government 
intervention.  
B. Private Interest Theories 
Private Interest Theories or, as some authors designate them, Capture Theories, are driven 
by the pursuit of private and not public interests. They emerged as a response to the 
perception that regulators were ineffective in meeting the public interest goals.  
Stigler (1971) proposes that the creation and operation of regulatory agencies is meant to 
transfer economic resources to private interests in return for votes or campaign 
contributions to politicians, meaning he provides a political justification for regulation. 
Stigler, based on Olson’s theory of collective action, also explains that “as a rule, regulation 
is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits”.  
In this context, regulation is not imposed to the economic agents but it is demanded and 
supplied according to the interests of those regulated. So, regulation is the outcome of the 
demand and supply forces, in other words, it is a product supplied to the interest groups that 
value it the most. As such, the value of regulation to particular groups and the costs of 
obtaining regulation become important variables in the regulatory arena.  
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The Private Interest Theory considers that regulators tend to be dominated over time by the 
regulated industries, even if at first they are driven by the pursuit of public interest. The 
regulator acts in the interest of incumbents rather than in the interest of society as a whole. 
At the heart of this argument is the fact that firms have stronger incentives and resources to 
defend their cases than consumers do. The industry’s control of information, its career 
opportunities, and the repeated iterations between the regulator and the firm, often lead to a 
situation where the regulator comes to serve the interests of the regulated.  
Empirical findings, mainly from the USA, on regulatory decisions that were against firms’ 
interests questioned these arguments. The Private Interest Theory then developed to include 
other actors, such as consumers, and not only the relationship between the regulator and the 
firm (Posner, 1971). This is the approach taken by the Economic Theory of Regulation.  
Economic Theory of Regulation5 
The Economic Theory of Regulation has a broader view than initial Capture Theories, 
because it admits the possibility of capture by interest groups other than the regulated firms 
(Peltzman, 1976). This theory recognises that the need to regulate is likely to appear in the 
event of market failures because these failures inflict losses on some interest groups.  
Stigler and Peltzman suggest that in the case of a competition failure, or monopoly, the 
regulator is given the power to allocate the monopoly profit. Therefore, the regulated 
industry in general has an incentive to influence the regulator so that it benefits from a 
“regulatory rent” (i.e., a market for regulation is created). In this case, the regulator would 
be captured by the industry because the commodity of regulation goes to those who value it 
most. Producers would thus tend to be better served by regulation than the (more diffused, 
less organised) masses of consumers (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
                                                 
5 The Economic Theory of Regulation is in line with the thought of the so-called “Chicago school”. 
Sometimes it is even called the Chicago Theory. 
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The proponents of this theory advocate that there is a tendency to design regulation in 
benefit of groups that are relatively small but who have strong preferences, homogeneity of 
interest and relatively low organisational costs. Nevertheless, the price will be less than the 
monopolistic price given that pro-producer tendencies are somehow disciplined by 
consumer groups. The main assumptions of the Economic Theory of Regulation are:  
1. all parties involved in regulation are income maximisers (politicians, for instance, 
seeking votes to maximise their cash incomes), well informed, and learn from 
experience, and  
2. regulation is costless (Baldwin and Cave, 1999).  
Private Interest Theories, including the Economic Theory of Regulation, emerged on the 
basis of public choice analysis (Black, 1996) (Box 2). 
Box 2 Public Choice Theory 
The Public Choice Theory aims at explaining how individual preferences are reflected in voting and other 
procedures adopted by institutions, and at evaluating their consequences for social welfare (Ogus, 2004). The 
proponents of the theory argue that civil servants do not have incentive to manage state investments in an 
altruistic way, consistent with the public interest. This theory states that civil servants’ primary motivation is 
their own interest, and it accuses special interest groups of lobbying in such a way that the state outputs are 
deformed in favour of particular groups in society. In the majority of cases, these groups are well organised 
and politically powerful. In this situation, there is clearly the risk that regulation goes beyond the 
economically efficient level. 
 
Still in the same line of thought of Private Interest Theories, some authors challenged the 
emphasis placed on the regulatory agency’s control by one narrow group with powerful 
interests.  
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Special Interest Theory 
The Special Interest Theory proposes that multiple groups compete for the control of the 
regulatory agency’s activities (Becker, 1983, Peltzman, 1976). Stigler and Peltzman argue 
that the behaviour of legislators is driven by the desire to remain in office, and that the 
different interest groups compete against each other (by offering political support in return 
for favourable legislation). Peltzman (1976) tries to combine both views by considering the 
regulator as an actor searching for support from competing interest groups.  
Recent authors (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1994) tend to maintain this view that regulators draw 
support from a variety of sources that change over time. They focus on the winners and 
losers in the regulatory process, the associated rent seeking, and the incentives regulators 
have to act for or against various groups in society. The regulator must trade-off the desires 
of consumers against those of the firms.  
When there is a risk of capture, it may be desirable to limit the discretion of the regulator in 
order to reduce the firm’s incentive to expand wasteful resources and rent-seeking. To 
overcome this problem, Armstrong et al. (1994) proposed that regulators should be banned 
from integrating the regulated firms’ staff after their retirement from public service. This 
would prevent the temptation of benefiting the industry today in order to be rewarded by a 
generous remuneration in the future.  
C. New Institutional Economic Theories 
In general terms, Institutional Theorists argue that regulation is affected by the institutional 
environment rather than by an overriding public interest or the outcome of competitive 
bargaining between diverging private interests (Black, 1996). The emphasis is placed on 
how regulatory strategies are affected and constrained by the institutional environment, 
including legal and non-legal rules, which shape, mediate and channel preferences and 
actions (e.g., Shirley et al., 2000, Spiller and Tommasi, 2005).  
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Institutions are defined as the formal and informal rules that govern the ways in which 
individuals and organisations interact with each other. Thus, institutions include not only 
national laws and the political system, but also customs and social conventions. All this 
constitutes the institutional context in which the regulatory regime is embodied.  
Beside this broad perspective on the influence of (social, political, and economic) 
institutions on regulation, New Institutional Economics also focuses on a micro perspective 
based on transaction costs. According to this approach, regulation is justified if other rules 
are more costly in terms of transaction costs. We come back to it in the next section. 
*** 
Contradictory findings on the relation between ownership and efficiency questioned the 
purpose of privatisation. New challenges were created by a different type of reforms and, 
consequently, different forms of intervention adapted to the new context were required. 
New theories emerged to support and/or explain different forms of economic intervention 
in the markets.  
2.1.2 The challenges posed to regulation by liberalisation 
Some authors argue that the restructuring of the network industries should not result from a 
change of ownership – i.e., from privatization –, but rather from the introduction of 
competition, i.e., from liberalisation (e.g., Armstrong, 2003, Newbery, 2002, Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1991).  
As a reminder, liberalisation refers to a process by which competition is introduced in 
situations or sectors so far characterised as monopolies. Its economic rationale is grounded 
on the recognition that, in principle, competition is more prone to achieve efficiency than 
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monopoly6. In most of the markets, competition ensures that the interest of the consumers 
is satisfied because it obliges the firms to be cost-efficient, to attain a certain level of 
quality or to be innovative. This is the only way firms can survive and be profitable in the 
competitive market (Armstrong et al., 1994).  
The process of liberalisation can also be characterised as a process of “deregulation”. The 
idea behind this is that, where there is competition, normal competition policy should 
replace regulatory control exercised by the regulatory entities. However, in practice, many 
“deregulating” measures in the network industries involved a change in intensity rather than 
in number (Ogus, 2004). This means that regulatory instruments are less interventionist 
(e.g., fewer prescriptive standards; general targets as opposed to detailed mandatory 
requirements) and not necessarily removed.  
Indeed, in the event of market failures there are two ways to overcome the problem of 
market power:  
- regulating the market, or  
- introducing more competition in the market (Armstrong et al., 1994).  
The introduction of competition may not be desirable if the industry presents important 
natural monopoly characteristics, or if there is the threat of “cream-skimming”. In these 
cases, regulation tends to persist.  
There are only two network industries where competition appears attractive, namely 
telecommunications and postal services. In these cases, notably in the telecommunications 
                                                 
6 Although this is a relatively consensual principle in economics, some authors argue that the unsatisfactory 
results of some privatisation and liberalisation projects sustain the hypothesis that state monopolies might 
outperform competitive markets, even in markets that do not exhibit economies of scale (e.g., Ungern-
Sternberg, 2004). 
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sector, unbundling and technological innovations enables the introduction of competition in 
the whole - or part - of the value chain.  
In many network industries competition is limited, at least in a first stage. That is why 
government regulation is nonetheless deemed necessary as a means to ensure that the 
pursuit of profits does not conflict with social welfare (e.g., Vickers and Yarrow, 1991, 
Train, 1997).  
Newbery (2002) goes a step further, suggesting that regulation should not be confined to 
the natural monopoly elements. The author advocates that the potentially competitive 
elements also need regulatory oversight so as to ensure that markets are not manipulated 
nor market power abused. According to these authors, deregulated industries will still need 
to be regulated (a process also called “re-regulation”).  
In a context of deregulation, the regulatory debate focuses on the balance between 
regulatory intervention and competition policy, and not anymore exclusively on the abuse 
of monopoly positions. Let us now go through the main bodies of literature influencing 
these “deregulation” and “re-regulation” trends. Even in situations where it is difficult to 
introduce competition (e.g., due to market failures), they explore alternative mechanisms to 
overcome this limitation, and influence regulation.  
A. Contestable markets 
According to the Theory of Contestable Markets, the threat of competition (or potential 
competition) on its own induces a monopoly to be efficient (Baumol, 1982, Baumol et al., 
1982, Baumol and Willig, 1986). Therefore, there is no need to intervene in the market 
(i.e., to regulate).  
When there are no sunk costs, there is the possibility for free entry and free exit (hit-and-
run competition), and the markets are considered to be contestable. In this case a competitor 
can profitably enter the industry, undercut the incumbent, and take away its business. The 
best way for the incumbent to respond to that threat is to eliminate such profit opportunities 
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by being productively efficient and pricing at average cost (given uniform pricing). Given 
the constraint that profits cannot be negative, this outcome is welfare-optimal, that is 
allocative efficiency is maximized subject to the break-even constraint without any 
duplication of fixed costs (Armstrong et al., 1994).  
One of the major critiques made to this theory is that entry can happen faster than the 
incumbent’s price response. Another important criticism, especially in the context of the 
network industries, is that by slightly relaxing the hypothesis of absent sunk costs, the 
predictions of the theory change substantially.  
One interesting result is that rather than being an argument for the elimination of 
regulation, the Contestability Theory can be used as a guide for regulation (Baumol and 
Willig, 1986). Indeed, regulation should simulate contestability by setting the regulated 
prices between incremental and stand alone costs in markets that are not contestable.    
Franchise Bidding 
One way to make a natural monopoly contestable is to assign a franchise through a 
competitive tender. Demsetz (1968) proposes a return to concession contracts, which had 
been common in the nineteenth century, as an alternative form of competition (in 
opposition to both competition in the market and potential competition). The idea is to 
auction the right to operate the natural monopoly to the firm offering the lowest price of 
supply. The author criticises the performance of U.S. regulatory agencies and argues that 
competition for the right to serve the market can substitute competition within a market. 
Franchise bidding is regarded as being beneficial for efficiency. The fact that the 
concession is competitively awarded ensures that prices and services standards are fair to 
both consumers and investors. Even though franchise bidding has still strong advocates, it 
presents some drawbacks especially under asset specificity and cost uncertainty. New 
Institutional Economists (NIE) analyse in detail franchise bidding contracts. Some results 
are presented below. 
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B. New Institutional Economics 
NIE abandons the full-informational rational economic behaviour in favour of 
bounded-rationality. Coase (1937) is amongst the first authors to question the ability of 
public authorities (and regulatory agencies for that matter) to have complete and costless 
access to information, and showed that public regulation is not better in principle than 
private negotiation for dealing with market failures (Glachant, 2002). 
There is a special emphasis on contracts and on franchise contracts in particular. These 
works produced important results in terms of regulation. Firstly, new institutional 
economists argue that complexity of the service, agents’ cognitive limits, and incomplete 
information make it impossible to negotiate a complete contract (Williamson, 1985).  
Secondly, they argue that factors such as multidimensional quality, asset specificity7, and 
opportunistic behaviour (e.g., ex-post appropriation threat) fade out the results of ex-ante 
competitive mechanisms (e.g., Goldberg, 1976, Williamson, 1976, Williamson, 1985). 
Indeed, investment specificity, average cost uncertainty, and high costs associated with 
repeating the auctions, might well undermine the incentives to invest into the network 
infrastructure.  
Finally, it is difficult to make the bidding truly competitive, to define the optimal duration 
of the contract, and to renegotiate tariffs. For these reasons, some authors (e.g., Williamson, 
1985, Armstrong et al., 1994) do argue that even in the event of competitive bidding for the 
market, ex-post (i.e., after signing the contract) intervention in the industry is still 
necessary. According to Williamson’s model, ex-post intervention depends on asset 
specificity.  
                                                 
7 Asset specificity refers to the relative lack of transferability of assets intended for use in a given transaction 
to other uses. Highly specific assets represent sunk costs that have relatively little value beyond their use in 
the context of a specific transaction. 
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Williamson (1985, , 1996) distinguishes two types of network industry reform:  
1. industries with low asset specificity where the threat of competition remains 
credible ex-post; and  
2. industries with high asset specificity and little ex-post credibility of contractual 
incentives, and therefore where ex-post regulation is needed.  
Thus, institutional arrangements in network industries need to be adapted to different asset 
specificities, and cannot be reduced to public intervention. As a matter of fact, no uniform 
solution, involving either pure competition or public oversight, will find universal 
application to all network industries (Glachant, 2002). 
C. Intensity of Regulation (Bergman’s model) 
Bergman et al. (1998) analyse the conflicting priorities8 faced during the transition from 
monopoly to competition. Accordingly to their model, the intensity of regulation varies 
during this transition as a result of the resolution of conflicting priorities faced in the 
regulatory process.  
The authors distinguish three phases. In phase one, monopoly prevails and regulation is 
exerted through ownership in the majority of the cases. There is concern with all the aspects 
of the industry’s activities, such as prices, investments, allocation of output, and social 
obligations.  
                                                 
8 The authors identify ten conflicting priorities: short vs. long-term objectives; efficiency vs. equity 
objectives; competition vs. monopoly; slow vs. fast liberalisation; public vs. private ownership; sector specific 
regulation vs. application of general competition rules; rules vs. discretion; permanent vs. temporary 
regulation; centralised vs. decentralised regulation; and light-handed vs. heavy-handed regulation. 
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In phase two, one assists to a gradual introduction of competition (monopoly and 
competition coexist). The focus of regulation is on monopoly abuse by dominant 
incumbents, emerging competition issues, and public services obligations.  
Finally, in phase three, competition is extensive and increasingly effective in some or all 
markets. The need for regulation decreases in this phase but it is not completely abolished. 
The maintenance of public service objectives and fair trading practices still demands some 
light-handed regulation.  
The authors also analyse the trade-off in terms of regulatory intensity. If regulation is 
excessively light-handed, then the introduction of effective competition may be delayed due 
to legal uncertainty. If regulation is excessively heavy-handed and there are few sunset 
clauses, then it is more likely that institutions become entrenched and the progress towards 
a more effective regulation is delayed.  
2.1.3 The major regulatory instruments  
Alternative theories explain the reasons and the different approaches to regulation when 
network industries are restructured. Independently of the reasons behind the public 
intervention in the market, pricing of the service and access regulation are the most 
important instruments of economic regulation in the network industries. 
A. Pricing of the service 
The control of prices is the most common instrument of economic regulation. In markets 
with monopolistic characteristics, the intervention on prices aims at preventing predatory 
pricing and over charging. Marginal cost pricing provides the first best solution to pricing. 
However, it raises a problem by not taking into account other overheads, such as 
depreciation and capital costs (Kahn, 1970).  
In network industries, facilities normally have short-term spare capacity, so the cost of 
providing an additional unit of the service is low. Actually, only a part of the firm’s costs is 
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variable in the short-run, which means that by setting prices at the short-run marginal cost 
level, fixed costs would never be covered. It therefore raises the issue of average cost 
(based on cost recovery premises) versus marginal cost pricing (based on allocative 
efficiency premises).  
Box 3 Rate structures in the Network Industries 
Linear pricing 
Under linear pricing, the price per unit remains the same irrespective of the consumption volume. This 
uniform rate may be based on the average or the marginal cost of service provision. It is easy to understand 
and implement, and it provides a stable revenue stream for the operator.  
Nonlinear pricing 
There are two types of nonlinear tariffs, namely decreasing and increasing block tariffs. Under decreasing 
block tariffs, the price per unit of service decreases with the volume of consumption. It is justified under 
natural monopoly conditions. Its main disadvantage refers to its low incentives for resource conservation 
(e.g., in the urban water sector). As for increasing block tariffs, the unit price increases with the volume of 
consumption. It can be implemented for equity purposes, or to face resource or capacity constraints. 
Two-part tariff 
A two-part tariff is a price discrimination technique in which price is composed of two parts, namely a lump-
sum fee and a per-unit charge (that may correspond to an increasing or a decreasing block tariff). 
Peak-load pricing  
The rate structure may support tariff differentials for peak demand. That means that prices are higher when 
the demand for the service is at its highest levels (Boiteaux, 1949), as a means of reflecting investment costs 
needed for meeting peak demand. According to the economic theory, if the same type of capacity serves all 
users, then capacity costs should be levied only at peak hours. 
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The main challenge when setting prices in the network industries pertains to their natural 
monopoly characteristics, namely to find an alternative to the marginal cost principle that 
avoids the “dead-weight” welfare loss associated with monopolistic pricing (Ogus, 2004).  
Possible solutions that avoid the “dead-weight” welfare loss are to:  
1. allow price discrimination,  
2. set a two-part tariff with a fixed fee and a per-unit charge equal to marginal cost, 
3. meet the operator’s loss from marginal pricing with a subsidy. This is called 
Ramsey pricing if the amount exceeding marginal cost is inversely proportional to 
demand elasticity (i.e., if charged to customers with less elastic demand functions). 
All these solutions have drawbacks when implemented in network industries. For example, 
the universal service obligation defined in many network industries may not allow for price 
discrimination. Also, the fixed-fee of the two-part tariff might discourage low-income 
consumers from using the service. Finally, subsidies may distort incentives for efficiency. 
These solutions combine different rate level definitions and rate structures (Box 3).  
Rate-of-return and price-cap regulations remain the most important methods for defining 
the rate levels. Other methods are a mixture of these two. 
Rate-of-return regulation 
Rate-of-return (ROR) regulation establishes a price that covers the firm’s expenditures 
(including operating costs and depreciation) plus a reasonable return on capital investment 
(i.e., a “fair” rate-of-return). It aims at increasing certainty relatively to the profit outcome.  
The main difficulty of this approach is the definition of a “fair” rate-of-return capable of 
attracting the adequate level of investment. There are different methods for calculating the 
ROR, which are based on returns in comparable industries, on the necessary return to 
attract investors in the past, and on returns obtained from a portfolio of diversified 
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investments. However, none of these methods guarantees that the ROR optimises 
investments in a specific industry at a particular point in time (Ogus, 2004).  
The main criticism of rate-of-return regulation is its lack of incentives. In effect, the fact 
that the firm transfers to customers all its costs restrains incentives to improve efficiency. 
Moreover, since the profit is set according to the asset base, the firm might be tempted to 
over-invest (i.e., gold-plating) and/or to intensify its costs (i.e., cost padding) (Averch and 
Johnson, 1962). Finally, there are large regulatory (administrative and information) costs 
related to monitoring capital and operating costs, and to defining the necessary investment 
needs (and, accordingly, the fair rate of return). 
Price-cap regulation (RPI-x) 
Under price-cap systems, popularised by Littlechild (1983), the price is fixed and, 
therefore, the profit margin is variable as a function of the costs. The firm has to ensure that 
a weighted average of price increases in one year does not exceed the percentage increase 
in the Retail Price Index less a variable factor x (Armstrong et al., 1994). The factor x, 
which is the core of the system, is calculated by the regulatory agency and pertains to the 
firm’s cost-efficiency potential. Originally, price-cap regulation was intended to be a 
transitional form of regulation until competition developed.  
The advantage of price-cap over rate-of-return regulation is that it has stronger incentive 
properties. Price-cap creates an incentive for the firm to become more efficient because 
lower costs of production lead to higher profits. Prices are most commonly fixed on the 
basis of the costs observed for firms operating under the same conditions (i.e., yardstick 
competition).  
Apart from cumbersome information requirements, the main criticisms to price-cap 
regulation are the real impact of its incentive properties. Some authors criticise the length 
of time between reviews, most commonly five years, as being very short in comparison 
with the lives of many assets, yet too long to predict costs with confidence. In this case, 
price-caps provide weak incentives for efficiency savings (e.g., Mayer, 2001).  
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Laffont and Tirole (1993) go a bit further by pointing out that efficiency incentives depend 
not only on the length of time between reviews but also on the percentage of the firm’s 
costs that are covered by the price-cap.  
Another critique focuses on capacity investment, a critical issue in network industries. 
Newbery (2002) argues that setting price-caps may be a good solution for transferring past 
efficiency gains to customers, yet it is not proved that they provide incentives for efficient 
and adequate capacity investment.  
These critiques led to the definition of alternative price-cap mechanisms, such as the sliding 
scale and relative price regulation methods presented below. 
Sliding scale regulation 
Sliding scale regulation (Burns et al., 1995) is a mixture of price-cap and rate-of-return 
mechanisms. The adjustment in prices depends on whether the agreed profit level is 
attained. When the agreed profit level is reached, prices are adjusted downwards 
(independently of time).  
The obvious disadvantage of this system is that it does not create incentives for cost 
efficiency. The advantage is that, in the short-run, the eventual benefits of efficiency gains 
are shared between producers and consumers. 
Relative Price Regulation (RPR) 
The criticisms of RPI-x regarding its incentive properties led Mayer (2001) to propose a 
new type of regulatory system, which combines the best features of rate-of-return 
regulation (setting the prices based on actual outcomes rather than on projected ones) with 
the incentives of price-cap.  
Mayer argues that providing incentives through price-cap is a noble objective, yet the way 
it is being implemented across the network industries is not sustainable. The main reason is 
that price-caps focus on creating aggregate incentives over time (which are dependent on 
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forecasts of future costs and demand) instead of creating relative incentives across firms 
(Mayer, 2001). The high level of uncertainty about projections calls for systematic 
regulatory interventions between reviews, consequently undermining price-cap incentives.  
RPR involves adjusting the regulatory asset base of all companies to:  
1. projected new capital expenditures,  
2. changes in the RPI, and  
3. differences between average industry rates-of-return and the cost of capital.  
Companies retain incentives to outperform their peers by retaining relative returns in excess 
of the cost of capital. RPR intensifies incentives by allowing excess returns to be retained 
by the regulated firm for longer periods of time and by mitigating the risks of regulatory 
intervention. One of the main limitations of this approach is that it cannot be applied to 
natural monopolies where, by definition, there is only one firm. 
B. Access regulation 
Access regulation instruments become particularly important when monopolistic 
infrastructures are liberalised. There are three different routes to establishing the conditions 
of market rules and competition (i.e., to liberalise):  
- competition in the market (operators compete for end users),  
- competition for the market (operators compete for obtaining exclusive rights to 
operate in specific segment(s)), and  
- comparative competition.  
Competition in the market encompasses full market opening, third-party access or a 
combination of both. Technical unbundling, i.e. the separation of the network into its 
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reserved and competitive elements, is a pre-condition to third-party access. Different firms 
can operate each of these parts of the value chain.  
Also, when it is only possible to introduce competition for the market, the definition and 
allocation of exclusive rights also becomes a key issue. Thus, regulating the access to the 
network is fundamental in a liberalisation context.  
The remainder of the section focuses on the two types of access regulation pertaining to 
competition in and for the market, namely the use of the infrastructure through third-party 
access, and the allocation of rights of supply through franchising.  
Third-party access 
In the “classic” third-party access problem, the owner of a monopoly infrastructure is 
required to allow a third-party to provide a service using the infrastructure9. One of the 
main issues related to third-party access is access pricing. The price should, on the one 
hand, offer the access provider an adequate return to capital in order to encourage 
investment in the infrastructure and, on the other, encourage its efficient use by 
third-parties.  
The principles governing access pricing are an application of natural monopoly pricing 
theories. In the event of scale or other economies, marginal cost pricing does not allow the 
firm to cover its total costs. If other sources of revenue are unavailable (e.g., tax revenues), 
then prices must be raised above marginal costs.  
In some cases, it is efficient to discriminate prices, charging for example a two-part tariff. 
An important variant of two-part pricing is capacity based pricing, where the fixed 
                                                 
9 Other types of access problems refer to cases where competing firms purchase essential inputs (e.g., the use 
of the infrastructure) from a monopolist and, in addition, the monopoly firm must purchase inputs from the 
competing firms. In this review we only consider the classic problem of one way access.  
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component determines the capacity, and the variable component depends on the purchased 
quantity (being very high for quantity purchases above that capacity limit) (OECD, 2004a).  
Two main challenges for the regulator are the substantial requirements of information 
(e.g., on the cost structure of the regulated firms), and problems of information asymmetry. 
The use of price-caps (i.e., a regulation that sets the maximum price a company can charge 
for a designated group of services, which changes and targets for improvements in 
productivity) is presented by some authors as a solution to these problems.  
Finally, it is important to mention the widely discussed efficient component pricing rule 
(ECPR), which was popularised by Baumol and Sidak (1994). ECPR states that the 
appropriate access price equals the monopolist’s opportunity cost of providing the access, 
ensuring that production or service provision is not diverted to an inefficient firm10. 
Franchising 
In terms of franchising, it is important to define the way firms are selected and the 
conditions under which they operate. There are different reasons for allocating the right of 
supply to a firm, such as the existence of a natural monopoly, potential for 
cream-skimming, and technological or resource scarcity. The franchisee normally becomes 
a monopolist in a specific market for the duration of the franchise.  
The franchise may be directly awarded by the public authority or it may be allocated 
through competitive bidding (based on public interest or pricing criteria). The degree of 
competition of the allocation process is an important variable to take into account. The 
fairness and transparency of the competitive process is essential in determining its 
consequences on allocative and productive efficiency. 
                                                 
10 For a critical view on ECPR see, for example, (Economides and White, 1995). 
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So far the discussion has been centred on the rationale for regulating and the main 
instruments available to regulators, or, on the contrary, for non-state intervention in the 
markets. Overall – and even though the debate has not yet come to a final conclusion – it is 
nevertheless obvious that both privatisation and liberalisation have, somewhat 
paradoxically, led to a greater/or to a new role for regulation in the network industries. The 
following section focuses on how economic regulation of the network industries tends to 
converge at incentive regulation. 
2.1.4 Incentive Regulation as the convergent form of Regulation  
The traditional forms of regulation have been under criticisms for the past decades, 
consequently triggering deregulatory trends. However, at least in the network industries, 
there has not been total deregulation but instead a move towards different forms of public 
intervention, the majority of them focusing on creating more incentives.  
Incentives aim at motivating different actors of the system, especially operators, to reach 
the objectives set by public authorities, with a reduction of information and administrative 
costs for both operators and authority/agency (Ogus, 2004).  
At first, in the context of privatisation, rate-of-return regulation, which aimed at regulating 
the private incumbent, was criticised due to the little attention paid to incentives. As a 
consequence, regulators now tend to implement incentive mechanisms, such as price-caps, 
for regulating private monopolies (e.g., privatisation of the network industries in England).  
In the context of liberalisation, competition is introduced in monopolist industries because 
they lack incentives for efficiency and performance. Therefore, independently from the 
type of reform implemented, incentive regulation appears to be the convergent form of 
regulation in the network industries.  
  
45
The application of incentive regulatory mechanisms may actually refer to different goals, 
which may even be contradictory. Amid the most important ones are to: 
- increase economic efficiency (i.e., minimise the costs);  
- increase (environmental and service) quality in a cost effective way; 
- stimulate (product/service and technical) innovation; and 
- stimulate efficient capacity investment. 
The most important incentive regulation instruments available to the regulator are price 
mechanisms. In terms of pricing, rate-of-return (or cost of service) and price-cap regulation 
are two polar examples of regulatory instruments regarding incentives creation. The former 
one is considered to be a low-powered incentive mechanism (the regulated firm is 
compensated for all incurred costs of production), while the later one is considered as a 
high-powered incentive mechanism (prices are adjusted according to an exogenous price 
and the regulated firm’s performance).  
When the regulated firms are given the choice between these two types of contract, 
low-cost firms prefer price-cap pricing (because they are left with some rent), while high-
cost firms have a preference for cost of the service pricing (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
Sliding scale and relative price regulation are intermediate cases in terms of incentive 
creation, which can be considered optimal in a second best sense (Joskow, 2005).  
Incentive regulation mechanisms thus relate to the regulated firm’s performance, which is 
mainly defined by cost and quality variables. Again, the regulator’s dependence on 
information about the regulated firm’s costs creates information problems for the regulator. 
Some authors propose alternative ways to reduce the regulator’s information disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the regulated firm. One is by offering the regulated firm a menu of cost contingent 
contracts, forcing them to reveal their cost type (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Another way is 
to set the price for each firm based on the costs of identical (non-competing) firms, i.e. by 
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yardstick regulation. Related to yardstick regulation it is benchmarking based on a 
hypothetical efficient firm (Vogelsang, 2002) (e.g., water and electricity regulation in 
Chile). Finally, the regulator can also accept the firm’s level of costs and focus on 
benchmarks for performance improvements based on the firm’s historical performance 
(Joskow, 2005).  
At last, it is important to make reference to the important trade-off between (operating and 
capital) costs and (short- and long-run) quality of the service. Any incentive regulation 
mechanism needs to consider the potential impact of cost reduction on quality and vice-
versa. This might imply the need to implement a package of cost- and quality-related 
incentives, which constitutes a huge challenge for regulators. 
The following section focuses on the specificities of regulating the urban water sector. It 
identifies the main types of regulation, analyses the influence of the most important features 
of reform on the regulation of the sector, and presents the objectives of regulation in a 
reform context.  
2.2. Specificities of Regulating the Urban Water Sector 
Some features distinguish the Urban Water Sector (UWS) from other network industries11. 
The most important ones are the local nature of supply and the quasi-public good 
characteristics of the water services. Together with the sector’s network and scale 
economies, sunk costs and environmental externalities, these features create significant 
regulatory challenges, which are in turn intensified by the sector’s reform.  
There are two types of problems calling for distinct regulatory functions in the UWS (Table 
3). Firstly, there are problems resulting from the monopolistic characteristics of the water 
market calling for economic regulation. Secondly, there are problems arising from public 
                                                 
11 For more details, please refer to Part I General Introduction. 
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health and environmental externalities, and information asymmetry calling for social12 and 
technical regulation. These issues are traditionally considered to be areas of state 
intervention.  
Table 3 Types of regulation in the UWS 
Types of Regulation Source of problems Aspects to be regulated 
Economic Monopolistic characteristics 
- Structure of the sector 
- Market creation/ functioning 
- Sustainability of the system 
Social 
- Consumer protection 
- Public health and safety issues 
- Water resource protection 
Technical 
Externalities 
Information asymmetry 
- System’s integrity  
 
In short, one can summarise the aspects that need to be regulated in the UWS as follows:  
1. market creation and functioning (including competition rules and tariffs),  
2. system sustainability (e.g., investments),  
3. consumer protection (e.g., quality of the service),  
4. water cycle (i.e., environmental requirements regarding the quality and scarcity of 
water resources), and  
5. system’s integrity (i.e., technical norms).  
These aspects are related to well-defined regulatory functions, which are applied at 
different levels and, in some cases, by different entities (Luís-Manso and Finger, 
forthcoming).  
                                                 
12 Social regulation comprises environmental protection (following, for example, Ogus, 2004).  
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Economic regulation refers to competition, market regulation and sustainability of the 
system. The rationale for competition regulation is grounded on the fact that the current 
process of liberalisation in the water sector is progressively leading to significant changes 
in the structure of the sector. In particular, it is leading in some cases to oligopolies and 
market concentration13, which might jeopardize the advantages of liberalisation (especially 
those for the consumers). Thus, competition regulation:  
1. defines merger and anti-trust regulations in order to avoid an excessive 
concentration in the market,  
2. sets the rules for bidding contracts, and  
3. defines benchmarking mechanisms capable of creating competitive pressures 
(where other types of competition cannot be implemented).  
Market regulation concerns specific aspects of operating in the market. Firstly, it is about 
defining tariffs taking into consideration environmental, social, and economic concerns. 
This is in fact one of the main areas of regulatory intervention in the urban water sector. 
Secondly, there is the need to foster operating efficiency in both technical (e.g., reducing 
water leakages) and economic terms (e.g., reducing costs).  
Finally, there is the need to regulate the sustainability of the system, i.e., to ensure asset 
service ability over time and the development of the infrastructures. This aspect has been 
somehow neglected in theory with classical14 utility regulatory analyses favouring a short-, 
rather than a long-term perspective (Hirschhausen et al., 2004).    
                                                 
13 The utilities remain local monopolies, yet the same firms are operating more than one utility. 
14 Classical utility regulation pertains to the regulation of the natural monopoly. Non-classical utility 
regulation refers, for example, to access regulation.  
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Competition law is most appropriately defined and enforced at national or even at global 
levels, as competition and anti-trust bodies must be sufficiently strong in order to regulate 
trans-national corporations (TNCs). As for market and system’s sustainability regulation, it 
is most appropriately defined and enforced at the national level (eventually by the sector 
regulator), yet taking into account the costs and revenues requirements of local utilities. 
Social regulation pertains to consumer and environmental protection. Accessibility to the 
service, service quality, and price affordability are three important dimensions of consumer 
protection, which are no longer automatically guaranteed in the context of reform. Service 
quality regulation refers to defining levels of service that meet consumer needs and can be 
provided at a financially sustainable and affordable cost, and monitoring that such level of 
service is actually provided (Trémolet et al., 2004).  
In the water sector, the quality aspect is particularly important, as it includes health and 
sanitation standards. But service quality in this sector also refers to issues such as the 
number of hours of service provision per day and the handling of customer complaints. 
Consumer protection regulation is most appropriately set and enforced at the national level 
(most likely by the sector regulator). 
Environmental protection refers to the regulation of the scarce resource, namely in terms of 
extraction and discharge of water resources. It comprises both quantitative and qualitative 
requirements. It also includes the promotion of the efficient use of water. The most 
appropriate level for defining and enforcing this type of regulation is the river basin, which 
is an ecologically and not a politically defined entity.  
Technical regulation aims at ensuring the integrity of the infrastructure systems. So-called 
“system’s integrity” is about interoperability. Again, technical regulation is most 
appropriately defined and enforced at the national level. 
The reforms in the UWS created new challenges for the regulation of the sector. We 
analyse in particular the consequences of the private sector participation and the 
introduction of competition. 
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2.2.1 Challenges created by the private sector participation 
Since the 1980s, in many countries the form of “regulating” the sector via ownership has 
been replaced simultaneously by new forms of operations involving the private sector15, as 
well as by new mechanisms of regulation. Pricing of the service (i.e., economic regulation) 
and service quality regulation (i.e., social regulation) become particularly important 
regulatory instruments in this context. 
There are different forms of reform involving the private sector, namely complete 
privatisation (e.g., England and Wales), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes (e.g., in 
many East Asian and Pacific countries), concessions and other delegated management 
contracts.  
A small number of large trans-national companies account for the largest share in terms of 
private sector participation in the water sector, namely Suez, Veolia, and SAUR (from 
France). However, a recent trend has been gaining importance lately with the emergence of 
local private operators (e.g., GWI, 2006). 
At first, private sector involvement was thought to be the sole solution for water problems. 
Then the failure of several experiences16 questioned this axiom and led to different routes, 
where the private provision of a service of general interest is possible and even desirable, 
yet it calls for other types of intervention in the market. The important things are whether 
the service provider has the right incentives, and how accountable it is to the general public 
(Prasad, 2006). With the private involvement in the sector, the role of the public sector does 
                                                 
15 Though private sector participation is increasing, there are many cases where both private and public 
operators co-exist at national level (whilst preserving their local monopolies). 
16 Some of the most scrutinised cases are Buenos Aires (Argentina), Cochabamba (Bolivia), and Manila 
(Philippines). 
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not vanish with reform but takes different forms. Regulatory mechanisms such as quality 
regulation and pricing are amongst the most important. 
Regulated private firms were typically subject to rate-of-return regulation (Guthrie, 2006). 
In this type of regulation, prices are set to ensure that the provider receives a specified rate-
of-return. However, rate-of-return regulation is blamed for lacking incentives and 
presenting high information costs.  
An alternative pricing method, which was firstly adopted in England and Wales at the time 
of the sector’s privatisation, focuses on incentives and refers to price-cap regulation17. 
Independently of the type of regulation, the main difficulties in setting an efficient pricing 
policy are: (1) its conflicting objectives (namely cost recovery, economic efficiency, equity 
and affordability (Kessides, 2004)), and (2) cost information asymmetry.  
Competition is a common approach to overcome information asymmetry. The creation of 
competitive pressures, such as franchise bidding and yardstick competition, is yet another 
important feature of the sector’s reform. The following section focuses on these types of 
competition, on its limits when introduced into the sector, and its consequences in terms of 
regulatory intensity. 
2.2.2 Limits to competition and intensity of regulation 
Even though the introduction of competitive forces is an important element of the network 
industries’ reform, water services are not highly contestable (due to high sunk costs, 
especially in transport and distribution). Competition in the market, and access regulatory 
                                                 
17 For more details, please refer to Section 2.1.3 on the major instruments of economic regulation. 
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regimes for that matter18, remain experimental and rare in the water sector (Wills-Johnson 
et al., 2003).  
The most feasible forms of introducing competition in the UWS remain competitive 
procurement of specific functions (short-term service contracts), and franchise bidding 
(concession, lease and other management contracts). Yet different problems, such as the 
creation of joint ventures between the private companies that control the “global” water 
markets, also limit competition for the market (Prasad, 2006).   
Yardstick competition is another way of introducing competitive pressures in the sector. In 
this case, the regulated firm competes with a “shadow” firm, whose performance levels 
correspond to: 
- the industry’s average (e.g., England & Wales where the regulator promotes 
competition by assessing, comparing and publishing information on each private 
operator’s performance), or  
- the best practice (e.g., Chile where the regulator sets prices in accordance to a model 
operator that efficiently provides WSS services under existing regulations).  
This form of regulation strongly encourages efficiency and mitigates the information 
asymmetry problem (informational rents are extracted via the comparison of cost). Its 
success depends on the degree of comparability across different systems, as well as on the 
existence of comparable firms under the jurisdiction of the regulator. In some cases, 
different companies operate in different parts of cities (e.g., Paris is divided in half, and 
Mexico City is divided into quadrants with separate companies responsible for the 
                                                 
18 Access regulatory regimes are a necessary (yet not sufficient) condition for competition in sectors 
characterised by natural monopoly elements.   
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provision of water services), one of the reasons being the availability of data for 
benchmarking their performance against each other. 
Due to the fact that there are important limits to introducing competition in the UWS, one 
cannot expect the sector to evolve into perfect competition. Therefore, the need to intervene 
in the market will persist in time (Figure 2), in order to provide a substitute for competition 
(in terms of efficiency incentives) and to meet the social welfare objectives (since water 
services are services of general interest). 
This does not mean that the substance of the regulatory interventions does not change 
though. On the contrary, regulatory interventions are expected to change towards the 
creation of more incentives, and away from command-and-control types of regulation.  
 
Figure 2 Evolution of regulation over the liberalisation process in UWS 
In the next section, we present the two most common mechanisms of governance in the 
regulation of the sector, namely regulation by contract and by a sector-specific regulatory 
agency. 
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2.2.3 Mechanisms of governance 
The most common mechanisms of governance in the economic and social regulation in the 
UWS are contract regulation and the creation of a sector-specific regulator.  
Regulation by contract 
Regulation by contract is a common regulatory system in several countries. Under this 
system, the majority of the rules and regulations are stated in the contract between the 
parties (i.e., the public authority and the firm). The supervising unit of the contract in the 
UWS is normally located at the local level. For this reason, its degree of autonomy and 
independence from policy-makers may be limited. 
The success of this approach highly depends on the specification of performance 
parameters, procedures for renegotiation, and remedies for non-performance. The potential 
for contract incompleteness, which is high in the UWS due to long-asset lives and 
underground infrastructure, is an important issue that may intensify the risk of disputes and 
renegotiation. For this reason, the existence of a clear and functioning conflict resolution 
mechanism is essential for the sustainability of the reform and the efficacy of regulation 
(e.g., Biltrán and Arellano, 2005, Ménard and Clarke, 2002). 
Regulation by contract is often preferred to the creation of regulatory agencies, because the 
costs and complexities of creating a new institution are avoided, as well as the potential 
overlap of functions with existing institutions (Trémolet et al., 2004).  
Regulatory agency 
One of the main trends in the evolution of urban water services, along with a shift towards 
market logic, is the creation of new regulatory regimes. In some cases, these new regulatory 
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systems include the establishment of regulation authorities, such as the cases in England, 
Portugal, Mozambique, Zambia, and Chile19. 
The creation of industry-specific agencies as opposed to contract regulation without a 
regulator aims at creating stability and continuity in regulatory decision-making 
(Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998a). The separation between regulation and policy-making, and 
a clear definition of the regulator’s role and responsibilities, are critical for a good 
regulatory design (Eberhard, 2006).  
The risk of the regulator’s capture and its credibility are two other important factors 
influencing the success of such a regulatory framework. Regulators need to be made 
accountable for their decisions in order to reduce the information rents created by 
information asymmetry (Bergman et al., 1998). This is especially important in contexts 
with high risks of regulatory capture.  
The scope for capture depends on several factors, such as the degree of flexibility 
(precision of rules versus regulatory discretion), the transparency of regulatory procedures 
and, as previously mentioned, the existence of adequate accountability.  
Another important aspect is the credibility of the regulatory agency, which is essential 
particularly in sectors where investments are highly specific and durable, such as in the 
UWS. 
*** 
Regulation by contract and the creation of a regulatory agency are not incompatible and 
they often co-exist, corresponding to different levels of regulatory discretion. The adequate 
level of discretion depends on the local institutional context. Both forms of regulation may 
                                                 
19 In the USA, there is already a long experience with regulating private utilities through regulatory agencies 
(named commissions). 
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also be supported by the outsourcing of regulatory functions, for example to external 
consultants or expert panels (Trémolet et al., 2004). An important common feature is that 
they both need to be subject to courts of law with effective appeal systems (Bakovic et al., 
2003), and to (re)define their regulatory objectives for the system according to the 
challenges created by reforms. 
2.2.4 Regulatory objectives20 
In the new environment created by the sector reforms, there is the need for ensuring a 
number of functions that are quite heterogeneous and that were previously assumed, in the 
majority of the cases, by the public provider. Among these functions, maintaining the 
sustainability and integrity of the infrastructure, guaranteeing a “fair” attribution of the 
scarce resources among alternative users, as well as defining and enforcing public service 
objectives, all deserve special attention.  
None of these functions could be eliminated by reforms. Therefore, new ways had to be 
found so that after reform (and ideally parallel to it), the sector would maintain its integrity 
and guarantee security for consumers. Such requirements meant that the sector had to be 
(re-)regulated in order to ensure the proper functioning of the new modes of organisation 
that intended to introduce market pressures for the benefit of both citizens and consumers. 
The specificities of the urban water sector play a major role in the definition of the key 
regulatory objectives. Even after reform, forms of monopoly power continue to be 
dominant. The monopoly position of firms, whether they are public or private, requires 
forms of monitoring from public authorities (i.e., regulation). On the one hand, the fact that 
water services are vital for all human beings and have no substitutes, make them an almost 
perfect example of a service of general interest. On the other, the characteristics of 
                                                 
20 Section 2.2.4 is based on a chapter published in (Luís-Manso et al., 2007b). 
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investments, namely the high rate of sunk costs, make the introduction of competition in 
the market highly improbable, and make ex-post regulatory interventions more necessary. 
With respect to the problem explored in this thesis, we can categorise the UWS regulatory 
objectives into objectives aiming at protecting consumers and investments (Table 4).  
Table 4 Regulatory objectives in the UWS 
Objectives 
Protect consumers 
- quality of the service 
- affordability 
- accessibility to the network 
- equity in conditions of access 
- efficiency in fixing problems 
- coherence of system with environment 
Protect investments 
- attraction of financial resources  
- secured access to financial market 
- guarantees regarding respect of property rights 
- protection against discretionary interference with management of operator 
- adequate incentives for long-term investments 
- coherence of investment plans 
- conformity with more general regulations 
- heavy (and credible) penalties when targets not met  
 
One major difficulty in defining and monitoring these objectives, and one that has been a 
repeated source of conflict almost everywhere reforms were introduced, is the tension 
between the requirements associated to:  
1. water (and sanitation) as a service of general interest, which requires that it be 
reliable, meeting quality standards, at an affordable price, and  
2. the need to protect the system’s sustainability and, in particular, long-term 
investments, which often translates in either sharp increase in prices, or 
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accepting the development of a substantial debt so that the burden is passed to 
future generations. 
In order to mitigate this tension, the promotion of efficiency is crucial in that it aims at 
providing the service at the lowest possible cost, while maintaining properly the existing 
assets, and developing adequate capacity investments in order to meet future demand.  
Finding ways to improve the efficiency of UWS is also essential in order to attract finance 
into the sector. This requires allowing investors to recover operational costs, and to earn a 
reasonable return on investments in the long run. This is not a trivial issue in the UWS, 
precisely because water (and sanitation) meets an essential need for which there is no 
substitute and because this very specific characteristic of water tends to feed ideologies that 
consider immoral or unsocial to pay high price for water (or to pay for water at all). 
2.3. Conclusions 
The literature on the regulation of the network industries has followed, and sometimes 
triggered, the sectors’ reform processes. One can identify two different such processes: 
1. privatisation and the need to intervene in order to ensure that there is no abuse of 
monopoly position, and  
2. deregulation and reliance on competition policy.  
In the urban water sector, private sector participation became an undeniable trend. Given 
that the private operators face little direct competition and have seldom used capital 
markets as source of finance, regulatory oversight remains the only mechanism to 
discipline their actions (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998a).  
As for the pressure to deregulate, in practice today this refers essentially to 
command-and-control types of intervention in the market. As a matter of fact, there has 
been a move towards different forms of intervention, with a special emphasis on 
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sector-specific and incentive regulation. There is actually a trend towards incentive 
regulation, which recognises the need to ensure that the pursuit of profit does not enter into 
conflict with social welfare.  
At the same time, we are witnessing the rise in importance of regulatory agencies as 
significant actors of the regulatory system. By relying on regulatory agencies, the question 
that comes to mind is whether we are coming back to Public Interest Theories and to the 
belief that a well-intended agency can pursue public interest.  
Our perception of reality in the majority of the network industries, and in water in 
particular, is that there are considerable differences today relative to the initial propositions 
of the Public Interest Theories. One important difference is related to the independence of 
these agencies both vis-à-vis political interferences and the industry. But probably the most 
important difference pertains to the objectives of regulation, especially the move away from 
the dichotomy between pursuing public or private interests.  
Today, the main regulatory objectives in the UWS are the protection of consumers and the 
protection of investment. These are somehow contradictory objectives, which significantly 
increase the regulatory risk in the sector. The major challenge is thus to properly balance 
the interests and powers of both consumers and investors by improving efficiency and 
increasing incentives to invest in the network that corresponds to public policy objectives.  
This chapter has shown that the regulatory objectives change along with the 
sectors’ reforms. It now becomes essential to identify and analyse in detail the risks created 
by the UWS reforms. This is the focus of the next chapter. 

  
61
Chapter 3. Reforms and Risks in the Urban Water Sector21  
The urban water sector has undergone important reforms in many countries, triggered by 
the search for efficiencies, underinvestment, and new environmental challenges. Overall, 
these reforms are creating new sources of uncertainty and vulnerability for the management 
and regulation of water utilities. They result from the emergence of new actors in the 
sector, as well as from “unbundling” of operational and regulatory functions. 
One of the main features of reform in the UWS is the transfer of rights and responsibilities 
that were traditionally integrated in the publicly-owned utilities to other actors in the broad 
water supply and sanitation system. The delegation of responsibilities to private (or public) 
operators and the outsourcing of specific tasks are two examples. This transfer of rights and 
responsibilities is called “transaction” and, according to Transaction Costs Economics, it 
can be characterised in terms of frequency, uncertainty, and specificity of investment 
required (Williamson, 1979). 
Transactions differ according to the type of rights and responsibilities that are transferred: 
- provision of specific tasks (service contracts),  
- operation and maintenance of the system (lease),  
- management and investment (concession), or  
- ownership of property rights (divestiture).  
                                                 
21 Preliminary results of Chapter 3, with a special focus on specific investment, were published in LUIS-
MANSO, P. and FINGER, M., “Risk sharing and capacity investment in the urban water sector in Europe” in 
ARAVOSSIS, K. et al. (Ed.) (2006), Environmental Economics and Investment Assessment, Southampton: 
WIT Press. 
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3.1. Types of risk in the Urban Water Sector 
In this context, risks22 are defined as any factor, event or influence that threatens the 
successful completion of a transaction in terms of time, cost or quality (adapted from EC, 
2003). After identifying an exhaustive list of the different types of risks in the sector, as 
well as their causes, we differentiate them between those that are endogenous and 
exogenous to the transaction (Figure 3).  
Transaction 
and risks
Endogeneous
Exogeneous
Construction
Demand
Business 
risks
Reform 
risks
Technical
Regulatory
Operational
Financial
Risk that contractors do not finish the project on time, 
within budget and according to specifications
Risk that customers are not able/willing to pay for the 
amount projected during tariff setting
Risk that the facilities fail to meet performance 
parameters
Risk that the operator does not have adequate cash flow 
to meeting its operating expenses
Social
Risk that the technical systems malfunction (e.g., related 
to interoperability and capacity management)
Risk that the regulator reinterprets regulations or 
creates new ones that increase costs or reduce revenues
Risk that the public service is not provided to the 
population under the specified conditions
Exchange rate
Political
Environment / 
force majeure
Risk faced by investors related to currency exchange fluctuations and 
convertibility, as well as risk related to disparity between domestic-
currency revenue and international borrowing
Risk of political interference, devaluation, expropriation, nationalisation, 
war, civil disturbances and contract breach
Risk that events beyond partners’ control interrupt operations for a 
considerable time  
Figure 3 Types of risk in the urban water sector 
                                                 
22 Risk management is an important element in framing the problem under study, even though it is not an 
objective of this dissertation to make a contribution to these theories. 
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3.1.1 Exogenous risks 
Exogenous risks are those that are not subject to any manipulation by the parties during the 
transaction’s duration. They pertain to the macroeconomic and political characteristics of 
the economy, as well as to major non-controllable events. They are: 
- Exchange rate risks faced by investors pertain to currency exchange fluctuations and 
convertibility (Bakovic et al., 2003); to disparities between domestic-currency 
revenue and international borrowing; and to credit repayment;  
- Political risks concern political interference, devaluation, expropriation, 
nationalisation, war, and civil disturbances; and  
- Force majeure risks are related to events beyond the parties’ control (e.g., natural 
disasters, riots, war) that lead to a prolonged interruption of operations. 
3.1.2 Endogenous risks 
In our perspective, endogenous risks are the most interesting to analyse because they are 
subject to manipulation by the transaction parties. Some of these risks are faced by any 
water sector operator in the execution of its functions and, as such, are named as business 
risks. These are: 
- Construction risks if contractors do not finish the project on time, within budget and 
according to the contract specifications; 
- Demand risks related to the ability and willingness to pay for the amount projected by 
the operator or the regulator while setting tariffs (Bakovic et al., 2003); 
- Operational risks if facilities fail to meet performance parameters (e.g., due to process 
and production delays or limits on capacity); and 
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- Financial risks specifically related to the operator’s capacity to raise an adequate cash 
flow to meet its operating expenses (e.g. depending on cost increases, and decline in 
demand). 
Other (endogenous) risks are only relevant when (at least part of) the rights and 
responsibilities that had been traditionally integrated under a local publicly-owned utility 
are transferred to another actor in the broader water and sanitation system. These are the 
risks created by the sector’s reforms23, which pertain to technical, regulatory, and social 
hazards. We describe them as follows. 
- Technical risks are created by the unbundling and fragmentation of the technical 
systems, which are normally required when introducing competition. Technical 
unbundling makes interoperability, interconnection, and capacity management more 
complex activities (see e.g., Newbery, 2001); 
- Regulatory risks refer to a behaviour assumption of opportunism related to the 
reinterpretation of existing regulations by the regulator, or to the creation of new ones 
that increase costs or reduce revenues for the operator (Bakovic et al., 2003). When 
compared to other network industries, strong environmental and public health 
externalities related to the provision of water services reinforce the multiplicity of 
public policy objectives in the sector (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998b) and, in the context 
of reform, exacerbate the need to regulate. Moreover, municipalities with little 
experience often become responsible for important regulatory functions (Haarmeyer 
and Mody, 1998b); and 
- Social risks refer to the possibility that the service provider: (1) raises tariffs to socially 
unacceptable levels since users are captive, and (2) carries out a selective expansion of 
activities to the most profitable segments (i.e., cream-skimming), endangering the 
                                                 
23 Some of these risks already existed, yet they become significant in the context of reforms. 
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financing of non-profitable segments. In a context of reform, the provision and 
financing of services of general interest (SGI) are no longer guaranteed by public 
ownership and management. Moreover, with the end of cross-subsidisation, price equity 
is no longer guaranteed. The revenue from a customer has to cover the costs associated 
with his supply, independently from equity considerations.  
The sector’s reform is indeed source to many risks, creating additional obstacles to 
managing and regulating the water systems. It is interesting to note that the risks created by 
the reform are also exacerbated by the specificities of the urban water sector. We now turn 
to a more detailed analysis of the reform risks by identifying the main elements at risk in 
the new context.   
3.2. Elements at risk because of the reform of the sector 
From the analysis of the risks created by the sector’s reform, one can identify four main 
elements at risk, namely system’s integrity, security of supply, equity of access, and 
affordability of prices (Table 5).  
Table 5 Categories and elements at risk because of reform 
Category of risk  Elements at risk 
System’s Integrity  
Security of Supply Specific Investment Technical 
Regulatory 
Social Equity of access 
Affordability of prices 
Universal provision of SGI 
 
Integrity of a water system is its ability to handle external and internal stresses in order for 
the physical elements of the system to work properly. It is therefore essential for the overall 
quality of the service provided. It requires a regular assessment of the infrastructure’s state 
  
66
as well as frequent decision-making about maintenance, replacement, and renewal of the 
network’s unreliable elements.  
The separation of ownership and management responsibilities as well as the delegation of 
responsibilities to third-parties during a limited period of time may render it difficult to 
assess the state of the network and may jeopardize the necessary long-term perspective on 
the requirements of the system. 
Security of supply is the water systems’ capacity to avoid service disruptions below a 
certain tolerable level (adapted from Bazillian et al., 2006). Security of supply pertains to 
both issues of quantity, quality and price. It concerns: 
- long-term physical integrity of the system,  
- availability and vulnerability of sources of water resources, and  
- institutional capacity of the sector to respond to challenges posed by a complex 
system of provision of a SGI.  
Some features of the reform, such as the delegation of management for a certain period, 
make it difficult to define and implement a long-term strategy for the sector. 
Equity of access is about the possibility every citizen benefits from water services 
provision. There are two important components of equity of access: one of them being the 
availability of infrastructure with adequate capacity and, the other being pricing (access 
price and consumption price).  
Equity of access is therefore highly related to affordability of price, which refers to the 
ability customers have to purchase the service. A more competitive environment and/or 
increased private sector participation may lead to a selective expansion of activities to the 
most profitable segments (putting an equitable access to the service at risk), or to 
unaffordable tariff levels.  
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*** 
All these four elements are interrelated (Figure 4). To start with, non-affordability of prices 
makes capital cost-recovery very difficult and, therefore, jeopardises capital investments. 
As a consequence, the system’s integrity and security of supply are at risk. The same 
applies for equity of access – it could be at risk if there is no security of supply or if the 
system’s integrity is not guaranteed.    
 
Figure 4 Elements at risk in a reform context  
The vulnerability of these four elements at risk is particularly important in the urban water 
sector. It results from the combination of several factors, namely:  
1. existence of natural monopolies in certain segments of the sector,  
2. low price elasticity of demand (for primary uses of water), and  
3. important externalities related to the provision of water services. 
We can confirm that the main concerns posed by the sector’s reform (refer to Part I), which 
are the sustainability of capital investments and universal provision of a SGI, are indeed 
important components of the identified elements at risk, and are themselves at risk in the 
new environment. 
System’s 
integrity 
Affordability of 
prices 
Security of 
Supply 
Equity of 
Access 
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3.2.1 Sustainability of Capital Investments 
The total costs of running a water system encompass operating costs and capital costs. In 
this context, capital investment is meant to cover capital costs, which are related to base 
service levels, new quality expenditures, service improvements, and balance of supply and 
demand.  
The execution and efficacy of capital investments is thus essential for the overall quality 
and integrity of the system. The output quality of such investments can be measured by 
indicators such as the performance of the system, percentage of leakages, asset conditions, 
and safety conditions. 
In the UWS, capital investments are also named specific investments because the water 
supply and sanitation infrastructures and equipment closely correspond to Williamson’s 
definition of asset specificity. A treatment plant or an underground water network cannot be 
redeployed into a different activity. 
Some features of the reform have put the sustainability of capital investment at risk. Prior 
to reform, the public monopolist was the sole responsible for these investments throughout 
the integrated value-chain and for the entire duration of the assets’ life. Disintegrating the 
network services may lead to a possible loss of economies of scope, that is a loss of the 
advantages of co-ordinating the network’s operation and expansion with the services 
provided over it (Newbery, 1999). 
Structural and functional unbundling, delegation of management for limited periods, and 
private sector participation are some features of reform influencing incentives to invest. 
Incentives to invest in the new environment also depend on the purpose of investment 
(either new or renewal) and on its main characteristics. 
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The main characteristics of investments are: 
- predictability (i.e., the ease with which the need for that type of investment can be 
forecast) (according to Alexander and Harris, 2005),  
- controllability (i.e., the extent to which the utility can control expenditure on this 
investment, both in terms of volume and unit cost) (Alexander and Harris, 2005),  
- specificity (i.e., the extent to which the invested asset can be redeployed into its next 
best application. Specificity may occur in physical assets, human assets, or be site-
created), and 
- flexibility (i.e., the degree at which the initial investment can be changed both in 
terms of quantity, timing and type of investment (according to Guthrie, 2006)). 
The more unpredictable, uncontrollable, specific and inflexible the investment is, the higher 
the risk.  
3.2.2 Universal provision of the Service of General Interest 
Urban water services are of particular importance in society and are considered to be 
essential to the general public and the economy. Due to their specificities, water services 
may not be economically viable and are services which the market would not provide to the 
desirable extent under normal circumstances. Therefore, a more competitive environment 
and/or increased private sector participation may put the universal provision of the service 
of general interest at risk (e.g., by a selective expansion of activities to the most profitable 
segments or by raising tariffs to socially unacceptable levels).  
For this reason, public authorities may impose public service obligations (PSO) on water 
providers to ensure that such services are provided under the conditions specified by public 
policies. PSO was historically provided and financed by a monopolistic public operator 
  
70
without any competitive pressures. In a reform environment, authorities face the problem of 
organising the provision and financing of PSO. 
The definition of PSO differs from case to case. For example in the European Union, there 
are great disparities in the formulation of public service obligations, ranging from the 
quality of the service supplied (e.g., in terms of continuity, reliability and pressure), to 
access to all citizens at every point of the national territory, to affordability of prices. One 
can nonetheless say that in general, PSO mainly refers to access and price conditions.  
3.3. Risk allocation per institutional arrangement 
After identifying what is at risk in the urban water sector, with a special emphasis on those 
created by the reforms, it is important to analyse how risks are shared between the parties. 
Risk allocation differs according to the institutional arrangements (Chong et al., 2006, 
Christiansen, 2006). The most common management arrangements24 in the sector are:  
- Direct Public (DiPu),  
- Delegated Public (DePu),  
- Delegated Private (DePri), and 
- Direct Private, with Independent Regulation (DiPri).  
Two additional categories are considered under delegated private management, namely 
delegation by Leasing (DMlea) or by Concession (DMcon). The main difference between 
these two categories is that under concession the responsibility for investing in the 
infrastructure is transferred to the operator, while under leasing the responsibility remains 
with the public authority.  
                                                 
24 The most common institutional arrangements in the sector are identified in the Part I General Introduction. 
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Table 6 presents the allocation of risks between the responsible and management entities, 
namely the public authority (PA) and the operator, which can be public (Opub) or private 
(Opri) for the identified institutional arrangements. The allocation of risks presented in the 
table results from the definition of each institutional arrangement. 
Table 6 Risk allocation per institutional arrangement 
Risk allocation 
DePri 
Categories of risk DiPu DePu DMlea DMcon 
DiPri 
Construction Opub PA PA O Opri 
Demand Opub PA or Opub25 O O Opri 
Operational Opub Opub O O Opri 
Financial Opub PA or Opub20 O O Opri 
Technical Opub PA or Opub20 PA O Opri 
Regulatory Opub Opub O O Opri 
En
do
ge
no
us
 
Social Opub PA or Opub20 O O Opri 
Exchange rate - - - O Opri 
Political Opub Opub O O Opri 
Ex
og
en
ou
s 
Force majeure Opub Opub all all All 
Legend: 
DiPu 
DePu 
DMlea 
DMcon 
DiPri 
Direct Public Management  
Delegated Public Management  
Delegated Management by Leasing 
Delegated Management by Concession 
Direct Private Management 
O 
Opub 
Opri 
PA 
Operator 
Public Operator 
Private Operator 
Public Authority 
 
                                                 
25 It depends on the degree of autonomy of the management entity vis-à-vis the political authority. 
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Under direct management arrangements, all the risks are taken by the operator (being it 
public or private). Under delegated management arrangements, all depends on the type (and 
degree) of rights and responsibilities that are transferred. 
Focusing on the risks created by the sector’s reform (in colour in the table), the allocation 
of technical risks depends on who the responsible entity for the provision of the service is. 
Under concessions and direct private management, technical risks are transferred from the 
public authority to the operator. 
As for regulatory risks, the allocation of these risks is by definition borne by the operator. 
This is, however, in contradiction with recommendations from risk-management theories, 
according to which the party that has more control over a given risk factor should bear this 
risk. Therefore, the public sector would be expected to carry risk classified as political and 
regulatory (Christiansen, 2006). 
Social risks are ultimately borne by the consumers if they do not have access to the service 
(or according to the defined quality standards). According to some authors (e.g., Kessides, 
2004), the State (that is, taxpayers) should bear this social commitment. In practice, 
regulation has an important impact on the social risk allocation, namely those concerning 
the financing of a minimum level of service. Thus, social risks can be (at least partly) 
transferred to the operator or even to certain categories of consumers. At this stage it is 
considered that social risks are borne by the responsible entity for service provision. 
From the risks created by the reform of the sector, both the allocation of technical and 
social risks differs significantly across institutional arrangements. This is particularly 
important in the scope of this research since we focus on specific investment (related to 
technical risks) and the provision of the service of general interest (related to social risks). 
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3.4. Conclusion 
There are several categories of risk at stake in the network industries, and in the water 
sector in particular. The sector reform creates new risks, or at least augments their 
probability and severity. In this context, reform risks are defined as any factor, event or 
influence resulting from the sector’s reform that threatens the successful implementation of 
a transaction in terms of system’s integrity, security of supply, equity of access, and 
affordability of prices. Within the scope of this thesis, we focus on capital investments (as a 
fundamental component of security of supply and system’s integrity) and on universal 
service provision (comprising both equity of access and affordability of prices).  
Individuals, businesses, and governments are willing to accept a certain risk in return for 
the perceived benefits from reform. This acceptance level depends on the information 
given on the hazard created by reform, as well as on the characteristics of the transaction(s). 
In the context of this thesis, the ultimate goal of risk management is to properly identify 
and clearly (re)allocate reform risks to the parties that are in the best position to mitigate 
them at the lowest costs. 
However, one cannot reduce reform risks in its entirety because the reform process 
inherently has its benefits and costs. In terms of benefits, the process is expected to improve 
efficiency, increase capital productivity, decrease the prices to customers, as well as 
increase the investment in new technologies. In terms of costs, they pertain to the above 
identified risks. In order to mitigate these risks, it is essential to check whether new hazards 
and transaction costs created by the reform undermine capital investment and universal 
service provision. It is therefore essential to identify and analyse the vulnerability factors of 
these two elements at risk because of reform, as presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Elements at risk because of reform: a vulnerability analysis 
The reform of the Urban Water Sector (UWS) creates new risks pertaining to the 
sustainability of capital investments and the universality of service provision. Both these 
elements at risk because of reform are very important. On the one hand, capital investments 
are essential for the sustainability of the system and the quality of the service. On the other, 
the provision of urban water services is very important for society, and it is considered to 
be essential to the general public and the economy. 
In this chapter, we draw together the issues that influence the vulnerability of these two 
elements at risk. Their identification and analysis provide essential information in terms of 
risk management. We also make a comparison across different institutional arrangements, 
in order to assess whether the hazards created by the reform affect positive or negatively 
these vulnerability factors. 
The relevant unit of analysis is the transaction, i.e. the transfer of management, investment, 
or property rights. Contractual relationships between the parties in the system (e.g., the 
responsible entity and the service provider) become particularly important because they 
govern transactions. Moreover, contracts:  
1. provide the specification of the service to be provided,  
2. define the compensation mechanisms for the service provider, and  
3. determine how risk is allocated between the parties.  
In this way, the literature on Contract Theories, more precisely Transaction-Costs and 
Incomplete-Contract Theories, is used as a tool to design the framework for carrying out 
the vulnerability analyses.   
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4.1. Literature review on Contract Theories  
The literature on Contract Theories is used as a tool to design the framework for 
identifying the main vulnerability factors of capital investment and universal provision of a 
service of general interest (SGI). We analyse two central schools of thought in the field of 
Contract theories26, namely Transaction-Costs and Incomplete-Contract Theories.  
These theories are based on different underlying assumptions and, therefore, focus on 
different dimensions of the contracts. For this reason, they can be viewed as 
complementary (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). This section surveys the literature on 
Transaction-Costs Theory (section 4.1.1) and Incomplete-Contracts Theory (section 4.1.2), 
focusing on the results on asset specificity, non-contractibility, and renegotiation. 
4.1.1 Transaction-Costs Theory 
Transaction-Costs Theory (TCT) is a branch of New Institutional Economics27. The central 
focus of TCT is the assessment of alternative modes of organisation (and the associated 
types of contracts) efficiency. This assessment is based on the comparative efficiency with 
which alternative generic forms of governance structure – namely Markets, Hybrids and 
Hierarchies – economise on transaction costs (Williamson, 1996). The criterion for 
choosing the governance structure thus becomes the minimisation of transaction costs. This 
                                                 
26 Incentive theory is another important branch in the field of Contract Theories. However, due to its 
unrealistic assumptions (i.e., perfect rationality, complete information, and reliance on perfect external 
institutions), we do not focus on this theory to build our framework. 
27 New Institutional Economics has two main bodies of literature. One focuses on the institutional 
environment (e.g., North). The other one focuses on the contractual relationship and on the different modes of 
governance (e.g., Williamson). Transaction-Costs Theory belongs to the latter one.   
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is relevant for this thesis because the reform of the sector refers to the implementation of 
alternative modes of organisation. 
TCT has its origins in the “make-or-buy” decision (Coase, 1937), yet it has been 
increasingly applied in many other contexts where contracts are present. In TCT, the basic 
unit of analysis is the transaction as organised through an implicit or explicit contract.  
Coase presented transaction-costs as referring to writing, executing, and enforcing 
contracts. Williamson (1973) expanded this definition to include new behavioural 
dimensions, namely opportunism (due to information asymmetry) and bounded rationality.  
There are two types of informational hazards: asymmetry and uncertainty of information. 
Asymmetry of information occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better 
information than the other party. It creates two different informational hazards:  
- adverse selection, which refers to a situation where contractual parties have 
asymmetrical information about their risk profiles, and 
- moral-hazard, which refers to the risk that a party to a transaction has not entered 
into the contract in good faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, 
liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate 
attempt to earn a profit before the contract settles. It is not about the selection of the 
partner but about its overall performance. 
Table 7 follows Williamson’s broader definition and correlates the most significant 
informational hazards with different types of transaction-costs before (ex-ante) and after 
(ex-post) the contractual relationship is established. 
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Table 7 Informational hazards and related transaction-costs 
Related transaction-costs Informational Hazards 
Ex-ante Ex-post 
Asymmetry of information      
- adverse selection Signalling/screening  
- moral-hazard Specification 
Monitoring/audit 
Incentive/penalty schemes  
Uncertainty of information   
- contract incompleteness 
Design/Specification 
Negotiation 
Renegotiation 
Dispute resolution 
 
Transactions (Williamson, 1979) can be defined on the basis of their: 
- frequency (F),  
- uncertainty (U), and  
- level of asset specificity (AS) involved (i.e., transaction-specific investment).  
These characteristics have an influence on transaction-costs and, therefore, on the 
efficiency of the governance structures. The three attributes determine the following 
relationship (signs show the predicted impact of a positive variation of each characteristic 
on transaction-costs) (Ménard, 2005):  
    TC = f (F-, U+, AS+) 
In the context of this thesis, we are particularly interested in analysing the results pertaining 
to asset specificity and uncertainty. Transactions that require a high level of specific 
investment create bilateral dependency. This, in turn, increases transaction hazards, as well 
as the potential for substantial increase in transaction-costs, a risk that needs to be dealt 
with. As a matter of fact, important contractual problems arise in specific investment.  
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Williamson (1985) emphasised the importance of transaction-specific investment and the 
consequent threat of hold-up, i.e., appropriation of economic rent. In a context of 
uncertainty, where contracts cannot be specified in a perfect and costless manner, 
opportunistic behaviour explains the threat of hold-up. The more specific the assets are, the 
higher the risk of hold-up28 is, and the higher the potential costs. This is even more the case 
in a market with few available competitors (Hubbard, 2001), as it is often the case in 
delegated management tenders in the UWS. Partners thus fear opportunistic behaviour 
in the presence of specific investment.  
There are different ways to mitigate this problem. Gilbert and Newbery (1994) observed 
that a repeated relationship between the parties, and in some ways long-term contracts29, 
limits incentives for opportunistic behaviour. It is necessary that the parties can credibly 
commit to not deviating from their stated policies and behaviour. This approach relies on 
informal mechanisms such as trust and cooperation to resolve any dispute that may arise.  
There are also more formal mechanisms related to up-front investments to write more 
complete contracts. One limitation is that hold-up is difficult to verify empirically, because 
all that is observed is the outcome of the behaviour and not the intent to appropriate rents 
(Jensen, 2004). As a consequence, contracts to prevent the hold-up problem may be 
unenforceable. 
Another important insight from TCT, which as said cannot be separated from the hold-up 
issue, relates to the duration of the contracts. The choice of contract duration is very 
important in the sense that it represents the balance between periodic contestability 
and adequate investment in specific assets. Theory suggests that the greater the degree of 
                                                 
28 However, it is interesting to note that switching costs may cause a hold-up even if asset specificity is low. 
29 Long-term contracts have many properties that are attributable to a repeated relationship, such as 
compensation based on past performance. 
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specificity, the longer the required term of contract will be. Several empirical studies 
support the hypothesis that in the presence of relationship-specific investments, firms are 
more likely to use long-term contracts and vertical integration (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).    
It is also important to make reference to the advantage enjoyed by the incumbent over its 
competitors due to imperfect transferability of (physical and human) capital, and imperfect 
measurability of the investment residual value (Williamson, 1976). Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) developed a model based on these assumptions. They argue that the threat of 
replacement lowers the incentives to invest, because the incumbent would not be able to 
transfer assets at a correct price. Their suggestion to overcome this problem is for the 
regulator to favour the incumbent at re-procurement. This could, for example, take the form 
of an extension of the contract, provided its performance is satisfactory. 
Surprisingly, Affuso and Newbery’s (2002) study about the British privatised rail industry 
suggests that neither horizontal consolidation nor longer franchise contracts promote 
discretionary investment. In fact, these authors argue that discretionary investment is 
stimulated by shorter rather than longer term contracts. The periodic competition for new 
contracts creates stronger incentives to investment, in an effort to create a positive image 
for the regulator and to build a first mover advantage vis-à-vis potential entrants30. It is 
important to mention that they analyse “spontaneous” investment, i.e., not deriving from 
contractual obligations. 
                                                 
30 Different results in terms of the impact of exogenously determined modes of organization on investment 
decisions in the British rail sector are presented in (Yvrande-Billon and Ménard, 2005). 
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From this body of evidence, one can infer that the most important contractual hazards 
arising in asset specificity and uncertainty are:  
- threat of opportunistic behaviour (mitigated by repeated relationships), and  
- threat of replacement (related to the degree of contestability, i.e., to issues such as 
contract duration, asset transferability, and first-mover advantage).  
The following section focuses on Incomplete-Contract Theory, specifically its results on 
non-verifiability and allocation of residual control rights. 
4.1.2 Incomplete Contract Theory 
Since the late 1980s, a new body of literature named Incomplete Contract Theory (ICT) 
extends some of the insights from TCT. Williamson (1976, 1985) and Goldberg (1976) had 
already considered limitations from incomplete contracts as a result of individual bounded 
rationality. They stress the fact that it is unlikely to anticipate every contingency at the time 
of contract design, especially in a highly uncertain context or in the presence of long 
contract duration. They also highlight the fact that frequent and competitive re-bidding of a 
concession is not realistic, especially if the contract anticipated substantial investments.  
The assumptions of Incomplete Contract Theory differ from those of Transaction-Costs 
Theory in the sense that agents are rational and have symmetric information (Brousseau 
and Glachant, 2002).  
ICT’s main concern lies on considering limitations of contracts that fail to specify all 
possible contingencies. Incompleteness may be due to unforeseen contingencies, excessive 
costs of specification of a large number of contingencies, and inability of a third-party 
(e.g., courts) to “verify”, ex-post, the real value of the variables central to the transactions 
(Hart and Moore, 1988).   
Within the scope of this thesis, the most interesting results from the Incomplete Contracts 
Theory pertain to the consequences of (1) non-verifiability, and (2) the allocation of asset 
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ownership and formal control rights, namely in terms of residual control rights. As a matter 
of fact, these two features have a fundamental role in the management of risks in the sector. 
An important application of ICT pertains to the particularities of contracting a service. 
Quality of the service can be difficult to measure and, thus, be non-verifiable (and, 
therefore, non-contractible). Uncertainty about demand is another particularity of 
contracting a service. For example, maintenance contracts in the sector may define that the 
service provider has to maintain the network and fix all faults during a certain period of 
time. The exact number of maintenance activities depends on uncertain factors, such as the 
weather conditions, or the state of the water pipes.  
These two factors together create important contractual hazards. They are especially 
important for the provision of services of public interest (e.g., services that can cause 
serious environmental and public health externalities), where in general the service provider 
must agree to meet any level of demand (Jensen, 2004), and the authority must be able to 
prevent quality shading effects (which might be difficult if some features of the service are 
non-verifiable). 
Another important result from ICT relates to contract incompleteness and renegotiation. 
Since complete contracts cannot be written, contractual parties cannot prevent themselves 
from renegotiating the terms if it is mutually beneficial to do so (Hart and Moore, 1988).  
Even though renegotiation may improve efficiency ex-post, it also reduces ex-ante 
efficiency incentives (if only one party has to invest ex-ante, and the control rights are 
shared between both parties). If one party’s incentive to make a relationship-specific 
investment is more important than that by the other party, it should own the asset (i.e., have 
the control rights over the ex-post decisions that are non-contractible ex-ante). It can also 
happen that one party hides (or slows down the revelation of) information about anticipated 
efficiency gains in order to benefit more from renegotiation (e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
From these, one can infer that the party whose investment incentive is relatively more 
important should hold the control rights.  
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Thus far, we have focused on contractual hazards, particularly on literature related to asset 
specificity, opportunistic behaviour, and contract incompleteness. In the following section, 
we present two main types of contracts and analyse their most important trade-offs in terms 
of incentives to perform and risk-sharing. 
4.2. Contract design 
In the previous section, Contract Theories were used to identify the main contractual 
hazards arising in the event of information asymmetry, uncertainty, and non-verifiability of 
information. The types and potential impact of contractual hazards depend on the 
specificities of the sector, the characteristics of the transaction, and the characteristics of the 
environment in which the transaction takes place. Contract design (i.e., the type of 
contract) is a major factor in managing the risks created by these hazards, because it defines 
different risk-allocation patterns. 
Designing contracts means to balance the trade-off between incentives and risks. The 
operator’s incentives depend on how residual claimants are shared. When there is no 
residual claimant, there is less incentive to reduce the costs or to improve quality. 
Increasing the operator’s residual claimant means to make its gains dependent on 
performance, which consequently, corresponds to increasing its risks. As a consequence, 
the risk premium demanded by the operator to ensure its participation is also higher. 
Different types of contract correspond to different risk-incentive trade-offs. There are two 
main types of contracts: fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts31. In practice, there 
are several intermediate cases, where the responsible entity agrees to pay only a fraction of 
all the costs to the operator. Thus, the operator is guaranteed a certain level of payment but 
it also bears some uncertainty. We concentrate the analysis on the two extreme cases.  
                                                 
31 In this section, for simplicity reasons, we consider that the contract is signed between the responsible entity 
for service provision and the operator. 
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4.2.1 Fixed-price contract 
In the fixed-price contract, price is defined ex-ante. The operator bears the risk of cost 
uncertainty (there are no reimbursements of cost overruns), charging the responsible entity 
a premium for bearing this risk. This type of contract presents high-powered incentives for 
productive efficiency. As a matter of fact, the operator captures the difference between the 
pre-defined (or bid) price and the cost incurred; thus the operator is rewarded for any cost-
reducing effort it makes (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  
The opposite occurs in terms of incentives concerning quality; that is, the operator can 
increase profit by reducing quality (i.e., quality shading effects), especially where quality 
characteristics are not contractible and where the operator has to allocate efforts between 
different tasks (Hart et al., 1997, and Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).  
Finally, renegotiation costs may be high because the operator will seek to be reimbursed for 
any contract variation. Therefore, the responsible entity has high incentives to invest in 
specifying the contract ex-ante in order to avoid renegotiations (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). 
4.2.2 Cost-plus contract 
In the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, the responsible entity covers the operator’s actual costs 
and pays an additional fixed fee. The responsible entity bears the risk of cost uncertainty. 
For this reason, low costs of renegotiation are expected (the responsible entity reimburses 
all costs).  
This type of contract presents low-powered incentives for productive efficiency (the 
responsible entity fully ensures the operator against cost uncertainty). It is thus susceptible 
to moral-hazard problems. However, cost-plus contracts are free from quality-shading 
effects. In fact, the opposite may occur, i.e. “gold-plating” (where the operator produces the 
highest quality possible because it is reimbursed for all the efforts). For this reason, these 
contracts are often used for cases where quality is important; or when services are difficult 
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to define and there is a high probability of costly contract renegotiation (Bajari and Tadelis, 
2001).  
4.2.3 Comparison 
In Table 8, we summarise the main features of these two types of contract, namely in terms 
of incentives and risk-sharing regimes.  
Table 8 Main features from fixed-price and cost-plus contracts 
Types of contracts  
Fixed-price Cost-plus-fixed-fee 
Main characteristic Price defined ex-ante Operator’s actual costs covered  
Incentive for productive 
efficiency High-powered Low-powered 
Incentive for quality Low-powered High-powered 
Risk sharing in terms of cost 
uncertainty Operator bears the risk Responsible entity bears the risk 
Potential problems 
Moral Hazard (quality-shading) 
High renegotiation costs 
Moral-hazard (productive efficiency) 
Gold-platting 
 
However, as can be seen from the summarising table, there are other trade-offs beside the 
incentive-risk one to consider when choosing the type of contracts. On the one hand, the 
public authority should also consider the trade-off between moral-hazard and risk effects.  
In highly uncertain environments, the risk-premium demanded by the operator to bear the 
cost-related risk is high and, in some cases, may outweigh the potential additional costs 
created by moral-hazard associated with insuring the operator. In these cases, cost-plus is 
more efficient than fixed-fee contracts. 
On the other hand, the trade-off between incentives and transaction costs should also be 
considered (e.g., Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). The more complete the contract is (i.e. the 
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specification of the service to be provided), the less likely costly ex-post renegotiations are 
needed. However, more specifications impose higher ex-ante costs on the responsible 
entity. Highly complex tasks are difficult to specify, and have a high probability of 
requiring contract renegotiation. Cost-plus contracts are, therefore, more efficient in these 
cases. A fixed-price contract is not adequate when the service provided is complex because 
the benefits created by high-powered performance incentives could be dissipated by costly 
renegotiations. 
In conclusion, contract design defines different risk sharing patterns corresponding to 
different levels of incentive creation, potential for moral-hazard, and degrees of transaction 
costs. In this way, contract design influences the outcome of the transaction. 
Based on the identification of the main contractual hazards, and how these are related to 
risk-sharing in different types of contracts, we present in the following section a 
vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk because of reform.  
4.3. Vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk 
The previous two sections introduced the framework that provides the background to the 
vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk because of reform, namely capital 
investment and universal provision of the SGI in the urban water sector. The vulnerability 
factors are indeed highly related to the identified contractual hazards, and their impact in 
certain institutional arrangements cannot be analysed independently from contract design. 
The identification of the main vulnerability factors, as well as the analysis of their impact in 
each institutional arrangement is made separately for each element at risk.  
4.3.1 Capital investments 
Capital investments in the urban water sector are highly specific (i.e., a high proportion of 
the costs is sunk), capital-intensive, and correspond to long-lived assets. We use the term 
specific investment because the water supply and sanitation infrastructures correspond to 
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the Williamson’s definition of asset specificity, which is the relative lack of transferability 
of assets intended for use in a given transaction, to other uses.  
The combination of asset specificity and long durability is one of the most important 
vulnerability factors of capital investment in the UWS. The long-term durability of assets 
increases the vulnerability created by asset specificity. Moreover, it also increases 
specification costs, consequently augmenting transaction costs related to contract design 
and enforcement. 
One major implication of asset specificity and long durability is the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour (in a context of asymmetry of information) both by the operator 
and the public authorities.  
Long amortisation periods enable the water company to maintain low tariff levels and to 
operate for years without recovering its fixed costs (Noll et al., 2000). In a context where 
the management is delegated (to a party whose private goals will differ from the public 
ones) for a limited period of time, long amortisation periods may trigger opportunistic 
behaviour by the operator. It may under-invest in the infrastructure for a long time before 
the consequences are visible. This is exacerbated if the delegated contract duration is 
shorter than the life of the asset. The limit is the moment when the operator begins to 
under-invest in maintenance and expansion of the network (Shirley et al., 2000).  
In the case of opportunistic behaviour by the public authority, long-lived assets expose 
investors to the risk of hold-up. That is, authorities may be tempted to change the rules of 
the game during the executing of the contract (e.g., in response to popular pressures), 
knowing that (private) investors cannot withdraw easily from specific investments, which 
are characterised by capital intensity, durability, and sunk costs (e.g., Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003). 
Such attitude by the public authorities makes future negotiations to renew the investment 
highly unlikely.  
Guthrie (2006) suggests that only the possibility of opportunism (e.g., unanticipated costs 
disallowances) affects investment decisions, even when this possibility is not realised. The 
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threat of opportunistic behaviour by the public authorities may also have positive effects. 
Firms that anticipate the possibility of cost disallowances will show greater caution when 
selecting projects (i.e., firms will only choose projects deemed as “used-and-useful”). 
High asset specificity and long-term durability also influence the third factor of 
vulnerability of capital investment, which pertains to financial constraints. These are, in 
fact, one of the main factors of change triggering the sector’s reform. Financial scarcity 
may have different sources, such as the high fragmentation of the sector’s structure, the 
constraints of public finance, and the underdevelopment of capital markets.  
Firstly, the fragmented structure of the sector is explained by the local character of water 
natural monopolies, meaning that there are many small size management entities (in 
contrast to other network industries where there is one national incumbent).  
Secondly, we consider the crisis in public financing. In the EU, public finance decisions 
(taxes and spending) are now closely linked with the Maastricht criteria. Together with 
increasingly stringent environmental standards, these are pressing the traditional way of 
financing the UWS through the public budget.  
And thirdly, the underdevelopment of capital markets (Haarmeyer and Mody, 1998b) is 
also an important source of vulnerability, especially in developing countries. In many 
countries, capital markets are not adequately developed to source long-term domestic 
funds, and thus whatever debt can be raised is usually in foreign exchange and carries 
significant exchange rate risks (Baietti and Raymond, 2005). 
Finally, another important factor of investment vulnerability is the uncertainty related to 
the real conditions of the network due to underground assets. The high degree of 
uncertainty about the network renders the valuation of assets more difficult (Haarmeyer and 
Mody, 1998b). This has two consequences: on the one hand, it is harder to elaborate 
investment plans; on the other, asymmetry and incompleteness of information lead to 
imperfect asset measurability and transferability at the end of the contract.  
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Uncertainty over the real conditions of the network is particularly important because it: 
- increases the writing, renegotiation, and (re-)tendering costs,  
- reduces incentives to invest, and  
- gives the incumbent a first-mover advantage vis-à-vis potential new entrants. 
The identified factors of investment vulnerability are affected by the features of reform. 
Asset specificity and durability, as well as uncertainty over the real conditions of the 
network, do actually increase the vulnerability of investment in a context of reform. As for 
the fragmentation of the sector’s structure and the constraints of local funding, they may be 
mitigated by particular reform features, such as regionalisation and the mobilisation of 
(private) capital into the sector. Finally, the threat of hold-up is only significant when the 
responsibility for investing in the infrastructure is transferred to an operator.  
We now make a vulnerability analysis across institutional arrangements in order to assess 
whether the different features of reform affect positive or negatively the vulnerability 
factors. 
Comparison across different institutional arrangements 
An essential objective in risk management is to identify and clearly allocate the risks to the 
parties that are in the best position to mitigate them. In the current section, we compare the 
factors affecting the vulnerability of capital investment, and identify how these risks are 
shared between the actors in each institutional arrangement.  
In Table 9, the positive and negative signs correspond to the influence of each factor on the 
vulnerability of investment. Factors intensify (+) or not (-) the investment’s vulnerability. 
The identification of the risk-bearer, i.e., the responsible actors for investment, results from 
the institutional arrangements’ definition, and not from the vulnerability factors. 
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Table 9 Vulnerability factors of capital  investments 
 Institutional Arrangements 
DePri 
Factors of vulnerability DiPu DePu DMlea DMcon 
DiPri  
Asset specificity & durability - - - + - 
Opportunistic behaviour      
  - by operator - - - + - 
 - by public authority - ? - + + 
Financial constraints + ? - - - 
Asset valuation - - - + + 
 Opub PA or Opub32 PA O Opri 
 Risk bearer 
Legend: 
DiPu 
DePu 
DMlea 
DMcon 
DiPri 
Direct Public Management  
Delegated Public Management  
Delegated Management by Leasing 
Delegated Management by Concession 
Direct Private Management 
O 
Opub 
Opri 
PA 
Operator 
Public Operator 
Private Operator 
Public Authority 
 
Compared to other institutional arrangements, the main factors affecting the vulnerability of 
specific investment under Direct Public Management are the constraints of public finance. 
Specific investments are capital intensive, long-term, and represent sunk costs, which 
municipalities facing budgetary constraints find difficult to cover.  
The fragmentation of the sector’s structure still intensifies the vulnerability of investment, 
especially when financial resources are scarce. In some cases, the fragmentation of the 
sector’s structure is being attenuated by a trend towards the concentration of local systems 
under the same management structure.  
                                                 
32 It depends on the degree of autonomy and responsibility delegated to the public operator. 
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In selected countries, the financing factor has been attenuated by Cohesion Funds (in 
Europe) or development aid (in developing countries). The responsible entity for capital 
investments is the public operator. 
The analysis regarding Delegated Public Management highly depends on the public 
operator’s degree of autonomy, and the types of functions that are delegated. If the public 
operator is completely autonomous, yet the responsibility for investment remains with the 
public authority, then the analysis is very similar to Delegated Management by Leasing.  
In the event that the responsibility for investment is transferred to the public operator, it 
may face the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the public authority, such as in the case of 
the private operator under concession. However, asset durability and asset valuation are not 
so much a problem under Delegated Public Management because, in the majority of the 
cases, the responsibility for investment is delegated for a long period of time, and the threat 
of operator’s replacement is relatively low. 
The analysis of Delegated Management by Leasing is similar to Direct Public Management 
in the sense that the responsibility for capital investments remains with the (local) public 
authority. One difference may lie in the lower importance (i.e., weaker vulnerability) of the 
financial constraint factor due to efficiency gains at the operational level, obtained by a 
greater autonomy and transparency of the operator. 
As for Delegated Management by Concession, there is a delegation of responsibility to 
invest to the operator (which can be private or public) for a certain period of time. This 
raises the vulnerability of capital investment in different ways. Due to asset specificity and 
durability, contract specification costs are higher than in institutional arrangements where 
there is no transfer of such responsibility (i.e., for direct management and leasing). The 
same rationale applies to transaction costs related to contract renegotiation and 
(re-)tendering, which are by definition negligible when there is no contract to delegate 
investment’s responsibility.  
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There is the threat of opportunistic behaviour by the operator, which might under- or over-
invest depending on the contractual incentive schemes. Yet, there is also the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour by the public authorities, exposing the operator to the hold-up risk, 
which increases the vulnerability of capital investments.  
As for financial constraints, the analysis is not conclusive. Some authors consider that the 
private sector is able to mobilise more capital, and in a faster and cheaper way than small 
local public entities do. This is due, on the one hand, to the crisis of the public finances and, 
on the other, to restructuring measures that in many cases come with the delegation by 
concessions (e.g., full cost recovery). 
The assessment of specific investment’s vulnerability in the Direct Private Management 
case highly depends on the efficacy and independence of the regulator. Although there is no 
need to write a contract, regulatory functions call for some type of specification and 
valuation of assets.  
In terms of opportunistic behaviour, the risk to the operator are mainly related to regulation, 
namely the definition of a lower than expected regulatory asset base (and, consequently, on 
lower cost allowances). The threat of opportunistic behaviour by the operator is relatively 
low, as long as the regulator allows for full-cost recovery of operational and capital costs. 
The responsible entity for capital investment is the private operator. 
After having analysed the vulnerability factors of capital investments, the following section 
focuses on another element at risk, which is the universal service provision. 
4.3.2 Universal provision of the Service of General Interest 
The vulnerability of the provision of the service of general interest is also affected by the 
reform of the UWS. In the present section, we analyse its main vulnerability factors. Given 
that operational performance pertains to the level and quality of the service provided 
(e.g., average hours of service, population served, average pressure in the distribution 
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system, water quality), contract operational performance can be used as a proxy to 
provision of SGI.  
One factor of vulnerability pertains to the nature of the good. As a matter of fact, the 
urban water services are considered a quasi-public good because, politically, access to the 
service cannot be denied (i.e., non-excludability of the service). Also, the quality of the 
service is of utmost importance. The problem is that operational performance (i.e., service 
quality) may be difficult to predict ex-ante. Even though there are very precise performance 
indicators in the urban water sector, these are not easily contractible due to high 
uncertainties related, for example, to the weather and the quality of underground assets. 
Therefore, certain attributes of operational performance can be non-contractible making the 
level of public service provision difficult to guarantee. This is particularly relevant in the 
event of delegated management and the consequent writing of a contract.   
Another factor of vulnerability is the threat of opportunistic behaviour by the operator. 
It can take two forms, namely “cherry-picking” and socially high tariffs. Firstly, the fact 
that some segments of the sector are not profitable (at a regulated price) may lead the 
operator to “cherry-pick” the most lucrative segments of the market, putting the provision 
of the public service at risk. This is especially the case when the competitive pressure rises, 
as well as in the event of private sector participation.  
Secondly, the operator might try to increase prices to socially unacceptable levels 
(according to the political authority) because users are captive. On the one hand, captivity is 
justified by the nature of the good (i.e., it is an essential good) and, on the other, by the 
non-availability of substitutes (at least for its primary uses).  
Finally, one needs to consider financial constraints as another vulnerability factor for 
public service provision. One aspect relates to municipal financial constraints (already 
mentioned as a source of capital investment’s vulnerability), which are particularly 
important when the municipality is the operator.  
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A second aspect is the new wave of policy reforms pushing towards full-cost recovery, thus 
making cross-subsidising a non-viable solution of finance in the new environment. 
However, the implementation of full-cost recovery may be restrained by regulated prices 
(in order to ensure price affordability), consequently putting at risk the provision of public 
services.  This is relevant in the event of private sector participation and delegated 
management, but also for autonomous public operators (who are forced away from 
cross-subsidies and towards increased transparency of costs). At last, more stringent 
(environmental and quality) standards also increase costs, pushing prices up. 
In sum, the identified factors of universal service provision’s vulnerability are intensified 
by the reform. The threat of opportunistic behaviour by the operator and the nature of the 
service are particularly important when there is the need to write down and enforce a 
delegation contract, as well as in the event of private sector participation. Financial 
constraints are intensified in all reform scenarios (the combination of regulated prices, 
full-cost recovery, and attack on cross-subsidisation, which used to be an important source 
of finance, may be difficult to manage and implement). In the following section, we 
compare these vulnerability factors across alternative institutional arrangements. 
Comparison across different institutional arrangements 
Parallel to the analysis made for capital investment, this section compares the factors 
affecting the vulnerability of the provision of the SGI, and identifies the actors who bear the 
responsibility for providing a universal public service across alternative institutional 
arrangements (Table 10). In this section, the division between lease and concession 
contracts is not considered because it refers to different risk-sharing outcomes in terms of 
capital investment, and not public service provision. Again, the identification of the risk 
bearer for universal service provision results from the institutional arrangements’ 
definition, and it is independent from the analysis of the vulnerability factors. 
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Table 10 Vulnerability factors of universal  service provision 
 Institutional Arrangements 
Factors of vulnerability DiPu DePu DePri DiPri 
Nature of the service - - + + 
Opportunistic behaviour     
- cherry picking - - + + 
-high tariffs - - + + 
Financial constraints + + ? ? 
 Opub Opub depends Opri 
 Risk bearer 
Legend: 
DiPu 
DePu 
DePri 
DiPri 
Direct Public Management  
Delegated Public Management  
Delegated Private Management 
Direct Private Management 
Opub 
Opri 
 
Public Operator 
Private Operator 
 
 
Compared to other institutional arrangements, the main factors affecting the vulnerability of 
universal service provision under Direct Public Management are financial constraints. 
These are due to municipal budgetary constraints, and the pressure to end cross-subsidies. 
Traditionally, cross-subsidies have been an essential source of public service finance. There 
are several types of cross-subsidisation:  
- high-income customers subsidises low-income ones,  
- urban customers subsidise rural ones, and  
- energy (or other network industry) subsidises the water business.  
The latter type becomes unavailable for finance as other network industries are liberalised. 
As for the former two types, they become unavailable because environmental and allocative 
concerns are increasingly influencing policies in the sector, and pushing towards full-cost 
recovery. The responsible entity for the public service provision in this institutional 
arrangement is the public operator. 
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The analysis regarding Delegated Public Management is similar to the previous one, in the 
sense that the public operator remains the responsible entity for the public service 
provision. One difference lies in the fact that the pressure towards the end of 
cross-subsidisation is even stronger than under direct public management, due to a greater 
autonomy and transparency of the operator. The same applies for institutional arrangements 
with private sector participation. In these cases, the main issue is the definition of the 
regulated price. 
It seems that the main issue to consider when analysing the universal service provision 
vulnerability is the ownership of the operator. One cannot expect that a private operator 
acts as a public one. A private operator won’t enter non-profitable segments and won’t 
provide a public service without a profit, unless it is externally incentivised to do so 
(meaning if it is compensated for its loss). This can be done in two ways:  
Firstly, under Delegated Private Management, incentives can be created in the contract 
between the responsible authority and the operator. Everything depends on the type of 
contract.  
- In a fixed-price contract, the operator bears the risk of revenue and cost uncertainty 
(pertaining to public service provision). Precaution needs to be taken because there 
is the threat of opportunistic behaviour by the operator, which may be prone to 
reduce quality in order to increase profits.  
- In a cost-plus contract, the public authority bears the risk related to the provision 
and finance of the public service. Performance-based contracts may be a good 
solution if targets are easily enforceable.  
Secondly, under Direct Private Management, incentives can be created by the regulator. 
Again (as for capital investments) the assessment of the service provision vulnerability 
highly depends on the efficacy and independence of the regulatory agency.  
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4.4. Conclusions 
Transaction-Costs and Incomplete Contract Theories give important insights on the factors 
that influence capital investment and the provision of a service of general interest. 
Incentives, which have an influence on the outcomes of transactions, are correlated with the 
way risks and transaction costs are shared between the parties.  
These theories also suggest that the allocation of reform risks between the parties depends 
upon the characteristics of the transaction, the costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing 
the contract, and the threat of opportunistic behaviour from the parties to the contractual 
relationship. 
The vulnerability factors affect capital investment in different ways and degrees, 
depending upon the institutional arrangement. All other things being equal, delegation 
management by concessions is the most vulnerable arrangement in terms of capital 
investment. This is because delegation for a limited period of time intensifies the 
investment vulnerability due to the specific characteristics of the water assets. It also 
exposes partners to opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, the main risk bearer is the 
concessionaire, who is not the owner of the assets and whose responsibilities are limited in 
time. This leads to the next conclusion. 
In principle, a specific-investment related risk is better taken by the operator because it has 
access to better information about the system and the real conditions of the network. 
Moreover, it is in the operator’s best interest to have an efficient system to run the service. 
However, the incentive to invest in specific assets is weakened if the asset is not owned by 
the operator (i.e., if control rights do not coincide with property rights), as well as by 
limited delegation periods. Also, the private incentive to invest may not exactly correspond 
to public goals. In the event that the operator is not given adequate conditions to invest 
(e.g., in terms of return on capital or adequate institutional environment), the onus of risk 
bearing should be taken away from the operator, for example through the creation of an 
infrastructure-related investment pool. 
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As for the universal provision of a service of general interest, its vulnerability analysis is 
particularly important in a context of reform because water services may not be 
economically viable, and are services which the market under normal circumstances would 
not provide to the desirable extent.  
Private sector participation and the end of cross-subsidisation appear to be the main issues 
affecting the vulnerability of the public service provision. On the one hand, one cannot 
expect that a private operator is willing to provide a public service without a profit. When 
prices are regulated, private operators will have an incentive to increase efficiency only if 
they can capture some of the related gains. On the other hand, the pressure to end 
cross-subsidisation increases the vulnerability of public service provision by constraining 
the financial options of operators.  
The identification of the vulnerability factors for these two elements at risk because of 
reform is an essential step in order to understand more fully which partners are in the best 
position to bear reform risks in the different institutional arrangements.  
In Part III, we present the empirical analysis, which focuses on risk-sharing patterns in 
various institutional arrangements, as well as the importance of the vulnerability factors in 
each arrangement. We also explore whether operators’ strategies are aligned with the 
presented evidence. These are necessary steps before proposing in Part IV institutional 
solutions that tackle the problems highlighted by each arrangement. The goal is to minimise 
the vulnerability factors and, consequently, enhance incentives to invest in specific assets, 
which meets public policy objectives set for the sector. 
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PART III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The reform of the urban water sector (UWS) challenges the traditional risk patterns of the 
industry and calls for new approaches to risk management. New categories of risk are 
created by the introduction of competitive pressures, the participation of the private sector, 
the unbundling of functions, as well as the greater autonomy of management entities.  
The most important elements at risk resulting from the sector’s reform are capital 
investments and universal provision of the service of general interest (SGI). Their 
vulnerability is particularly important in the UWS, due to a combination of factors, such as 
natural monopolies, sunk costs, low price elasticity of demand (for primary uses of water), 
and strong environmental and public health externalities related to service provision. 
In Part III, we aim at identifying empirically (1) the risk-sharing patterns presented in the 
theoretical analysis (that correspond to different institutional arrangement), and (2) the 
importance of the vulnerability factors of the main elements at risk because of reform in 
each arrangement. 
This empirical analysis is broken down into three chapters. The first one (Chapter 5) 
comprises a questionnaire survey targeting a large number of management entities 
worldwide. The questionnaire (see Annex 1) is structured into five topics based on the 
contents of the preceding chapters of the thesis, namely: 
1. identification of the institutional arrangements,  
2. characterisation of contracts and contracting relations,  
3. identification of risk-sharing patterns,  
4. identification of the funding sources and factors of vulnerability of capital 
investment, and 
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5. identification of funding sources and factors of vulnerability of universal 
provision of the SGI. 
In the second chapter of Part III (Chapter 6), we analyse in more detail a set of case-studies 
illustrating different institutional arrangements in four countries. It involved interviews 
with key actors in each case, such as regulators and senior managers. Case-studies follow 
the same structure of the questionnaire analysed in the previous chapter.  
Finally, in the third chapter of Part III (Chapter 7), we focus on operators’ strategies. The 
results presented in this chapter were developed by the author in the context of the 
Euromarket project33. The analysis is based on ten case-studies, which were prepared 
together with project partners34. The relevant references are made in the boxes presenting 
the case-studies. It is important to underline that the case-studies in this chapter, which 
served as basis for producing the results on operators’ strategies, are not the same ones as 
those presented in Chapter 6. The main objective is to verify whether operators’ strategies 
are aligned with the trends and evidence collected in the first two chapters of this empirical 
analysis. 
                                                 
33 The author played a leading role in the coordination and research activities of this 3-year European project 
on the Liberalisation of the Water Sector. Her main tasks and responsibilities were: reports and articles 
co-authoring; final book co-edition; biannual newsletter co-edition; validation of final reports’ coherence; 
management of relationships with stakeholders; management of final deliverables; planning and organisation 
of 10 workshops; organisation of the final conference. 
34 The author thanks project partners from EPFL, TU Delft and University of Zaragoza for their contribution 
in the development of the case-studies. The results of this work were published in (Luís-Manso et al., 2007a). 
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Chapter 5. Questionnaire: Risk-Sharing and Vulnerability Analysis 
The analysis made in this chapter is based upon a questionnaire structured according to the 
results developed in Part I and II of the thesis (Box 4). The objective is to identify trends in 
terms of risk-sharing patterns and the main elements at risk because of reform (i.e., capacity 
investment and universal provision of the service of general interest).  
Box 4 Structure of the questionnaire 
 Main topics in the questionnaire     Builds on
1 Institutional arrangement      Chapter 1 
2 Contracts and contractual relations     Chapter 1 
3 Ownership of infrastructure     Chapter 1 
4 Public subsidies       Chapter 4 
5 Funding sources and vulnerability factors of capital investment Chapter 4 
6 Funding sources of operating costs     Chapter 4 
7 Vulnerability factors of service provision to low-income customers Chapter 4 
8 Patterns of risk-sharing      Chapter 3 
 
In April 2007, the questionnaire was sent out to 250 operators worldwide (Figure 5), more 
precisely to selected individuals, in the majority of cases, members of the organisations’ 
executive board. The database of contacts was built through an extensive search on the 
internet, in the participants’ lists of conferences, and in water-specific journals. It was 
translated into four languages, namely English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Before 
sending out the questionnaire to all the contacts in the database, five selected operators 
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agreed to answer a preliminary version in order to test the coherence and clarity of the 
questions. 
Europe
62%
Africa
11%
America
14%
Asia
8%
Australia
5%
 
Figure 5 Geographical location of the recipients 
Twelve percent of the total number of questionnaires were returned and considered as valid 
responses. The following figures illustrate the heterogeneity of responses in terms of the 
operators’ geographical location across continents and the types of institutional 
arrangements. In Figure 6, one can see that the majority of the responses are from European 
countries (67%), followed by African and American countries (17 and 10%, respectively). 
Asia and Australia are the less represented continents with 3% of respondents each. 
Europe
67%
Africa
17%
 America
10%
Australia
3%
Asia
3%
 
Figure 6 Geographical distribution of respondents 
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Management 
Contract
3%
Privatisation
14%
Delegated Public 
Management
24%
Lease
14%
Direct Public 
Management
7%
Concession
38%
 
Figure 7 Institutional arrangements of respondents 
As for the institutional arrangements, Figure 7 shows that about 20% of the respondents are 
direct management arrangements (public and private), and 80% pertain to delegated 
management arrangements (public and private). Concessions account for the larger number 
of responses for a single institutional arrangement (about 38% of the total responses), 
followed by delegated public management.  
In the subsequent sections, the main results are presented following the structure of the 
questionnaire. Many respondents asked for anonymity because they considered the topic to 
be very sensitive. This request is, of course, respected throughout the research. 
5.1. Evidence in terms of risk-sharing 
One objective of the questionnaire is to verify the results presented in Chapter 3 related to 
the main types of risks in the UWS, as well as how they are shared between the different 
actors across institutional arrangements. 
Significant evidence is that, in many situations, either it is not clear-cut who the 
responsible risk-bearer is, or the risk is taken by several actors. In the interviews, we were 
direct 
delegated 
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able to confirm that when one type of risk is shared between several actors, it is often 
difficult to define the extent of each actor’s responsibilities35.  
A significant trend identified by the questionnaire is that in the cases where management is 
delegated - i.e., delegated public management, lease and concession arrangements - the 
majority of the risks are shared between the operator and the entity that delegates this 
responsibility. This is especially the case when there are contracts ruling the transaction36. 
About 50% of the respondents identify consumers/customers as actors sharing some risks. 
This is very marked in all English and African cases, although for different reasons 
highlighted in the interviews with local respondents. These are: (1) additional costs are 
transferred to final prices (in England), and (2) the quality of the service including access 
worsens (in Africa).  
A more detailed analysis of specific types of risk also enables the identification of some 
trends. There seems to be more clarity about risk-sharing in the case of business risks than 
in both reform and exogenous risks (according to the classification presented in Chapter 3 
of the thesis). In the former case, about 65% of the total respondents identify very clearly 
only one actor as being responsible for business risks, which (as expected) is normally the 
operator. 
Finally, it is important to mention that insurance is very seldom mentioned. In the few 
cases it is mentioned, insurance pertains to exogenous risks (mainly political and 
environmental). The most common cases are the provision of financial protection against 
                                                 
35 This can be due to an incomplete definition of responsibilities or to insufficient knowledge of contractual 
clauses by the interviewees. 
36 There are cases of delegated public management where there is no contract, for example when local public 
authorities delegate the responsibility for managing the water systems to a municipal company or an 
autonomous municipal service for an unlimited period of time. 
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the loss of, or damage to, real and personal property caused by such perils as fire, theft, 
explosion, vandalism, and malicious mischief, as well as short-term pollution event 
coverage. 
5.2. Evidence in terms of capital investment 
The importance of capital investments is paramount for the sustainable operations in urban 
water systems. In chapters 3 and 4 in Part II, capital investment was identified as being one 
of the most important elements at risk because of some features of the sector’s reform.  
For about 83% of the respondents, the management entity is actually responsible for capital 
investments. This corresponds to direct (private and public) management, delegated public 
management, and delegation by concession arrangements. One can thus count on a 
significant number of the total responses to shed some light on the trends involving capital 
investments.  
As expected, contract duration in the cases where the responsibility for capital investment 
is delegated (i.e., concessions) is higher than when this responsibility in not transferred 
(i.e., management and lease contracts). Table 11 presents these averages, excluding 
management contracts because there is only one case in the set of responses which could 
bias the results. In this single case, the duration of the management contract was 3 years 
(which is in accordance with the identified trend), yet there has been a long-term 
relationship between the two partners of the contract (i.e., this is not the first contract they 
signed together). 
Table 11 Average duration of lease and concession contracts 
Institutional arrangement Contract duration in years (on average) 
Lease 23 
Concession 32 
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Given the fact that lease contracts do not include the transfer of investment rights and, 
therefore, do not involve very high asset-specific investments, it is somehow surprising that 
the average duration of these contracts is so long. In literature, the duration of lease 
contracts is identified as being, on average, 8 to 15 years (see, for example, OECD, 2006, 
Cowen, 1997). 
In the questionnaire, a group of five questions directly targeted capital investment (Box 5), 
mainly with the purpose of identifying the reasons justifying these investments, their 
funding sources, and the factors increasing the risk of making this type of investments. 
When questioned about the reasons justifying capital investment, it is interesting to notice 
that operators under direct management arrangements (either public or private) choose, on 
average, a larger number of available options than those under delegated management 
arrangements (with the transfer of investment responsibilities). This suggests that operators 
under direct management arrangements, where there is no time limit for being responsible 
for investments, have a longer-time perspective on asset management. Other alternative 
explanations, such as the possibility that concessions would only become attractive in water 
systems with relatively lower investment requirements, were ruled out during interviews37. 
The most frequent reason justifying capital investments is capacity expansion (named by 
80% of the operators), followed by quality of the service improvements, and - in particular 
in European countries - higher environmental standards.  
 
 
                                                 
37 It was an interview with an expert in contract management and local authority’s capacity building in 
particular. There is also evidence from France (Carpentier et al., 2006) suggesting that the probability of 
delegating the water service to a private firm increases with the complexity of the service (low quality of raw 
water, elaborated water treatment process, high level of interconnection with other water network, etc.). 
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Box 5 Questions on capital investment 
5A. Has your organisation made any important capital investment (i.e., investment on a fixed asset such as in 
the infrastructure) in the past 5 years? 
 Yes 
 No, yet we are responsible for investing in capital equipment 
 No, it is not our responsibility to invest in capital equipments  
5B. Were these investments made to meet contract requirements? 
 Yes 
 No 
 In part 
5C. What are the reasons justifying capital investments? (Several possible options) 
 Capacity expansion 
 Modernisation 
 Age of stock  
 Environmental standards 
 Quality of the service standards (other than environment) 
 Reduction of operating costs 
 Others. Please specify 
 
5D. What are the sources of financing for capital investment? (Several possible options) 
 Revenue  
 Equity finance 
 Bond finance 
 Loan 
 Subsidise loan 
 Public subsidy 
 European Funds 
 Project Finance 
 Others. Please specify 
5F. Decisions to invest in capital (equipment, infrastructure) involve risk. Please mark in order of importance, 
what you consider the most important factors increasing risk to be (1=very important, 2=important, 3=of 
some relevance, 4=irrelevant) 
 Long amortization periods  
 Short duration of the contract 
 Risk that authorities change rules, prices, or cost allowances  
 Difficulty in assessing real conditions of underground assets 
 Lack of financial resources 
 Other. Please specify 
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It is interesting to note that the funding sources for capital investments are very diverse, 
especially when compared to sources for covering operational costs (such as employment, 
energy, and materials). Capital investments in the sector seem to be very dependent upon 
public subsidies and subsidised loans. As a matter of fact, about half of the operators 
identified some type of subsidy (either grants or subsidised loans) as an important financial 
source for covering capital investments. This is true for all institutional arrangements but 
privatisation, and across all continents, especially in Africa where public funding and 
subsidised loans were selected by the totality of the respondents. There are other possible 
funding sources, such as bonds (in Europe and Australia) and project finance (Annex 2), 
but they do not seem too widespread. 
Among the factors identified as being very important in increasing the risk of capital 
investments, regulatory risk (i.e., the risk that authorities change rules, prices, or cost 
allowances) seems to be the most important. It is actually named by two-thirds of the 
operators as being very important in all but direct public management arrangements (as 
expected because under DPM there is no unbundling of the regulatory functions). This is 
particularly true for operators in Europe and Latin America, as well as for concessions.  
About a third of the respondents identified the lack of financial resources as very important 
in increasing the vulnerability of capital investments. This does not come up to our initial 
expectations, as the lack of financial resources is often named as one of the main problems 
in the sector. 
Also, about a third of operators have identified long amortisation periods as a very 
important factor increasing the risk of capital investments, even when there is no contract. 
What is interesting to note, is that the large majority of these respondents (about 70%) 
operate under delegated public management.  
As for the importance of contract duration in putting capital investments at risk, it is only 
named by about 20% of the operators, which represents 30% of all contracts. At first this is 
striking because one would expect contract duration to be a constraint for capital 
investments due to the assets’ long amortisation periods. Yet, in practice, the average 
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duration of concessions contracts is also long (which compensates for the long amortisation 
periods).  
Finally, uncertainty about the conditions of the underground assets is only named by 15% 
of the respondents. When questioned in more detail about the fundaments of this type of 
uncertainty, several interviewees acknowledged that information asymmetry is more 
significant than the actual uncertainty about the conditions of the assets.  
5.3. Evidence in terms of universal provision of the SGI 
Universal service provision is another important element at risk because of reforms. In the 
questionnaire, two questions targeted the universal provision of the water services (Box 6), 
mainly with the purpose of identifying the main funding sources, and the factors 
guaranteeing universal coverage of the service of general interest. 
The funding sources for covering operational costs are used as an indicator of the sources 
for the universal provision of water services. This is highly representative in developed 
countries, where access levels to the service are close to 100%. Yet, for developing 
countries, access is a problem and the results are only valid for the percentage of the 
population that is connected and served by water services. Lack of access can be due to 
unaffordable fees or to unavailability of network capacity. In the latter case, universal 
access to the service and capital investment are highly correlated. 
All operators identified revenue as the main (and on many cases only) source for funding 
operational costs. About 50% of respondents have also identified the use of cross-subsidies 
as being a very important source for funding low profitable areas and poor consumers. The 
use of block tariffs, which vary according to the volume of consumption, and 
cross-subsidies between different types of consumers (e.g., domestic and industrial) are 
particularly common forms of cross-subsidies. On average, delegated public management 
arrangements are the ones that diversify the most in terms of types of cross-subsidies, 
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mentioning not only block tariffs and types of consumers, but also cross-subsidies between 
different types of businesses and regions.  
Box 6 Questions on service provision 
6. How does your company cover operational costs (e.g., employment, energy, materials)?  
(Several possible options) 
 Revenue (tariffs) covers all operational costs      
 Revenue (tariffs) partially covers operational costs       
 Cross-subsidies 
 Block tariffs (depending on consumption)       
 Type of consumers (domestic, industrial)       
 Regional (urban subsidise rural consumers)        
 Other business segments subsidise water business     
 Public subsidies           
 Other. Please specify 
7. Which of the following factors are, in your opinion, important to guaranteeing the provision of water 
services to low-income customers? (1=very important, 2=important, 3=of some relevance, 4=irrelevant)  
 Existence of subsidies to cover service provision to the poorer 
 Possibility to use cross-subsidies 
 Prohibition to cut off service provision due to non-payment    
 Flexibility in terms of service quality (e.g., hours of access)    
 Other. Please specify 
 
As for the factors that are important to guarantee the universal service provision, the 
question focuses on the provision of water services to low-income customers, which is the 
most vulnerable group when the universality of the service is not guaranteed. The existence 
of specific mechanisms (in some cases subsidised by public authorities) to help customers 
in financial distress to pay their bills, as well as the possibility to use cross-subsidies are 
considered the most important factors. Amongst the mechanisms mentioned to mitigate the 
impact of tariffs on low-income customers are debt restructuring, rate reductions, and social 
subsidies. 
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It is interesting to note that of the operators that recognise receiving public subsidies (about 
40% of the total), less than 30% justify them on the grounds of water services provision to 
poor consumers. About 80% of these operators receive subsidies to cover capital costs. 
Nonetheless, when asked about important factors for guaranteeing the provision of the 
service for the poorest consumers, many operators replied that it is the existence of public 
subsidies. This is valid in all continents and for all forms of institutional arrangements. 
Again, one has to keep in mind that water services provision to the poorest consumers may 
imply the expansion of the network and, therefore, significant capital investments. 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
The development of this questionnaire was very important in order to verify the results 
presented in Part II of the thesis, i.e., in terms of risk-sharing patterns and elements at risk 
because of the sector reform. The questionnaire was sent out to senior managers, who have 
a deep knowledge of the sector, as well as of the relationships between their organisations 
and the other entities involved in the sector. Discussions with several of these managers 
after receiving the responses to the questionnaire gave us more confidence on the results. In 
this sense, the identified trends are significant and must not be neglected.  
One of the most significant trends is that, in practice, risk allocation between the actors is 
not as clear as the patterns identified in Chapter 3 of this thesis38. This is especially the case 
for the risks created by the sector’s reform and those exogenous to the transaction.  
Regarding capital investment, it is interesting to note that there is a diversity of funding 
sources, yet they are, for the majority of cases, still quite traditional (i.e., public funding, 
equity, and loans). More innovative funding alternatives, such as municipal bonds and 
project finance, are not very developed in the majority of cases. There is still a strong 
                                                 
38 These results were based on the theoretical definitions of institutional arrangements with a straightforward 
allocation of responsibilities. 
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dependency upon subsidies from local governments, European funds, and international 
cooperation agencies, especially in what refers to capacity expansion (expansion of the 
network and treatment capacity). 
Another significant trend is the weight of regulatory risk as a factor increasing the risk of 
capital investments. As a matter of fact, regulatory risk is more often named as a very 
important factor putting capital investment at risk than it is the lack of financial resources. 
Finally, one must mention the weight operators give to cross-subsidies as a very important 
factor guaranteeing the universal provision of water services. This cannot be neglected in 
the discussions regarding full-cost recovery. 
In the following chapter, we present a set of selected case studies with the purpose of 
strengthening our empirical analysis. The majority of the selected cases belongs to the 
European Union (EU) for comparability reasons, but also because about 65% of the 
respondents to the questionnaire are from this region. One case from Africa is also 
presented mainly with the purpose of underlining the similarities and differences between 
developed and developing countries 
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Chapter 6. Case-studies: Risk-Sharing and Vulnerability Analysis  
We present five case-studies illustrating different institutional arrangements in England and 
Wales, France, Portugal, and Mozambique. The cases range from the separation of the 
responsible and the management entities (i.e., delegated management) to their integration 
(i.e., direct management); and from the separation between managerial and regulatory 
responsibilities with the creation of a sector regulator to regulation by contract. Moreover, 
delegated management by lease and concession contracts are differentiated because they 
correspond to cases where the responsibility for operations and, in the latter type, 
investments, is delegated to a different actor in the larger water system. 
Case-study 1 (CS1) illustrates the only type of institutional arrangement in England and 
Wales, that is a direct private arrangement. The private operator is the owner of the assets 
and provides water and sanitation services to about 1.6 million people.  
Case-study 2 (CS2) illustrates the most common institutional arrangement in France, that is 
delegated private management by leasing. The private operator belongs to a large TNC and 
provides retail water supply services to about 2.68 million people. 
Case-studies 3 and 4 (CS3, CS4) are examples of two different types of system in Portugal. 
CS3 illustrates a multi-municipal system, where a public operator was awarded a 
concession to provide bulk water services to about 600 thousand people. As for CS4, it 
illustrates a municipal system, where a private operator won the concession contract to 
provide water and sanitation services to about 115 thousand people. 
Finally, case-study 5 (CS5) exemplifies the most significant institutional arrangement in 
Mozambique after reform, that is delegated private management by leasing. A private 
operator majority-owned by an international firm provides water supply services to about 
670 thousand people.  
The following table presents the selected cases and their main characteristics. Due to the 
fact that some operators requested to remain anonymous, the identities are not revealed. 
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Table 12 Presentation of the selected case-studies 
Case 
Studies Country 
Institutional 
Arrangement Type of Service 
Ownership of 
operator 
Population 
served (appr.) 
CS1 England & Wales 
Direct Private 
Management 
Water and 
sanitation services Private 1’600’000 
CS2 France  
Delegated Private 
Management by 
Leasing 
Water supply (only 
retail) Private 2’680’000 
CS3 Portugal 
Delegated Public 
Management by 
Concession 
Water and 
sanitation services 
(only bulk) 
Public 600’000 
CS4 Portugal 
Delegated Private 
Management by 
Concession 
Water and 
sanitation services Mixed 115’000 
CS5 Mozambique 
Delegated Private 
Management by 
Leasing 
Water supply Private 670’000 
 
In general terms, case-studies follow the same structure as the questionnaire presented in 
the previous chapter. The objectives set for this chapter are: 
1. to show the water sector’s reform is a reality in several systems, 
2. to illustrate the diversity of institutional arrangements, 
3. to identify risk-sharing patterns,  
4. to identify the vulnerability factors of the main elements at risk because of the 
reform, and 
5. to identify the major regulatory challenges across institutional arrangements. 
Case-studies are grouped on a national basis. The main characteristics of each country’s 
urban water sector are described at the beginning of each chapter. The first four 
case-studies belong to the European Union (EU). The main instrument of the European 
water policy is the Water Framework Directive [COM 2000/60/EC from December, 22]. It 
established a common regulatory framework for all the member states, at least concerning 
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environmental issues. As for the ownership (of infrastructures and operators) and the 
structure of the sector, the European Treaties are neutral. Therefore, each country remains 
responsible for its legislation on the ownership, type of management, institutional 
structures, and distribution of competences39. This means that, in practice, a diversity of 
institutional arrangements characterise the European urban water sector.  
Then we describe the context of each case-study, including the institutional framework and 
type of contractual arrangements. After that, we present the risk-sharing patterns between 
the main actors in each case, and identify the vulnerability factors of capital investment and 
universal provision of the SGI. 
The data for the case-studies was gathered through desk research of secondary sources, 
such as company reports, supplemented by primary data collected from operators through a 
questionnaire and selected interviews to important actors in the systems. We will start out 
by presenting the English and Wales case-study. 
6.1. England and Wales: the strong Economic Regulatory Agency 
England and Wales (E&W) is one of the most commonly referred models in the urban 
water sector. The distinguishing features of the E&W model are the complete privatisation 
of the sector, and the creation of a strong independent economic regulatory agency, the 
Office of Water Services. More details on the English model are presented in section 6.1.1, 
before the case-study illustrating a direct private management arrangement in section 6.1.2. 
                                                 
39 The only exception is if the management of the service is delegated to a third party, where the principles 
and rules on public procurement and concessions must be respected [COM (2004) 327 final from April, 30]. 
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6.1.1 The English and Wales model40 
The national government sets the national policy framework for water and sewerage 
services. In England, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is 
responsible for all aspects of water policy, including water supply and resources, and the 
regulatory systems for the water environment and the water industry. In Wales, it is the 
National Assembly for Wales (NAW) that has statutory and policy responsibility for 
matters related to the water industry. 
The reform of the water sector in England and Wales represents one of the most profound 
cases of reform worldwide, with the privatisation of the WSS services. First, the 1974 
Government Act changed the scope of action from the local to the regional level with the 
creation of 10 Regional Water Authorities (RWA), which were responsible for managing 
the entire water cycle.  
By the end of the 1980s, there was a great demand for resources to rehabilitate the network, 
which proved to be an impossible enterprise for RWAs due to the financial austerity 
imposed by the government. Following these financial constraints and some ideological 
reasoning, RWAs were transformed into Public Limited Companies (PLC) and were sold 
out in 1989 (Water Act). From then on these new private corporations were held 
responsible for the provision of the services and became the owners of the infrastructures.  
Regarding regulation, the 1989 Water Act established three regulatory bodies in order to 
implement and enforce the national policy: the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) which 
monitors water quality; the National Rivers Authority for environmental performance, and 
was later on turned into the Environment Agency (EA) which monitors river and 
                                                 
40 The description of the English Model in this section (6.1.1) is partially based on the Euromarket project, 
mainly on Deliveries 2 and 4. The main results of the project are published in (Finger et al., 2007). 
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environmental pollution; and the Office of Water Services (OFWAT), to set the price 
regimes. 
The DWI is responsible for assessing the quality of drinking water, taking enforcement 
action if standards are not being met and appropriate action when water is unfit for human 
consumption. It also investigates complaints from consumers and incidents which affect or 
could affect drinking water quality. Its investigations of incidents can lead to the 
prosecution of water companies.  
The EA has the duty to conserve, augment, redistribute and secure the proper use of water 
resources. It is the central body responsible for long-term water resources planning. 
The OFWAT is the economic regulator of the industry. It sets limits on prices, ensures 
companies are able to carry out their responsibilities, protects the standard of service, 
encourages companies to be more efficient and to meet the principles of sustainable 
development, helps to encourage competition where appropriate, and makes comparisons 
between the companies to help raise the standards of those that need to improve41. 
More recently, in 2005, the Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) was set up to represent 
consumers' interests and to investigate their complaints about the water company. Figure 8 
presents the main actors on the sector in E&W. 
                                                 
41 From http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/ [in June 2007]. 
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Figure 8 Main actors in E&W model 
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Main features of the model 
Privatisation 
Private companies are currently responsible for the provision of water and sanitation 
services. The 1989 Water Act provided for the privatisation of the RWAs by selling their 
shares to the public. The newly-floated companies became owners of the entire water and 
sanitation systems, and became statutorily responsible for water and sanitation services in 
their areas (appointed by the Secretary of State). They were group-holding companies 
sharing similar corporate structures, in which a subsidiary water and sewerage company 
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(WaSCs) assumed the main operational responsibilities. As far as the already existing 
private water companies were concerned, the Act preserved their status and areas of supply. 
They were appointed to supply water services (only) within their own areas under Licence 
in the same way as the ten WaSCs. Currently there are 10 water and sewerage companies 
and 13 water-only companies.  
The overall structure described above has remained in place to the present day. There have 
been a number of mergers, but only involving smaller companies, as the ten large 
companies are still separately owned (although not necessarily by the same owners as in 
1989). The main change, which continues to impact the industry, is the change of 
ownership. Companies change owners relatively frequently and some are no longer listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, as they have been bought by companies based outside the 
UK. 
Strong Economic Regulation 
OFWAT is an independent regulator, which was established in 1989 when the industry was 
fully privatised, and which is accountable to Parliament (and not a Minister). In the absence 
of effective market competition, OFWAT bases its decision on setting price limits and 
standards of services on comparative competition. The application of price cap regulation, 
combined with yardstick competition, constitutes a prominent feature of the system.  
OFWAT regulates prices based on the investment programs of the regulated companies, 
and the performance of all competitors. It uses a price-cap system, taking into account the 
general retail price inflation, performance standards, and efficiency and service levels. The 
price (or revenue) cap is set every 5 years.  
Individual customer tariffs are approved on an annual basis. The regulator verifies if the 
proposed tariffs are discriminatory or preferential and if they are environmentally efficient. 
Customer bill stability is another important criterion. 
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OFWAT can seek court orders to insist on performing a duty. If the company does not 
comply, it can ask the court to appoint a special administrator.  
The Water Industry Act 1999 made the interests of the consumer become OFWAT’s first 
priority, removed companies’ powers to disconnect due to non-payment of charges, and 
limited the circumstances in which companies can compulsorily meter consumers.  
Most common institutional structures 
Direct private management is the only institutional arrangement in the E&W water sector. 
Private companies are responsible for the provision of water and sanitation services. They 
are statutory undertakers with duties and responsibilities set out in primary legislation. 
However, they do not have exclusive rights and they are not considered as legalised 
monopolies. The regulator can terminate an appointee’s licence as a water/sewerage 
undertaker but this requires a long notice period.   
The companies have access to the international financial markets. There have been a 
number of financial restructurings as companies have sought to reduce their cost of capital 
by replacing equity with debt finance. One company - Dwr Cymru - is now wholly debt 
financed. Five other companies are now very highly geared (two WaSCs and three WoCs). 
Gearing across the industry has increased from zero to almost sixty per cent since 
privatisation in 1989.  Only a few small water only companies have gearing ratios below 
forty per cent.  
Conclusion 
In England & Wales, the existing institutional arrangement with a privatised system and 
strong regulation is not questioned in its essence. The strong regulatory system 
implemented is perceived as a powerful counterpart to the interests of private operators. 
The focus of discussions normally lie on the high funding requirements pertaining to the 
modernisation of the old network and the improvement of wastewater treatment in order to 
raise local water quality (very important because water abstraction is essentially made from 
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surface waters). Because costs are supposed to be totally recovered through tariffs, the fear 
is that increased tariffs may threaten the affordability of water charges. The following 
section presents a case-study that highlights these topics.    
6.1.2 Case-Study 1: Direct Private Management 
Case-study (CS1) illustrates the most common institutional arrangement in England, a 
direct private arrangement. The water and sewerage company (WaSC) was created in 1989, 
following the privatisation of the regional water authority. It belongs to a large UK group 
focused on water, sewerage, and waste management businesses.  
The WaSC, together with the four regulators, constitutes the most important actors in the 
system (Figure 9).  
Figure 9 Main actors in CS1 
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OFWAT is the economic regulator. It regulates the water prices, the company’s investment 
programme, the cost of capital, and the operational and environmental obligations. It also 
compares the company’s performance on a wide range of parameters such as efficiency, 
customer service, and environmental performance. The Environment Agency is responsible 
for water abstraction licensing and the regulation of discharges. The Drinking Water 
Inspectorate sets and enforces drinking water quality standards. Finally, the Consumer 
Council for Water represents consumers. 
Risk sharing 
The risk-sharing patterns in CS1 are very clear, with the WaSC taking all the risks, in the 
majority of cases alone. Part of these risks may be ultimately transferred to customers via 
price increases, but only if OFWAT considers they are caused by exogenous factors to the 
company (and if they have strong implications on profitability). 
Business risks are taken by the WaSC, in other words by the private operator. The most 
important risks are the failure to deliver the capital investment programme, the failure to 
raise sufficient funds to finance its functions, the failure to recover customers’ debt, and the 
failure to deliver operating cost savings implicit in the regulatory review for the current 
period (2005-2010). These are particularly important issues for the WaSC because the price 
cap is only revised every 5 years. 
As for the risks created by the reform, regulatory risks are particularly important for the 
operator mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, there is the risk that price controls on the 
turnover of the company’s business could adversely affect profitability. On the other hand, 
environmental regulations and quality standards could increase the company’s costs and 
adversely affect profitability.  
When it comes to social risks, the WaSC cannot cut off the service due to non-payment. It 
is therefore obliged to provide the service even if it will not be reimbursed. For this reason, 
the recovery of customers’ debt is a particularly important strategy for the WaSC which has 
created specific schemes to help the poorest customers to pay their water bills. 
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Capital investments 
The WaSC is the operator and the owner of the infrastructure and, legally, the sole 
responsible for all capital investments. The existing regulatory framework supports this 
endeavor in the sense that one of the regulator’s primary duties is to ensure that private 
companies can finance themselves by earning a reasonable rate of return on capital. 
In recent years, the company has been facing significant upward cost pressures as a result 
of the need to meet new environmental legislation. More specifically, the main focus of the 
WaSC since privatisation has been on improving wastewater treatment and its disposal. 
Upward costs also result from the need to fully maintain the necessary asset base to meet 
consumer service expectations. Maintenance costs have been particularly important, with 
water mains rehabilitation accounting for 40% of capital investments in 2006.  
Besides more stringent environmental standards and the modernisation of old capital stock, 
the WaSC has also identified expansion of capacity, improvements in the quality of the 
services, and reduction of operational costs as very important factors justifying capital 
investments. By choosing such an exhaustive list of reasons for capital investments, the 
WaSC denotes a long-term perspective on asset management, which is justified by the fact 
that it is also the owner of the assets. 
Traditionally, the WaSC finances its capital investments from operations and debt 
financing. The company does not receive any subsidy from the Government or the 
European Union (unavailable for privatised companies). Nevertheless, it has benefited from 
the attractive conditions of EIB loans, used for projects that support the sustainability of 
environmental and customer service standards set by the EU and national legislation.  
In the WaSC’s perspective, the most important factor putting capital investments at risk is 
the risk that the government may decide to increase the extent of the operator’s liabilities. 
One specific example is the current debate on the operators’ adoption of all privately-
owned household sewers and surface water drains which, according to the government, 
aims at clarifying responsibilities and creating a more sustainable and integrated sewer 
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network42. Difficulty in assessing real conditions of underground assets is also identified as 
being important. On the contrary, long amortisation periods of investments and the lack of 
financial resources are not considered to be very significant. 
Universal service provision 
Almost the totality of the population in the system is connected to the network and is 
served by drinking water and wastewater treatment works (more than 99%). The quality of 
the drinking water is also good, with very good compliance levels to DWI standards. 
With the 1999 Water Industry Act prohibition to disconnect domestic water supply when 
there is no payment, the outstanding customer’s debt due to non-affordability became a 
major issue for the WaSC. Apart from this prohibition, the 1999 Act put other protections 
in place for particular groups: it prohibited companies for using discharge-limiting devices 
to enforce payment, gave the powers to the Secretary of State to make provision for the 
protection of vulnerable groups, and finally, gave the right to domestic customers to opt for 
a measured charge. 
To protect itself from debts, the company has established a charitable trust and hardship 
funds to assist customers in severe financial difficulties. A customer care programme was 
launched in order to advise customers in greater need about water use, household budget 
management, and special payment plans to which they are entitled. These schemes are 
funded by the WaSC revenues and can only be made available to customers in financial 
distress because it is legally acceptable to use cross-subsidies (in this particular case, 
mainly between types of consumers and urban and rural regions). 
The overall Income Support payment provided by the State is also deemed to meet water 
and sanitation charges, even though it is not specific to these services. This is a personal 
                                                 
42 For more details see (DEFRA, 2007).  
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allowance related to particular household circumstances and that is granted to cover 
day-to-day living needs.  
Conclusion 
This case-study presents a somewhat singular example in the urban water sector, 
corresponding to the private ownership, responsibility, and operation of the urban water 
system. For this reason, the allocation of risks is very clear, with the operator taking all of 
them.  
Reform risks are particularly important for the operator. On the one hand, the economic 
regulator has a strong (discretionary) power regarding essential tasks for the functioning of 
the system, such as the approval of investment plans and price setting. On the other hand, 
there is a prohibition to disconnect consumers due to non-payment. The possibility to use 
cross-subsidies to cover the costs of providing the services to customers in financial distress 
is, therefore, essential.  
From the regulator’s perspective, it is crucial to have access to good information, which is 
controlled by the regulated company. The provision of good relative performance indicators 
- which help to address the information asymmetry problem - across regulated companies, 
becomes a major challenge for the regulator.  
Nowadays, operating revenues and debt financing are the sources for covering the private 
company’s capital costs. It does not receive any subsidy for covering its capital 
investments. However, one cannot neglect two important facts. Firstly, by the time of 
privatisation, the debt of the regional authorities was paid with the public budget and it did 
not get transferred to the privatised companies. Secondly, it is a major duty of the regulator 
to guarantee that private companies can finance themselves. 
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6.2. France: Regulation by Contract 
France represents another commonly referred-to model in the urban water sector, due to the 
long-term experience of private sector participation in the management of the water 
systems. The French model is based on competition for the market and contract-based 
regulation (more details in Section 6.2.1). One case-study presented illustrates delegated 
management by leasing (Section 6.2.2), which is the most common institutional 
arrangement in the country. 
6.2.1 The French model43 
In France, municipalities (about 36 000) are responsible for the organisation of drinking 
water supply, and wastewater collection and treatment. A group of municipalities may 
decide, on a voluntary basis, to team themselves up with inter-municipal cooperation 
structures: inter-municipal syndicates, municipalities or town communities. Municipalities 
(and syndicates) have a choice between either directly managing the services of water and 
wastewater treatment themselves or delegating such management to other specialised firms 
whilst preserving the ownership of public infrastructures. 
The municipality and the management entity are the two main actors in the sector (in direct 
public management these are the same entity). At the national level, there are different 
committees and inter-ministerial missions responsible for defining, examining, and 
coordinating the policies from the different Ministries (Environment, Health, Public Works, 
and Agriculture). Figure 10 presents the main actors in the French urban water system. 
                                                 
43 The description of the French Model in this section (6.2.1) is partially based on the Euromarket project, 
mainly on Deliveries 2 and 4. The main results of the project are published in (Finger et al., 2007).  
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Figure 10 Main actors in the water sector in France 
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Main features of the model 
Public-Private Partnership 
About 75 per cent of the French population is supplied by some form of public-private 
operation (Renzetti and Dupont, 2003). The most important private companies operating in 
the water sector are Veolia Environment, Suez, and Saur, which have approximately 8.000, 
5.000 and 7.000 municipal contracts, serving 26, 14 and 10 million people in France. About 
12 other small private companies operate at local and regional levels. These three 
companies have become world leaders in the sector.  
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Public-private partnerships are normally ruled by different types of contracts, such as lease 
(affermage, in French), concession, and management contracts. In lease contracts, private 
firms operate a facility but the municipality remains responsible for investments. In 
concession contracts, private firms not only operate but are also involved in funding 
infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion. 
More than 80% of the delegated management contracts are leases. Therefore, in many 
cases, the municipalities remain responsible for investments. They can benefit from 
subsidies on capital investments (Boyer and Garcia, 2002), especially from the River Basin 
Authorities, which raise revenues from water abstraction and pollution charges. There used 
to be a National Fund for the Development of Water Conveyance to finance water and 
wastewater infrastructure in rural areas, but it ceased to exist in 2005. 
Regulation by contract 
There are two co-existing regulatory governance systems in France. In the first, the sector is 
regulated through ownership when municipalities remain the operators of the system, and 
there is no unbundling of the regulatory and managerial functions. In the second, regulation 
is arranged for in the contract when water services are delegated to the private sector. In 
this case, water tariffs are fixed in the contract and evolve according to a “cost-plus” 
formula, which accounts for the evolution of input prices. These tariffs can only be 
modified through contract amendments that must be approved by the municipal council. 
There is no regulatory agency for water supply and wastewater treatment. 
The French delegation contracts have a strong discretionary element (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003) 
because they are based on the intuitu personae principle. This principle means that 
negotiations for the delegation of the service are conducted freely on a bilateral basis 
between the parties, based on trust. Moreover, the oligopolistic nature of the French water 
market raised many doubts about the effective degree of competition. For these reasons, 
during the 1990s several laws were passed to tackle the lack of transparency and 
competition (Box 7). 
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Box 7 The oligopolistic nature of the sector and main legal instruments 
During the 1990s, several laws were passed which had consequences on the sector. Firstly, the Sapin Law 
from January, 29th 1993 focuses on the prevention of corruption and the transparency of public procedures. It 
states that the award of contracts and their renewal must be subject to competitive rules. Moreover, the local 
authority has to specify the scope of the work and the conditions in which it sets the objectives in terms of 
water volumes, prices and service, and to publicly diffuse the information on tenders. 
Secondly, the Barnier Law from February, 2nd 1995 focuses on the reinforcement of environmental 
protection, but it also sets new rules regarding contracts between public authorities and private firms. It fixes 
the maximum duration of contracts at 20 years, and requires management entities to publish an annual 
technical and financial report and make it available to the public. 
Thirdly, the Mazeaud Law from February, 8th 1995 on public procurement and delegation of public services 
limits the possibilities for contract extension. It also allows regional accounting chambers to monitor water 
services’ accounts with the purpose of increasing the transparency of public services.  
 
Most common institutional arrangements 
Two types of institutional arrangements co-exist in the UWS in France, namely direct 
public management, and delegated private management. 
In direct public management (régie, in French), the local authority is the owner and the 
responsible entity for investing and operating the urban water systems. The local authority 
manages the service with its own staff and has the obligation to balance revenue and 
expenditures. Water services need to have separate accounts. It is common that local 
authorities outsource part of their services (e.g., billing) - this intermediary case is called 
régie intéressée or gérance.  
Direct public management arrangements are common in small rural communities. Larger 
cities tend to delegate their water services to the private sector. Nonetheless, there are also 
cases of large cities that maintain direct arrangements, such as Strasbourg, Tours, Reims, 
Nantes, and Amiens. 
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In delegated private management (gestion déléguée, in French), municipalities fully or 
partly delegate their water services’ responsibilities to a private company, through a 
contract. In the past thirty years, local authorities have increasingly delegated the 
management of their water supply and wastewater treatment services to private firms. The 
two most important types of contracts (Elnaboulsi, 2001) are:  
1. Lease (affermage, in French), where the private company rents the facilities from 
the commune, and is responsible for operation, maintenance, and management of 
the service. The municipality, which remains the owner of the system, is responsible 
for capital expenditures for new projects, debt service, tariffs and cost recovery 
policies. The private company is responsible for operation and maintenance 
expenditures as well as billing, collecting and financing management work. 
Leaseholders must pay the municipality a rental fee included in the price of water 
services fixed in the contract, billed and collected by the private company. Lease 
contracts are generally set up for a period of 10-12 years. Today, more than 80% of 
the delegation contracts in water supply and in sanitation are lease contracts.   
2. Concession, where the private company is responsible for the services including 
operation, maintenance, and management, as well as capital investments for 
rehabilitation and expansion works. The firm is remunerated directly by the 
customers (through the price of the water). The municipality remains the owner of 
the assets. When a concession contract expires, all works and equipment are 
returned to the local authorities. Concession contracts are set up for a maximum 
duration of 20 years (since the Barnier law from 1995). 
Conclusion 
The French model of water supply and sanitation organisation and management is 
characterised by the co-existence of direct and delegated management arrangements, with a 
significant percentage of delegation contracts. These contracts with private operators have 
increased in number because of growing technical standards, which call for increasingly 
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complex know-how and important investments that municipalities have difficulties dealing 
with alone. 
The majority of the delegation contracts are lease contracts, which means that 
municipalities remain responsible for new capital investments. According to some 
interviewees, there is an increasing use of lease contracts with concessional clauses, where 
the private operator has to make part of the investments in the network. The new French 
Law no. 2006-1772 on Water and Aquatic Environments from December 30 introduces a 
new obligation which is particularly important in this respect. It states that in the event that 
a delegation contract transfers the responsibility for renewal or other major works to a 
different operator, a projected program of works with an estimation of the costs must be 
attached to the contract. 
One of the reasons frequently pointed out to justify the small number of concession 
contracts in France (as compared to lease contracts) is that public subsidies were normally 
awarded to public operators. The new Law also tackles this issue by stating that public aid 
to municipalities or other territorial entities responsible for drinking water and sanitation 
cannot be given according to the mode of organisation or management of the service.  
 Finally, one of the main criticisms often made to this type of sector organisation is that 
there is a certain inertia and irreversibility in the actual delegation process (Baert, 1999). 
Nearly 90% of contracts are renewed to the same concessionaire (ENGREF, 2001). This 
means that the actual degree of competition tends to be low. The very nature of the 
competitive process is questioned because even though local authorities are bound by the 
‘Sapin’ Act to launch periodically an invitation to tender, they are not bound to select the 
final set of bidders or the ultimate winner according to objective and predefined criteria 
(Yvrande-Billon, 2006). In the following section, a case on delegated management by 
leasing is presented. 
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6.2.2 Case-Study 2: Delegated Management by Leasing 
Case-study 2 (CS2) illustrates the most common institutional arrangement in France: 
delegated management by leasing. It is the municipality’s role to define the organisation of 
the sector in its territory, coordinate the actions of the management entities (in the event 
that there is more than one in the same territory), define prices, control drinking water 
standards and, finally, monitor the management entities’ performance. 
In 1985, the municipality decided to delegate the management of the retail water supply 
system to a private operator for 25 years. The contract was awarded (by direct negotiation) 
to a wholly owned subsidiary of a large multi-utilities company. The private operator 
became responsible for the transport and distribution of drinking water to consumers, the 
maintenance and replacement of water pipes, mains and other equipments in the network, 
the control of the drinking water quality, as well as billing and customer management. 
Prices are defined by the municipality according to the local specificities of the water 
resources, and the tariff structure defined in the contract. About 38% of the water bill 
corresponds to drinking water supply, 32% to sanitation, and the remaining 30% to taxes 
and fees (e.g., to the River Basin Authorities).  
The main actors concerned by drinking water services include the municipality, the retail 
private operator, the bulk drinking water operator, the bulk wastewater treatment operator, 
the River Basin Agency, the Public Health Departments, and consumers (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11 Main actors in CS2 
 
Risk sharing 
In the framework of this case-study, the allocation of risks between the actors is quite clear. 
Business risks are taken by the operator, with the exception of demand risks that are shared 
between the operator and the municipality. As a matter of fact, from the tariffs collected to 
the customers, the private operator has to pay an additional charge to the municipality. A 
decrease in water bills means a decrease in this charge, which may jeopardise the funding 
of capital investments which remains a responsibility of the municipality.  
The same risk-sharing pattern between the private operator and the municipality applies for 
reform risks, in particular regulatory and social risks. Firstly, a change or reinterpretation 
of rules may, on the one hand, modify the operator’s revenues or, on the other, call for new 
capital investment by the municipality (e.g., more stringent environmental standards). 
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Secondly, the costs to provide the service to the poorest costumers is shared between the 
private operator and the municipality, by means of special schemes and subsidies targeting 
households at risk (more details below).  
As for exogenous risks, the parties to the contract only find environmental/force majeure 
risks relevant, and the private operator is insured against them. There is no international 
funding or borrowing so exchange rate risks are not applicable. Regarding political risks 
pertaining to political interferences, expropriation, nationalisation, war or civil disturbs, the 
operator finds these are irrelevant in the stable political context they operate. 
Capital Investments 
The private operator is not the owner of the infrastructure and, due to the nature of the 
contract it is not responsible for new44 capital investments in the system. Nonetheless it 
has to make capital investments, in order to modernise and replace old infrastructure and 
equipment, and to improve the quality of the service and the environment. The main 
funding sources are revenues and subsidised loans. In this respect, the operator has received 
subsidised loans from the River Basin Agency (also called Water Agency) in order to 
replace lead water pipes. 
The municipality remains the responsible entity for new capital investments. Water bills 
(which are collected by the private operator) are an important source of funding for capital 
investments. Subsidised loans and direct subsidies from the Water Agency are also 
relevant, especially concerning investments directly related to water protection and quality.  
The main factors identified by the actors which put capital investments at risk are the long 
amortisation periods and the incomplete nature of the contract. As a matter of fact, 
                                                 
44 New capital investments appear in opposition to capital investments in maintenance and replacement of old 
infrastructure. 
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contracts are not exhaustive in terms of the investment requirements for the private 
operator. 
Universal provision of the SGI 
In France, drinking water supply and sanitation services are considered as public services. 
Being a public service means that there must be equal access for all consumers, and 
continuity of supply both in terms of quantity and quality. In the CS2 system, access is not 
a major issue with approximately 99.9% of the population connected to the network. As for 
drinking water quality, frequent laboratorial analyses attest for its good quality. 
Having said this, it is important to mention that according to French Law, water services 
are public services that have to be supported by the customers. This means that if there are 
no “good will” reasons justifying the non-payment of the water bill, the operator may cut 
the service off, yet not before notifying and giving the customer an additional opportunity 
to repay the debts. In this particular case, the operator still informs the customer about all 
the existing possibilities (and corresponding application rules) regarding special solidarity 
schemes. 
Even though there is no formal social water pricing, the operator has developed special 
schemes, such as debt rescheduling, targeting the customers in financial distress. About 
4 per cent of the total customers benefit from these schemes. There is also a special fund 
jointly financed by the municipality and the private operator, which is specifically 
dedicated to subsidising the poorest households. The municipality selects the beneficiaries 
and defines the amount of aid given. The public authorities’ intervention is indeed 
considered by the private operator to be the most important factor guaranteeing the 
universal provision of the service.  
Because water services are considered to be public services, it is not possible to adapt 
service quality standards to the level of customers’ affordability (for example, in terms of 
volume or hours of access per day). 
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Conclusions 
The main feature of this case-study pertains to the risk-sharing patterns where the majority 
of risks are being shared between the partners of the contract, i.e. the private operator and 
the municipality. One of the main problems pertains to the lack of detail in the contract 
both in terms of requirements and performance measures, which may create ex-post 
adaptation problems. 
The municipality remains responsible for new capital investment. One interesting feature is 
that part of these investments is subsidised by funds originally collected in the sector. It is 
somehow a form of cross-subsidisation in the sense that all customers contribute to this 
Fund via water tariffs, which is to be used in areas of greater environmental and quality 
need. 
In terms of the provision of the Service of General Interest, the main issue is affordability 
of the service to the poorest customers. To tackle this problem, the private operator and the 
municipality work together in putting up special schemes targeting customers at risk. 
The main challenge for the future is about contract renewal. There was no competition for 
awarding the present contract. However, the Sapin Law passed in 1993 changed the legal 
framework and, as a result, the attribution process for contract renewal due in 2010 will 
differ. According to the new law, the municipality has to publicise and consult potential 
bidders before the conclusion of the renewal.  
The number of agreements leading to a change in operators is rising at national level. 
However, probability is high that the existing operator is renewed for another term (in 80 to 
90 per cent of cases, according to Guérin-Schneider and Lorrain (2003)). This does not 
mean that there are no effects from competition. If the number of bidders is not limited by 
the lack of clarity of the award criteria (explained by the prevalence of the intuitu personae 
principle, which exempts the municipality from adopting the selection rule of the best bid) 
or by the existence of collusion behaviours, the incumbent may reduce its price in order to 
win the contract at renewal (Yvrande-Billon, 2006). 
  137
6.3. Portugal: a hybrid model 
Portugal presents yet another approach to the water sector reform, combining public and 
private sector participation in the management of the systems, as well as regulation by 
contract and a sector-specific regulator. In this chapter, two case-studies in Portugal are 
presented. They illustrate the most common institutional arrangements in the UWS after the 
1993 reform. But first we will present the Portuguese model for UWS organisation. 
6.3.1 The Portuguese model45 
Traditionally, municipalities were fully responsible for the UWS, from drinking water 
production to wastewater treatment. However, in 1993, significant changes occurred in the 
Portuguese legislation. Two Decrees defined a new institutional framework for the 
management of water and wastewater services. According to Decree 372/93, the private 
sector could participate in these services. Decree 379/93 regulated WSS management, 
making a distinction between municipal and multi-municipal systems. Between the 
multi-municipal systems, a further distinction between retail and bulk supply46 was made.  
Also, the Institute for the Regulation of Water and Solid Waste (IRAR, in Portuguese) was 
created to be responsible for the regulation of water and wastewater. As for environmental 
regulation, five Regional Directorates for the Environment (under the control of the 
Ministry of Environment) delivered licenses for water withdrawals and discharge. 
                                                 
45 The description of the Portuguese Model in this section (6.3.1) is partially based on the Euromarket project, 
mainly on Deliveries 2 and 4. The main results of the project are published in (Finger et al., 2007). 
46 Retail activities are denominated "low pressure" activities ("baixa" in Portuguese) and refer to water 
distribution and sewerage services. Bulk activities are denominated "high pressure" activities ("alta" in 
Portuguese) and refer to water production and wastewater treatment. 
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However, their boundaries did not correspond to water basins and water was only one of 
their competences. Figure 12 illustrates the main actors in the UWS after reform. 
Figure 12  Main actors after reform in water sector in Portugal 
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Main features of the model 
Multi-municipal and municipal systems  
Multi-municipal systems “serve at least two municipalities and require investments that are 
predominantly to be made by the State given reasons of national interest”47. The main 
distinguishing feature of multi-municipal systems is that the State is responsible for capital 
investments (and not the municipalities). Although initially multi-municipal systems were 
identified as bulk-supply systems, they can also refer to retail systems.  
For each system, a company subject to private law (provided that the public owns the 
majority stake) is created and is held responsible by the State, under the form of a 
concession, for their operation and maintenance. These concessionaire firms are created by 
decree, and up to 49% of their shares may be opened to private capital.  
A State-owned holding company - Águas de Portugal, AdP - was created in 1993 in order 
to develop the multi-municipal systems. AdP channels European funds, and it is the major 
shareholder of the multi-municipal companies. The remaining of the shares may be owned 
by local municipalities or by private capital. Today, besides multi-municipal companies, 
AdP, through its Aquapor subsidiary, has also won concession contracts in partnership with 
the private sector to manage municipal systems. 
Municipal systems are all other systems, including those managed through an association of 
municipalities, herein named inter-municipal48 systems. As a matter of fact, many 
municipalities are still fully operating their WSS services. Municipal systems may be 
directly managed by the municipality, or their management can be delegated to a public 
                                                 
47 Decree-Law 379/93 of 5th November. 
48 Inter-municipal systems are only associations of municipalities and not companies as it is the case of 
multi-municipal systems. 
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entity, a private entity, or to an association of users. If the management remains municipal 
(or inter-municipal), there are different forms of organisation, namely: 
- municipal services, which deal with WSS but are not specialised structures (they 
also deal with roads, solid waste, etc.), and have no separate budget; 
- SMAS, which are structures under the control of the municipality but devoted to 
WSS. They have their own budget but not juridical status, and the municipality 
power is still very strong (e.g., on tariffs and loans). Financial transfers between the 
WSS services and the municipality occur frequently (the principle of cost recovery 
is not implemented at all); 
- municipal enterprises, which are new corporate structures, organised as private 
enterprise but municipally-held. Management rules are more entrepreneurial and 
there are less financial transfers between municipal and water services’ budgets. 
Private sector participation 
According to Decree 372/93, the private sector can participate in the UWS, namely in 
contracts for the management of municipal systems, and in the form of a minority stake in 
the capital of the multi-municipal systems’ concessionaires. 
The most important private firms operating in Portugal are: CGE-Portugal (owned by 
Veolia Environnement), AGS (owned by Somague-Environnement), and Indaqua (owned 
by Mota-Engil, Soares da Costa, and Hidrante). In 2003, about 20 municipalities 
corresponding to about 22% of the total population had delegated the management of the 
service. However, if we exclude concession contracts with Lusagua and Aquapor, which 
are subsidiaries of the AdP public consortium, the proportion of population supplied only 
by private operators is less than 5%.  
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IRAR, the sector regulator 
IRAR is the regulator for water, sewerage and waste disposal. It is independent from its 
parent ministry (the Ministry of Environment) since it is financed by operators’ taxes.  
IRAR regulates concession contracts between multi-municipal systems and the State (about 
18 contracts) and also between municipalities and private operators (about 20 contracts). Its 
powers are giving advice, issuing recommendations, preparing regulations, reporting on the 
performances of the systems, and supervising the economic balance of the whole sector. 
The exception is the control of drinking water quality where it was assigned the full 
responsibility for all water services (and not only concessionaires).  
Concerning the pricing policy, IRAR can issue non-binding opinions on tariffs in the 
concession of multi-municipal and municipal systems. In terms of entry in the market, 
IRAR issues recommendations about the awarding process of multi-municipal or municipal 
concessions. As for investment policy, it can issue an opinion about the concessionaires’ 
investment plans. Finally, in terms of the service quality regulation, IRAR proposes 
regulatory standards and gathers information on quality levels of the services, which is used 
for comparing the different concessionaires. This information is published regularly and is 
intended to create competitive pressures through benchmarking.  
When compared to other regulatory agencies in Portugal (e.g., for telecommunications and 
electricity), IRAR has been assigned similar objectives, yet its powers are far less extended 
(Martins and Fortunato, 2002).  
Most common institutional structures 
Three types of institutional arrangements co-exist in the UWS in Portugal after reform, 
namely direct public management, delegated public management, and delegated private 
management. 
Direct public management can only be found in municipal systems. Local authorities 
directly manage the systems through municipal or municipalized services, and own the 
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water assets. The tariff structure is decided by the municipal board. The responsible entity 
corresponds to the management entity. Moreover, municipalities who directly manage their 
water systems are not subject to IRAR’s regulation. 
Delegated public management is present in municipal systems (when a municipal company 
is created) and in multi-municipal systems (when a concessionaire company is created to 
manage the multi-municipal system). The management entity is the municipal company in 
the case of municipal systems, and the concessionaire company created by the State in the 
case of multi-municipal systems. In the latter case, the concessionaire owns the 
infrastructure during the period of the concession. At the end of the concession the 
infrastructure becomes the property of the State. In municipal systems the same occurs with 
the exception that, by the end of the concession, the infrastructure becomes property of the 
municipality. Finally, in multi-municipal systems, the State is responsible for financing 
investments. A partial privatisation of the concessionaire (through a minority stake) is seen 
as a way to diversify financial sources.  
Delegated private management is permitted only in municipal systems, where local 
authorities delegate the management through a bid. It can be a concession (contract with 
investment requirements for the concessionaire), a lease (contract with no investment 
requirements for the concessionaire for a maximum period of 15 years), or BOT contracts 
(when a single facility or a group of assets have to be built). The management entity, in 
case of delegated management contracts, is the private operator. In concession contracts the 
responsibility for the provision of the service is held also by the private operator.  
The concessionaire has the right to set the tariffs and to demand payment for the respective 
tariff, yet the municipality must give its prior approval. The tariff’s structure is defined in 
the concession contract. The concessionaire must regularly present investment plans to be 
approved by the municipality. The concessionaire owns the infrastructure during the period 
of the concession and at the end of the contract the infrastructure becomes the property of 
the municipality. 
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Conclusion 
The 1993 reform is changing the way the water sector is organised and regulated in 
Portugal. The reform looks for efficient trade-offs across different layers and regulatory 
governance mechanisms. On the one hand, there is a partition of responsibilities between 
the various levels: the local level is in charge of water distribution and sewerage, the 
regional level is in charge of water production and wastewater treatment, and, finally, the 
national level provides and channels funds (from the EU) to multi-municipal systems 
(when there are reasons of national interest).  
On the other hand, there is a mix of regulatory governance mechanisms, ranging from 
concession contracts to the creation of a sector regulator, with coercive powers in terms of 
drinking water quality and diffusing information in other areas of economic regulation.  
The following sections present two case-studies illustrating new forms of organisation 
resulting from the 1993 reform, namely delegated public management in a multi-municipal 
system, and delegated private management in a municipal system. 
6.3.2 Case-Study 3: Delegated Management by Concession 
Case-study 3 (CS3) illustrates a delegated public management arrangement in a 
multi-municipal system. It aims at pointing out the main issues in terms of risk-sharing, and 
the main factors of vulnerability of capital investment. Because this case refers to bulk 
activities, the analysis of the vulnerability factors of universal service provision is not 
made. 
The multi-municipal company was created by decree in 2000. The shareholders are AdP, 
which is the state-owned holding company, the Regional Association of Municipalities, and 
15 municipalities.  
The company was directly awarded a 35-years concession contract to manage and explore 
a multi-municipal system comprising 15 municipalities. The contract does not foresee any 
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financial transfer from the concessionaire to the conceding entity (i.e., the State). All the 
benefits arising from tariff collection have to be transferred to the supplied municipalities. 
The system pertains to bulk activities, i.e. drinking water production and wastewater 
treatment. The responsibility for water distribution and wastewater collection remains with 
the municipalities. In the majority of these cases, retail drinking water and sanitation 
services are directly provided by the respective municipalities or by water-specific 
municipal services. In two cases, water services were delegated to a private/mix operator.   
The main actors concerned with water services are the municipalities, the multi-municipal 
company, customers, IRAR, the Ministry of Environment and its institutes (Figure 13). 
Figure 13 Main actors in CS3 
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Risk sharing 
The most interesting result from the analysis of this case study is that there is a strong 
dispersion of responsibilities among the different actors. Apart from this general comment, 
there are three other, more specific, remarks.  
Firstly, the concessionaire only bears the traditional business risks. And, even for these 
risks (i.e., construction, demand, operational, and financial), it shares responsibilities with 
other actors such as the municipalities.  
Secondly, reform risks are taken by other actors in the system than the concessionaire. 
Social risks are taken by the municipalities, which are the responsible entities for retail 
water services. As for regulatory risks, it is interesting to note that they are somehow 
understated by the concessionaire, because in multi-municipal concessions tariffs are 
approved following a cost-plus model where shareholders have a guaranteed 
return-on-investment. 
Thirdly, the consumer is identified as the main risk-taker in terms of exogenous risks. The 
main reason is that they bear the costs in terms of higher tariffs, service disruptions, and 
lower quality of the service resulting from macroeconomic, political, or force majeure 
events.    
Capital investments 
The concessionaire has an extensive investment plan for the duration of the contract. These 
investments are mainly related to the expansion of capacity, especially in the wastewater 
systems, but also to adapt the systems to more stringent environmental and service quality 
standards. The decrease in operational costs is another very important reason justifying 
capital investments, as pointed out by the concessionaire.  
Cohesion Funds and the loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) represent a 
significant share in terms of funding sources of capital investment. Revenues, equity, and 
commercial loans are the remaining sources.  
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There still is an important dependency on subsidies to cover part of capital expenses. This 
dependence is explained by the same facts that were the basis of the creation of the multi-
municipal companies. As a matter of fact, these companies were created and awarded a 
concession in systems with heavy investment requirements, considered to be of national 
interest. For this reason, they are the privileged recipients of Cohesion Funds.   
The concessionaire considers the lack of financial resources (including delays in the 
reimbursement of funds), the risk that authorities reinterpret or create new rules affecting 
the costs and/or revenues, and the resistance to increase tariffs as being the most important 
factors increasing the risk of capital investments.  
There are also other factors delaying investments, such as the slow process of public 
interest licences’ attribution. These licences are necessary when works in the drinking 
water and wastewater systems require using private property. 
Conclusion 
This case-study presents particular features, which somehow de-characterise the essence of 
a concession arrangement. It is true that the concessionaire (for the management of the bulk 
water systems) is responsible for investing in the infrastructure. Yet, these investments 
largely depend on funds channelled by the State because they are considered to be of public 
interest. 
The dry-up of these public subsidies may jeopardise future capital investments, especially 
in a context of resistance to increase tariffs. This point is particularly sensitive because the 
customers (i.e., the municipalities that buy the bulk water services) are also shareholders of 
the concessionaire.  
Finally, the uncertainty related to the real conditions of the network is not considered 
relevant because a significant part of the network is relatively new and still under 
expansion, especially the waste water systems. 
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6.3.3 Case-Study 4: Delegated Management by Concession 
This case-study illustrates a delegated private management arrangement in a municipal 
system. The local council decided to delegate WSS services to a private operator through a 
competitive tendering process. A private company won the bid and signed in 1997 a 
25-year concession contract with the municipality to provide water services. The 
company’s shareholders are a subsidiary of the state holding AdP (60%) and a subsidiary of 
a private holding company (40%). 
The concession contract comprises the development of all the necessary activities to secure 
the supply of water services in the entire municipality territory, including the maintenance 
and conservation of infrastructures. The municipality and the operator are the main actors 
in the system (Figure 14).  
Figure 14 Main actors in CS4 
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The municipality’s duties are to approve tariffs according to the tariff structure in the 
contract, and to approve the investment plans of the operator. As for the operator, it is 
responsible for the provision of water services, the maintenance and conservation of 
infrastructures, as well as customer management. The operator pays a fee to the 
municipality that is supposed to cover new capital investments. Other important actors 
concerned with water supply services include the IRAR and the Ministry of Environment 
and its institutes.  
In the following sections, the main trends on risk-sharing, as well as the most important 
vulnerability factors of capital investment and universal service provision are presented. 
Risk sharing 
There is a strong diffusion of responsibilities between the various actors in the large water 
systems, as it is the case in CS3. The main actors bearing the risks are the operator (demand 
and operational risks), the consumer (financial, regulatory, and exogenous risks), the 
municipality (construction and social risks), and the State (social, political, and 
force-majeure risks).  
It is surprising that, even though it is a concession contract, construction risks are taken by 
the municipality. A closer look at the contract shows that new works pertaining to the 
extension of the systems to connect new users, as well as new investments required for 
respecting sanitary and environmental rules, are the responsibility of the municipality.  
In terms of the risks created by the reform, the same fact explains that regulatory risks 
are also taken by the municipality and, ultimately, by customers through higher tariffs. As 
for social risks, they are jointly born by the operator, the municipality, and the State, which 
cover the special mechanisms to help financially-stressed consumers.  
Regarding exogenous risks, in particular exchange rate, political, and environmental risks, 
the operator has the expectation that higher costs are covered by higher tariffs. However, 
this may not be the case if the customers’ unwillingness to pay for higher tariffs limits 
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increases in the water bill. Exogenous risks are also taken by the State, which ultimately 
has to guarantee the public service. The operator highlighted the rising importance of 
environmental risks, especially due to climate change and its consequences in terms of 
water availability.  
Capital investment 
According to the contract signed between the municipality and the new operator, the 
concessionaire is responsible for maintaining and repairing the water mains and pipes as 
well as the systems’ infrastructures, including the good functioning of electrical, electronic, 
mechanical and electromechanical equipments. However, new capital investments remain 
the responsibility of the municipality. This drains the substance of the concession and it 
gives the contract the characteristics of a leasing.  
New capital investments justified by the expansion of the service or by new environmental 
or sanitary legislation are to be defined and specified by the concessionaire, yet they remain 
the responsibility of the municipality (which has to cover the costs). In some of these cases, 
the municipality may directly award the execution of works to the concessionaire.  
In this context, the main reasons justifying capital investments by the operator are 
modernisation of equipments and infrastructures, reduction of operational costs, and 
improvement of the quality of the service (mainly reliability).  
Revenues and commercial loans are the most important funding sources for the 
concessionaire’s investments on capital. On the municipality side, capital investments are 
funded by the payment made by the concessionaire, but there is also a strong dependency 
on European funds. The lack of funding sources for capital investments is identified as the 
most important factor putting capital investments at risk in these systems. The 
concessionaire has often expressed dissatisfaction about the late execution of investments 
by the municipality.  
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Universal provision of the SGI 
The provision of drinking water and sanitation services is the responsibility of the 
concessionaire. The coverage rates are particularly high, namely 99% and 95% of the 
population for drinking water and wastewater treatment, respectively.  
It is part of the consumers’ rights to be provided with good quality water services that have 
no service disruptions. The regular control of the quality of the water provided in the 
system is in accordance with the Quality Monitoring Program approved by IRAR, the 
regulator. About 99% of all the laboratory analyses conducted in the first half of 2007 
respect the standards fixed by law (Law-decree 243/2001). The cases where the results did 
not respect the legal values were analysed in detail, and it was concluded that these were 
one-off cases that did not persist in subsequent controls. 
There are different tariffs for drinking water according to the types of consumers, namely 
domestic, commercial and industrial, non-profitable organisations, State, and local 
authorities. As for the sewerage and sanitation tariffs, they should at least cover the 
maintenance costs of the infrastructure, as well as specified fixed costs. The tariff is defined 
according to drinking water consumption volume and type of consumer. 
The concessionaire may negotiate drinking water contracts with special tariffs, as long as 
every customer under the same circumstances may benefit from the same conditions (that 
is, it cannot be discriminatory). In exceptional cases, very low-income households may 
benefit from a highly subsidised tariff (funded by the concessionaire revenues). The Social 
Security Services need to attest the very low-income level of these households.          
It is possible by law to cut off service provision, in particular due to non-payment, as long 
as the customer is previously informed and is given the opportunity to repay its debts. In 
special cases, customers may be authorised to reschedule their debts and pay them off in six 
months maximum.  
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Conclusions 
At first, this case-study was meant to illustrate delegated management by concession. The 
available documentation makes several references to the signature of a concession contract 
between the concessionaire and the municipality. However, a closer look at the contract 
clauses shows that the municipality is responsible for more risks than it would be expected 
in a concession, in particular construction and regulatory risks. As a matter of fact, the 
municipality remains responsible for capital investments in the expansion of the 
infrastructure and its capacity, as well as those due to new environmental and sanitation 
standards.   
The new capital investments are funded by the fee that the concessionaire pays to the 
municipality, but this does not cover the totality of the costs and the importance of 
European funds is highly acknowledged.  
There are high coverage rates both in terms of water supply and sanitation with satisfactory 
drinking water quality results. From the interviews it became clear that cross-subsidies 
(mainly volumetric and across types of consumers) are widely used. Even though it is 
permitted by law to cut off the service due to non-payment, there are several mechanisms to 
protect low-income customers. The most important are: (1) special tariffs for the 
lowest-income households, and (2) special payment schemes for customers in financial 
distress. 
6.4. Mozambique: under the influence of the World Bank 
Mozambique is a country of 18 million inhabitants in Southern Africa. It is considered as 
one of the poorest and most indebted countries in the world, resulting among other factors 
from a 17 year-long Civil War that lasted until 1992. The existing water supply 
infrastructures date back to the 1960s and 1970s. These systems need both maintenance and 
expansion, but there is a general lack of funds to do so. There is a low and, in some cases, 
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non-existent coverage in terms of water services. Moreover, tariffs are normally very low, 
and there is a high level of uncollected revenues.  
In 1995, the Council of Ministers issued a Resolution defining a National Water Policy. 
The design of the Policy was assisted by the World Bank (WB). Moreover, numerous 
donors set their own preconditions before contributing to investments. The proposed 
programmes emphasized in particular the need for decentralisation and private management 
of the urban water system (e.g., IMF, 1998). The following section presents the 
Mozambican model in more detail. 
6.4.1 The Mozambican model49 
According to the National Water Policy, water resources management must be 
decentralised to autonomous entities, at the water basin level, and water services to the 
provincial level. Moreover, the Government is to withdraw from the delivery of the 
services and focus exclusively on defining priorities, guidelines, and the minimum levels of 
service provision. This Policy also mentions the participation of the private sector in the 
provision of water supply and, furthermore, it stipulates that water prices should reflect its 
economic value. 
In 1998, the Framework for Delegated Management (FDM) gives effect to the principle 
of decentralisation and establishes delegated management (Decree No 72/98). It recognises 
that water supply is inefficient and that it thus needs restructuring. The Framework is a 
coordinated set of entities and legal mechanisms that structures the participation of firms 
under private law in the provision of water supply services.  
The reform of the sector creates two different types of systems. The first type includes the 
systems under the Framework for Delegated Management, mostly for major urban cities. 
                                                 
49 This section is partially based on (Luís-Manso and Finger, forthcoming). 
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The assets and the responsibilities for service provision are transferred to a newly created 
public fund (FIPAG), which is in charge of delegating the management of these systems to 
private operators. The second type refers to the remainder of the territory and results from 
the decentralisation of water system responsibilities to provincial authorities.  
The most important actors participating in the sector are illustrated in Figure 15. The 
Ministry of the Public Works and Housing is responsible for the overall policy formulation, 
rule making, and promotional activities in the sector. Its agency, the National Water 
Directorate, is responsible for strategic management of water resources, the implementation 
and extension of the Framework for Delegated Management, as well as the mobilization of 
financing resources.  
Figure 15 Main actors in the water sector in Mozambique 
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Under the Framework, two important entities are created. Firstly, the Investment and Assets 
Fund for Water Supply (FIPAG in Portuguese), which is the public owner of the water 
supply assets under delegated management. Secondly, the Water Regulatory Council (CRA 
in Portuguese), which is the sector regulator and, as such, is responsible for regulating the 
water supply services, as well as for guaranteeing the interests of the users who fall under 
the delegated management framework. In addition, there are Municipal Delegates, who are 
local representative of the CRA, have the role to maintain communication links with local 
authorities and consumers, as well as to identify consumers’ needs and areas at risk. The 
following section presents the main features of the model created by the Framework for 
Delegated Management, which are delegated management and private sector participation, 
as well as the creation of FIPAG and CRA.   
Main features of the model 
Delegated management and private sector participation 
FIPAG is the only empowered entity to sign delegated management contracts with a private 
operator. The largest urban water systems in the country are already under the Framework 
of Delegated Management, and a series of management and lease contracts were already 
signed with a private operator. They last 5 and 15 years, respectively. 
It was decided that a single international bidding process was to be done and that the 
winner consortium would sign different contracts in five different urban water systems (for 
reasons explaining this decision, see Ricketson, 1998). Lately, four other cities were 
included in the same framework and new contracts are being negotiated. 
Initially, the process of delegation has had some drawbacks, especially when the lead 
participant abandoned the private consortium during the first years of the contracts. 
Nevertheless, the negotiations between the remaining partners and public authorities 
resulted in the signing of new contracts, which was considered a success due to the difficult 
context of the country. 
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FIPAG 
FIPAG is a public body assigned with the authority to represent the Government as a 
partner to the contract. FIPAG is also the owner of the assets under the Framework for 
Delegated Management. It is responsible for planning and implementing investment 
programs in these water systems, including rehabilitation and expansion, for contracting 
private companies to manage services, and for monitoring the private operators. FIPAG 
also has operational responsibilities in the case of management contracts. 
The main challenge for FIPAG is that it does not have the ordinary characteristics of an 
investment fund, which may deviate the Fund from its important functions of evaluating 
investment needs and gathering the necessary funds. It actually plays the role of both 
operator (for management contracts) and lessor (for lease contracts).  
CRA 
CRA is a national public entity with financial and administrative autonomy. Its main 
functions are economic regulation (namely to approve tariffs proposed by FIPAG and to 
guarantee the sustainability of the system), consumer protection, mediation between the 
partners of the contract, and advice to the Government (e.g., in term of contract design and 
operator’s activities). 
The main challenges for CRA pertain to the fact that its decisions are not binding, except 
for tariffs, and the existence of an overlap of responsibilities with FIPAG when it comes to 
monitoring operators’ performance and to guarantee the sustainability of the system. 
Most common institutional structures 
The legal framework for the water sector in Mozambique foresees two types of institutional 
arrangements, namely direct public management and delegated private management. 
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Direct public management 
According to the National Water Policy, the management of water services has to be 
decentralised to provincial authorities. This is especially the case in smaller towns and rural 
areas, where provincial governments become responsible for providing water services to 
the population.  
Because these systems do not belong to the Framework of Delegated Management, the 
authorities are not entitled to delegate the management to a private operator (only FIPAG 
is). However, there are other types and degrees of private sector participation. For example, 
local provincial governments are increasingly contracting out specific tasks to local private 
firms (normally via service contracts). Due to the same reason, the operators of these 
systems are not subject to the rules of the regulator, whose jurisdiction is limited to the 
systems under the Framework. 
Delegated private management 
Under the Framework for Delegated Management, assets are transferred to FIPAG (and not 
to municipalities), which becomes empowered to delegate the management to private 
operators. FIPAG can sign concession, lease and management contracts. In practice, there 
are only two types of contracts: lease and management contracts.  
Under lease contracts, the private operator is responsible for operating and maintaining 
FIPAG facilities, billing and collecting tariffs, at its commercial risk. The operator retains 
part of the tariff, and has to pay a fee to FIPAG and to CRA.  
Under management contracts, the operator is responsible for operating and maintaining 
FIPAG facilities, and for billing and collecting tariffs on behalf of FIPAG. Customers are 
under contract with FIPAG and not the private operator. The private operator receives a 
management fee, part of which is linked to the operator’s collection performance.    
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Conclusion 
The example of Mozambique illustrates the case of a water sector reform in a developing 
country facing important financial constraints to improve its water systems and serious 
water-related public health problems.  
The Mozambican water sector reform was heavily influenced by international development 
agencies and donors, and occurred in an almost complete regulatory void. To recall, the 
creation of an independent regulatory agency and the development of its regulatory 
capacities were only done ex-post, i.e., after the main delegated management contracts had 
been designed, which created inefficiencies in the regulatory activity. 
Two important outcomes of reform are decentralisation and delegation of management. 
The responsibility for water provision is increasingly being delegated to the provincial 
level, without however simultaneously delegating the ownership of the infrastructures, and 
the corresponding allocation of the required financial means. The decision to delegate the 
management can only be taken by the government, by allocating the system to the 
Framework of Delegated Management. We are therefore in the presence of two completely 
different regulatory governance mechanisms. The following section illustrates a case of 
delegated management. 
6.4.2 Case-Study 5: Delegated Management by Leasing 
This case-study illustrates a delegated management arrangement by leasing in 
Mozambique. After an international competitive tender, a 15-year lease contract was 
awarded to a single private consortium, composed of national and international companies. 
All infrastructures and water assets remained under public ownership, more precisely 
owned by FIPAG.  
The private firm is responsible for operating water supply facilities, conducting specified 
renewals and extensions (acting as a contractor to FIPAG), and billing and collecting 
customers’ tariffs (at the firms’ own commercial risk). Part of the tariff is used to pay rental 
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and regulatory fees to FIPAG and CRA, respectively. The main actors in the system are 
presented in Figure 16. 
Figure 16 Main actors in CS5 
 
Following the same structure of the previous case-studies, we now focus on risk-sharing, 
capital investment, and universal provision of the water supply services. 
Risk sharing 
In the context of the lease contract signed between the private operator and FIPAG, there is 
a clear risk-sharing pattern between the partners in terms of business risks. The private 
operator runs the business at its own demand, operational, and financial risk. As for 
FIPAG, which is the asset owner and the responsible entity for capital investment, it bears 
the construction and investment risks. However, a considerable part of these risks is 
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transferred to tax-payers because tariffs do not cover the totality of capital investments, and 
the loans from multilateral development agencies are repaid with the public budget. 
Ultimately, the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society bear these risks because 
efforts (and aid) are diverted to pay the debt. 
Regulatory risks are shared between the partners of the contract. The risk pertaining to the 
reinterpretation or creation of rules affecting current costs (or revenues) is borne by the 
private operator, while those affecting capital costs (or revenues) are borne by FIPAG. 
The major problem in this water system pertains to social risks because poor sectors of the 
population are taking all the costs which translate into no access or poor water quality. As a 
matter of fact, less than 50% of the population is connected to the network and benefits 
from water services. Despite the joint effort from all stakeholders to provide drinking water 
to all through public fountains, there is still a long way to go. 
Exogenous risks, apart from exchange rate risks that are taken by the operator, are shared 
between the partners of the contract. As the first years of the contract show, force majeure 
risks pertaining to weather events are particularly important due to the strong vulnerability 
of the systems and the population. Ultimately, it is the poorest citizens that suffer the most 
because they have no alternative sources of reliable drinking water supply. 
Capital investments 
FIPAG is the responsible entity for capital investments in the systems under delegated 
management, as it is the case of this one. Its autonomy and responsibility includes the 
financial and investment management for the rehabilitation and expansion of water assets, 
as well as the maximization of existing assets’ efficiency.  
The main priority of the system is to increase service coverage rates. Therefore, the main 
reasons justifying capital investments are capacity expansions and modernization of old 
assets and equipments. 
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The lack of financial resources is the most important factor increasing the vulnerability of 
capital investments. As a matter of fact, there is a heavy dependence on international aid, 
with capital investments being mainly funded by capital grants provided by cooperation aid 
and subsidized loans from multilateral development agencies.  
The uncertainty of the conditions of underground assets is another factor increasing the 
vulnerability of capital investments. It is important to remember that a significant part of 
the existing network was built before the country’s independence (mainly in the 1960s and 
1970s). 
Finally, stakeholders also identify regulatory risks as being a very important factor 
affecting decisions about capital investments. There are mainly two reasons for this. Firstly, 
it is the regulatory agency that approves final prices and proposes new areas for expansion 
of the network (i.e., influences investment plans). Secondly, it is not clear in the existing 
regulatory framework who the responsible entity for the infrastructure expansion plans and 
investment programs is, as these responsibilities are shared between CRA and FIPAG. This 
can create inefficiencies and conflicts, which so far have only been avoided because the 
heads of both entities have had the good will to cooperate. However, a change in the 
composition of the boards in any of these two entities may jeopardise the established 
equilibrium. 
Universal provision of the SGI 
Only 43% of the population is provided with water supply services. Together with an even 
lower access rate to adequate sanitation, it makes the levels of mortality due to water-born 
diseases in the region very high. The situation is particularly serious in peri-urban areas, 
where the population growth is high. Access rates are low due to scarce capacity (i.e., the 
infrastructure is not developed) and non-affordability reasons. 
For the population that has access to the network and that is served by the private operator, 
operational costs are covered by the tariffs. Tariffs are volumetric and differ according to 
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the type of consumers, namely domestic, commercial, industrial, and public. The private 
operator may cut off the service due to non-payment. 
As for the remaining population, there is a great dependency on informal markets and 
public fountains, which are a way to provide safe drinking water services to populations in 
areas which are not served by the household network. The problems with informal markets 
are the quality of the water provided and the consequent risks it poses in terms of public 
health. 
Since the signature of the lease contract, several partnerships were developed between 
FIPAG, the private operator, the regulator, the municipalities, NGOs, and the local 
population in order to improve the management of public fountains, in particular by 
increasing the participation of local communities. Public-private-community partnerships 
are considered to be the only viable solution to solve the master challenge of providing 
drinking water services to the poorest citizens. 
The main recommendations in terms of public fountains management defined by such 
partnerships are: (1) to implement a commercial attitude for the management of the public 
fountain; (2) to put an efficient monitoring scheme of the fountain’s operator into action; 
(3) to set a lower water price for public fountains than the price of informal markets; and 
(4) to involve the local community in deciding on the payment schemes. 
Conclusion 
This case-study illustrates a reform process heavily influenced by the World Bank and 
international donors, as it is the case in other developing countries. The reform envisaged 
decentralisation, delegation of management, and private sector participation. Following an 
international competitive bid, a private operator was selected as a partner to a 15-year lease 
contract.  
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The framework implemented to delegate the management to the private operator is singular, 
with a national public entity owning the assets and being responsible for gathering the 
necessary funds for capital investments, which is at the same time the lessor to the contract.  
The main positive aspects of this case are the self-sustainability of the existing system in 
terms of operations and management (that is, the private operator does not receive any 
subsidies); there is a good balance of powers (and understanding) between the different 
institutions in the Framework; and the private operator is presently taking responsibilities in 
other urban water systems in the country, although with fewer responsibilities and risks. 
On the contrary, there are also important drawbacks, which may not be related to the 
organisation of the system but need to be taken into account. One is that a significant part 
of the population is excluded from drinking water services. The other is that due to serious 
financial constraints in the country, there is a strong dependency on public aid and 
subsidised loans from development agencies, especially for funding capacity expansions. 
6.5. Comparative analysis and concluding remarks 
The cases presented in this chapter show that reform is a reality in several water systems, 
with changes ranging from the introduction of competition to private sector participation 
(PSP), and the creation of regulatory agencies. It is important to emphasise that although 
reform is a reality in all these systems, it differs significantly from case to case (Table 13).  
The degree of private sector participation differs considerably across countries, from the 
total transfer of management rights and asset ownership to the private operator in England, 
large-scale participation of private operators in delegated management contracts in France 
and, increasingly, in Mozambique, to limited participation in multi-municipal companies in 
Portugal. In all countries but England and Wales, asset ownership is public. 
It is worthwhile to mention that an important part (not to say the majority) of the private 
sectors operating in the three European countries is national. Although French TNCs are 
present in Portugal, there is also a strong presence of Portuguese private groups in 
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managing the sector. On the contrary, the shareholders of the private operator in 
Mozambique are mainly owned by a foreign company. 
As for the type of competition, there has been an effort to introduce competition for the 
market in France, Portugal, and Mozambique. However, the intuitu personae principle in 
France, the direct award of concession contracts in multi-municipal systems in Portugal, as 
well as the direct award of management contracts in the most recent cities joining the FDM 
in Mozambique have limited its implementation.  
In England and Wales, there is no competition for the market but, in contrast, there has 
been an effort to introduce effective market competition (but only for customers who are 
likely to buy more than 50 mega litres of water a year). However, the English system relies 
mainly on comparative competition, by including operators’ performance information in 
the price control regime. The Portuguese regulator also performs benchmarks but its 
activity is limited to the operators under delegated management contracts. Moreover, prices 
are fixed in the contracts and do not depend directly from benchmarks.  
In three of the four countries analysed, a regulatory agency was created at the time of 
reform, namely OFWAT in England and Wales, IRAR in Portugal, and CRA in 
Mozambique. Their attributions differ both in terms of area of influence and coercive 
powers. OFWAT is unquestionably the regulator with more coercive and discretionary 
powers, and its authority is extended to all water systems in the country. As for IRAR, its 
coercive powers are limited to drinking water quality controls. In terms of economic 
regulation, its powers are more restricted and its authority is limited to systems under 
concession contracts. Finally, CRA has coercive powers in terms of price, however and 
similarly to IRAR, its authority is limited to the systems under the Framework for 
Delegated Management. 
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Apart from the creation of a sector specific regulator, regulation by contract is also a 
common mechanism of regulatory governance in the water sector. It is interesting to note 
that in two of the analysed countries, namely Portugal and Mozambique, the two regulatory 
governance systems coexist50. 
The comparison of the reform features across the different case-studies has already 
anticipated the fact that there is a large diversity in terms of institutional arrangements. 
Except for the English case where there are only direct private management arrangements, 
in all other countries different arrangements co-exist (Table 14).  
Table 14 Types of institutional arrangements across case-studies 
Country Direct Public Management 
Delegated Public 
Management 
Delegated Private 
Management 
Direct Private 
Management 
England & Wales     
France      
Portugal     
Mozambique     
Legend: 
 Co-existence of different types of institutional arrangements 
 Only one type of institutional arrangement 
 
In France, the local authorities may choose whether to directly manage the water systems 
or to delegate it to a private operator. Delegated private management contracts are mainly 
leases with a relatively long duration.  
                                                 
50 Although in practice this is not very common. 
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In Portugal, in municipal systems, the local authority may choose whether to directly 
manage the system or to delegate it to a public or private operator. In multi-municipal 
systems, the management is delegated to a publicly-owned company where private partners 
can only have minority stakes.  
Finally, in Mozambique there are also two types of systems. In the systems under the FDM, 
the management is delegated to a private operator, while in the systems outside the FDM 
the provincial authority is increasingly becoming responsible for the management of water 
systems. 
Risk-sharing patterns differ from case to case. When there is a contract, it is quite clear 
that partners share the majority of the risks. Problems arise when unpredictable or 
uncontrollable events (e.g., exogenous risks) jeopardize the established balance between the 
partners. This is aggravated the more incomplete the contract is.  
In the case of full divestiture, the private operator bears the majority of the risks alone, but 
ultimately it expects to transfer the extra costs related to these risks to the customer. 
However, the transfer depends upon the regulator’s perception of the reasons creating these 
risks, in particular whether they are endogenous or exogenous to the operator. This makes 
regulatory risks particularly important for the main risk bearer in the system. 
Social risks are very significant in the developing country case because they are mainly 
borne by excluded consumers, with all the consequent public health costs. The risk that the 
service of general interest is not provided to all is aggravated by exogenous risks due to the 
high vulnerability of the water systems as well as the consumers. Considering that most 
cities in developing countries already have pressing needs in terms of water services, the 
expected growth rate of (peri-)urban population for the coming decades (UNFPA, 2007) 
will only aggravate the problem. 
Capital investments and the universal provision of the service of general interest were 
identified in Part II as being the main elements at risk because of the sector’s reform. From 
the case-studies, one can say that regulatory risks are a particularly important factor 
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increasing the vulnerability of capital investment. The decisions regarding the definition 
of tariffs and the approval of investment plans (OFWAT in England and CRA in 
Mozambique), the implementation of more stringent standards (the European Union), the 
large discretion of local authorities (France), and the overlapping of functions between 
entities (Mozambique) do actually affect the decisions, the need, as well as the returns on 
investment. 
The dependency upon subsidies and public aid for the expansion of capacity follows next in 
terms of factors increasing capital investment vulnerability in the case-studies, especially in 
France (public subsidies), Portugal (European Funds), and Mozambique (Multilateral 
Development Agencies and international donors).  
The exception is the English case, where private operators do not benefit from any subsidy. 
However, one cannot neglect that in Europe, as is the case in other developed regions, the 
process of developing the infrastructure network has taken one or two generations. It was 
highly subsidised by public funds and across regions (from urban to rural areas), and it 
benefited from long periods of economic growth.  
Today, the implementation of full-cost recovery policies in developed countries mainly 
refers to operational, maintenance and rehabilitation costs, and not capital costs (into new 
infrastructure). Therefore, one has to question the request to implement full-cost recovery 
policies (including recovery of capital costs) that is often made for developing countries, 
where the population has typically lower ability to pay for the services. 
Amortisation periods and contract duration do not come out as key factors in the 
case-studies because there are no real concession contracts. In all the examples considered, 
the operators have no responsibility related to financing and materialising capital 
investments.  
As for the uncertainty related to the conditions of underground infrastructure, this is only 
considered as relevant in the cases where responsibilities are transferred to a different entity 
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(e.g., the private operator) and assets are not new (such as the English and Mozambican 
cases). 
In terms of the vulnerability of the universal provision of the SGI, one has to distinguish 
two cases: non-provision of the service due to non-capacity of the system (calling for a 
need to expand the system) or to non-affordability of the service.  
In the case-studies in Europe, risks are that customers cannot afford the water bill. 
However, in all the cases there are specific schemes funded by the operator (via 
cross-subsidies) to aid customers in financial distress or direct public subsidies to the 
poorest consumers. 
The situation is more acute in the case of Mozambique, where non-provision is due to 
non-affordability but also to non-capacity of the system. A network of informal suppliers 
provides non-regulated services with significant quality and reliability limitations, which 
potentially pose public health problems. In this situation, the problem of non-provision of 
the service coincides with the lack of capital investments in the system. 
Finally, it is important to identify the main challenges of regulation across the different 
systems (Table 15). When there are contracts, such as in France, the main challenges are to 
overcome the problem of information asymmetry and limited capacity of local authority to 
control operators’ performance, as well as low contestability. These problems are somehow 
minimised when there is a regulatory agency performing benchmarking activities, as is the 
case in Portugal for systems under delegated management. 
The main challenges for regulatory agencies, such as those in England, Portugal, and 
Mozambique, are the collection of good quality information (free from the operators’ 
manipulation), as well as the definition of good relative performance indicators. In the 
specific case of the Portuguese regulator, non-binding decisions in terms of economic 
regulatory decisions limit its influence.  
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Table 15 Major challenges of economic and social regulation across different systems 
Country Regulatory Governance Major challenges 
France local authorities contract 
- overcome information asymmetry and limited capacities 
from municipalities to control the operator 
- low contestability 
England regulatory agency - necessity of good quality information  - good relative performance indicators 
Portugal 
local authorities 
contract 
regulatory agency 
- overcome information asymmetry and limited capacities 
from municipalities to control the operator  
- lack of regulatory agency’s coercive powers 
Mozambique 
provincial authorities 
contract 
regulatory agency 
- clarify regulator’s functions vis-à-vis partners of the 
contract, including FIPAG 
- lack of regulatory ladder 
As for the regulator in Mozambique, the main challenges are the clarification of functions 
vis-à-vis the partners of the contract, in particular FIPAG’s responsibilities in terms of 
contract and operator control as well as investment plans. The sector regulator was created 
after the delegation of management to a private operator. Contracts left little discretion to 
the regulatory body, which is neither a party nor a supervisor of the contract. It remains 
unclear what the regulatory body’s exact responsibilities are.  
The definition of a regulatory ladder, which consists of a series of actions that may be taken 
if the operator fails to comply with the regulatory and contract requirements, could also 
significantly contribute to reducing regulatory risks. 
In the following chapter we present the final chapter of this empirical analysis focusing on 
operators’ strategies. Operators are very important actors in the sense that they are 
monopolists in the local systems they operate in and, in many cases, also accumulate other 
essential responsibilities, such as regulation, planning, and policy-making. 
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Chapter 7. Operators’ strategies: what to expect in a reform context 
This chapter presents a study on operators’ strategies in the UWS performed in the context 
of the Euromarket project51. The results are therefore independent of the questionnaire and 
the case-studies presented in the previous chapters, and aim at exploring whether operators’ 
strategies are aligned with the above collected evidence.  
The analysis is based upon ten case-studies52 selected to illustrate different types of 
operators (Annex 3). The study focuses on European operators and, to a lesser extent, on 
their activities in developing countries. As a matter of fact, European companies are a 
common presence on bidding processes in the latter markets. In the majority of cases, the 
local private sector is not developed and foreign companies win the delegated management 
contracts. 
We start out in section 7.1 by identifying the strategies per type of operator. Then, in 
section 7.2, we present a table summarising the main results, highlighting the factors related 
to operators’ strategies that potentially affect capital investments and universal provision of 
the service of general interest (SGI). Finally, in section 7.3, we conclude by assessing the 
alignment of these strategies with the challenges posed by the sector’s reform. 
7.1. Strategies per type of operator 
The concept of strategy is not consensual in nature and has significantly evolved during the 
past decades, influencing the development of business strategy theories. Strategy herein 
pertains to the definition of aims and objectives of an operator, on the basis of the 
                                                 
51 The results were published in (Luís-Manso et al., 2007a). 
52 Case-studies are published in (Euromarket, 2004), available at http://www.epfl.ch/mir/euromarket.  
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recognition of opportunities and threats, and the response - including implicit and explicit 
(re)actions - to attaining these objectives. Both opportunities and threats come from 
external and internal forces to the operator, meaning it is important to consider the evolving 
environment, as well as the capabilities of the operator itself. 
One can distinguish two main difficulties in coming up with a systematic and rigorous 
analysis of water operators’ strategies. One difficulty pertains to the main specificities of 
the urban water sector, which prevent that theories from other sectors can be generalised 
(Schouten and Dijk, 2005).  
The other main difficulty is the number and diversity of water operators. Only in Europe, it 
is estimated that there are roughly more than 30’000 water operators, providing water 
supply and/or sanitation services. Moreover, UWS operators are very diverse, ranging from 
small non-autonomous public entities to large trans-national corporations (TNCs), as well 
as encompassing regional, public, mixed and private organisations.  
The strategies of water operators change from case to case and, in fact, different types of 
operators react differently and are exposed to varying realities and dynamics. For this 
reason, we identify the strategies per type of operators. 
In this chapter we present the results according to size and ownership. In terms of size, 
intervals were chosen to single out the specificities of operators, which range from very 
small to very large corporations. One consequence of this is that the category representing 
middle-size companies is very broad and, thus, we separate the analysis into public, private 
and mixed medium-size companies. In terms of small-size operators, they are mainly 
publicly-owned, while large-size operators are only privately and mixed owned. We start 
out by small public operators’ strategies. 
7.1.1 Small public operators 
In many countries, small, local public operators in the form of municipal services or 
municipal companies provide water supply and sanitation services, and even other services, 
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such as electricity and gas. Their objectives are normally formulated as follows: “efficient 
supply of services of a reliable quality, at an adequate pressure, at a reasonable price”.  
Small, local public operators operate in a setting, which is highly affected by public policy, 
and water management is considered to be a public task (Box 8). National, provincial and 
communal regulatory frameworks, including local environmental permits, provide a whole 
range of economic, social and ecological guidelines for these water operators. In fact, in a 
context of small operators, regulatory conditions are more easily established than for larger 
concessionary agreements, where conditions may be partly negotiated. 
Box 8 N.V. Tilburgsche Waterleiding-Maatschappij (TWM)53, Netherlands 
TWM is a municipal drinking water supply company with the objective to supply water in a sustainable way, 
meeting the traditional operating conditions for public works. TWM is characterised as a public owned 
company with a strong focus on product quality and cost price. TWM’s main shareholders are local 
authorities but it is an autonomous company. By and large the company is happy in the relationship with 
public authorities and the strategy is to maintain these good relations.  
The management of TWM thus perceives the current contractual arrangements as adequate. As the structure 
of ownership shows, the municipality is a key stakeholder with direct influence on the company management. 
Political intervention through the Municipality Council is reflected in the management only weakly. 
Nevertheless, in 2003, the managing director had to withdraw in a conflict with the Municipal Council.  
The level of compliance of TWM with the laws and regulations is currently regarded as good, but not relevant 
for the competitive position in the market, as there is no competition in the drinking water market. The 
management of the TWM does not see any advantages in having a free market for drinking water in the 
market for small users, as profit maximisation is not an objective. 
 
                                                 
53 Box 8 is based on the case-study made by TU Delft in the context of the Euromarket project. 
  
 
174
Funding systems involve a number of elements. An extraction fee is normally required for 
water production, which is to be paid to local or national governments. Customer price is 
based on cost plus a utility rate. The degrees to which revenues cover short- or long-term 
marginal supply costs, as well as environmental externalities depend very much on the 
situation. Smaller operators, as a consequence of their scale, may have high per unit cost 
for energy, and staff. These elements may drive strategies geared towards integration and 
expansion, to reap advantages of scale. 
According to some interviewees, the boards of these operators see no advantages in 
introducing competition in the sector, especially regarding small users, and are happy in 
maintaining the existing privileged relationship with the public authorities. Of course this 
secures stability in their generally good labour conditions. Related to this is the objective to 
further develop a ‘Socially Responsible Corporate Management’ dimension as a means to 
underline the local connection with water consumers and voters. By linking these aspects to 
their local world and creating a sense of connectedness with the population, as users and 
citizens, these small water operators seem to distinguish themselves from the large, 
anonymous, trans-national operating firms. This may be interpreted as a strategic move to 
fend off plans for restructuring and liberalisation. 
In some countries, competition is gradually developing in the market for large industrial 
consumers, which may choose to become self-reliant by abstracting their own water, or to 
go to other suppliers. In the long-run, the risk of losing large volume users is considered 
significant, with higher per unit supply costs and, consequently, prices as a result of under-
utilised capacity. So water suppliers are developing separate strategies towards communal 
drinking water supply and sanitation and the service to large users. 
It could be argued that depending on the quality of the water supplied and the wastewater 
released, small public operators consider more stringent environmental standards as a 
threat, or not. Indeed, when large investments are required, pressure may arise in the 
municipality to bring about restructuring, away from public ownership. Depending on 
circumstances, final prices may rise, reflecting the possibly higher level of environmental 
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and management costs to these firms. Also, local governments may be pressing the firms 
involved to increase their scale and scope, by means of associations of municipalities or 
mergers, in order to reduce costs and to facilitate environmental strategies (Box 9). 
Furthermore, policies with respect to River Basin Management may – in addition to cost - 
become important drivers in the integration of operators into larger entities. The relevance 
of integrating water supply and sanitation activities is often acknowledged as an effective 
and low-cost strategy to enhance efficiency. So, in the future, these small firms may be 
incorporated into (public) regionally-oriented companies, and municipalities into multi-
municipality companies, with common standards in respect of quality, hydrological, and 
environmental issues. 
Box 9 Aguas del Prat Plc54, Spain 
Aguas del Prat Plc was set up in 1989 as a public entity to supply water to Prat de Llobregat - a city with a 
population of 65,000 inhabitants. The local council created this municipal service as a public management 
tool to improve the quality of the water service, consolidate the role of the public sector in providing basic 
services, and maintain autonomy in the management and planning of this area. 
In 1999, faced with the growing possibility that private capital may enter the management of supply and 
sanitation systems, the municipal companies of Prat de Llobregat, Manresa, Reus and Mataró created the 
Integral Management of Waters of Catalonia Company (IMWC). The setting up of IMWC has allowed for the 
full use of synergies and an increase in individual representation. The objectives of this grouping of municipal 
companies are to: (1) define a common strategy and a common framework of action; (2) revaluate the benefits 
and advantages of public management of services; (3) exchange information about the evolution of the water 
sector; (4) analyse specific problems of the water sector in this geographical area; (5) analyse future 
opportunities; and (6) jointly participate in market activities related to water cycles and the environment. 
 
                                                 
54 Box 9 is based on the case-study made by University of Zaragoza in the context of the Euromarket project. 
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The need for additional capital and management expertise may eventually drive these 
utilities to offer shares to private investors in return for cash. Indeed, the example of such a 
(partial) privatisation is provided by the local electricity and gas utilities in the process of 
restructuring, in which the local authorities’ interest is clearly diminishing after having lost 
influence in day-to-day management.  
For the moment, one may be tempted to say that all these strategies are guided by the 
characteristics of the sector and its evolution and not so much by the size, segment or 
ownership. In fact, the first conclusion is that there is no real specific strategy for small 
local public authorities. However, one cannot forget that there is a sort of mission that small 
local public operators have towards consumers (with regards to quality of services), which 
in fact could be interpreted as a form of strategy to counter larger groups. Finally, the 
perception of profit is also largely absent or, in other words, different, compared to other 
larger private operators. 
7.1.2 Medium-sized operators 
Medium-sized public operators 
Throughout the past decade, there has been a clear trend towards the concentration of small 
public operators in the form of multi-municipal companies, association of municipalities 
and, in some cases, the creation of public holdings. The aim has been to search for the 
optimal size to exploit scale economies and allocate efficiently public funds. 
Ownership, size and the legal form seem to influence the strategy of medium public 
operators. In terms of size, medium operators sometimes extend their operations outside 
their initial local markets55 so as to benefit from scale economies. They do it, firstly, in 
                                                 
55 This depends on the legal system. For example in Germany, the “principle of locality” restricts the actions 
of municipal entities outside their initial regions. 
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adjacent geographical areas, and later in non-neighbouring markets including expansion 
overseas. In fact, entities that have traditionally been publicly owned and managed on a 
municipal basis are becoming genuine commercial entities able to operate outside their 
initial regions. Nonetheless, for all of them, the initial market remains the most important in 
terms of population served and revenues. In general, the higher the degree of autonomy is, 
the larger the difference in terms of strategy between medium and small public operators is.  
The expansion of operations to international markets has been restricted to developing and 
emerging economies and, in the majority of the cases, to countries presenting strong 
cultural and political ties to their domestic market (Box 10). This strategic geographical 
orientation, which has followed the strategy of large operators in the sector, is to a certain 
extent backed by multilateral development agencies as well as the domestic 
countries’ cooperation and foreign policies. This makes the withdrawal of operations from 
these markets, in case of serious drawbacks, much more difficult in political terms 
(contrary to large private operators). In fact, in the majority of cases, the objectives of 
public enterprises are twinned with those of the national Government.  
Box 10 Aguas de Portugal, SA 
Águas de Portugal (ADP) is a public holding company created in 1993. ADP works in all segments of water 
supply and sanitation sectors, and its core market is Portugal, yet the Group also operates, through its 
subsidiaries, in Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor and Mozambique. 
The choice of creating ADP as a public holding company must be placed in the current context of extension 
of the systems, as well as an instrument to channel EU funds efficiently. The strategic choices of ADP are 
deeply correlated to the Governmental policies and strategic objectives. In fact, ADP was created to develop 
multi-municipal water and wastewater systems so as to rise in an efficient and sustainable manner the 
percentage of Portuguese households served by drinking water and wastewater systems. One can imagine that 
this model will evolve when most investments are achieved and EU funds are allocated. 
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The provision of water supply and sanitation services operated under a de facto monopoly 
is normally the core business of this type of operator. Nonetheless, some of these 
operators56 are also competing for the provision of water services in systems open to some 
forms of competition (such as international bidding processes). In this case, medium and 
large private operators are perceived as the main competitors, yet the public ownership of 
the former may play a crucial role in obtaining the contracts. Amongst medium public 
operators’ non-core business one can consider the provision of other environmental 
services, such as urban waste, and energy (Box 11). 
Box 11 Canal de Isabel II57, Spain  
Canal de Isabel II (CIII)is a public company depending on the Autonomous Community of Madrid. It is a 
multi-utility with a firm basis in water services. The local government gave CIII the exclusive concessions to 
operate water and sanitation systems in 164 out of the 190 municipalities in the region. CIII has a good 
financial record since the 1980s, when, after a period of drought, it was allowed to invest in strategic 
infrastructures, financed by European funds, and to double water and sanitation tariffs.  
Given its position in the Madrid water management system, the company’s strategy to expand towards 
supplying other services and water systems depends mainly on its ability to prove that it is capable of 
supplying high quality services at a reasonable price. Local political decision-making is the main determinant 
in this process, where contracts are not awarded by public tender. In 2001, CIII did actually start a new stage 
of diversification and internationalisation of its activities by developing new businesses, focusing in Latin 
America. The energy sector is also a sector of special interest for CIII, which started operations in the 
generation, distribution, and commercialisation of electric energy and gas supply in Madrid.  
 
                                                 
56 So far multi-municipal associations have been excluded. 
57 Box 11 is based on the case-study made by University of Zaragoza in the context of the Euromarket project. 
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Regarding the scope of the market, these operators consider that size is not important and 
that their most important objective is to provide a public service to every citizen in their 
local area of operation. They have indeed a social strategy based on cross-subsidies from 
heavily populated urban areas towards rural areas. This is made possible because their 
activity is considered a public service by the State, which has therefore granted the 
exclusivity to explore these systems.   
The most important threats for medium public operators come from external factors, 
namely (1) the potential pressure to liberalise the water markets, (2) the claims in favour of 
non-discrimination of economic agents (e.g., implementation of the Treaty of Rome), and 
(3) the achievement of the objectives that were at the basis of the creation of these type of 
operators (such as the allocation of Cohesion Funds). 
The establishment of stricter environmental and public health requirements is in general 
welcomed by these operators, especially because up to now they have been complemented 
with public funds for financing the required improvements. In fact, and in comparison to 
other typology of operators, medium sized public operators benefit the most from European 
credits and funds. Therefore, their main strategy towards the EU is to comply with the 
legislation, so as to obtain funds to develop water systems and the quality of their services. 
Furthermore, these requirements have created new opportunities to get in rural and small 
town areas, which are facing difficulties to comply with the new requirements. In short, 
stricter requirements offer new opportunities for medium public operators to take 
advantages of their monopoly and economies of scale. Finally, their lobbying activities in 
relation to European institutions are usually developed through national governments.  
Medium public operators are normally responsible for capital investments (i.e., networks 
and other infrastructures) and are committed to develop water systems. In sum, these 
operators are normally instruments of the State, provinces or municipalities in order to fulfil 
strategic objectives. 
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Medium-sized private operator 
Private operators provide water services to one third of the European population. Even 
though large private operators have a stronger visibility and lobbying power, medium-sized 
private operators indeed provide water services to a bigger share of population than large 
ones do. Medium-sized private operators are normally the product of privatisation 
processes of formerly public operators, such as in England (Box 12), or the result of the 
diversification strategy of local private operators from other sectors into water (Box 13). 
Box 12 Severn Trent Plc58, England 
Severn Trent was initially formed in 1974 as a regional, state-owned water authority based in Birmingham 
responsible for water management and supply, and waste water treatment and disposal, in the catchment areas 
of two of Britain's largest rivers - the Severn and the Trent. Since 1989, as a private operator, Severn Trent 
Water has invested heavily in replacing and repairing its assets and infrastructure. As well as complying with 
Government legislation on drinking water quality and river pollution, it sets its own internal standards on 
issues such as public health, leakage reduction, and other sustainability targets. The company’s mission is to 
be a leading supplier of environmental products and services for the benefit of shareholders, customers, 
employees, and the wider community. 
Severn Trent has an international branch focused on providing private sector management in Western Europe, 
where state-owned water authorities are being restructured. It operates in Italy, Belgium, Germany, and 
Ireland. Furthermore, Severn Trent Services works with funding agencies and governments to support 
sustainable development and capacity building in the developing world, Eastern and Central Europe.  
Medium private operators have some common strategic features with medium operators in 
general, namely in terms of the expansion of activities to other geographical markets so as 
to benefit from economies of scale. For some of these operators, this is also a way of 
guaranteeing the sustainability of their businesses in the event of a competitive bidding 
process for their domestic market. For them, it is important that non-discriminatory rules 
                                                 
58 Box 12 is based on the case-study made by University of Zaragoza in the context of the Euromarket project. 
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are respected whenever concessions are awarded. In many cases, private operators join their 
efforts in associations aiming at lobbying for their interests. 
In the event of competitive processes, their main competitors are medium public and large 
private operators. Medium-sized private operators have normally the advantage of knowing 
the local market very well and, besides that, of participating in the bidding processes in 
collaboration with local financial and credit institutions. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the anti-privatisation movements have somehow 
ignored this type of operator. And this is even more bizarre since in many cases these 
operators are partially owned by the same large firms that are the object of heavy criticisms. 
The reason probably lies on the closer relationship these operators can build with citizens 
compared to large TNCs. And, in fact, medium-sized operators are highly aware of the 
important influence that the local civil society has on their businesses. 
Box 13 Indaqua, SA59, Portugal 
Indaqua is a public limited company set up in 1994 with private shareholders (Mota Engil, Teixeira Duarte, 
and Hidrante, all national companies). Indaqua develops its main activities in the north of Portugal where the 
rates of connection and treatment were lower. Local authorities need to make large investments to broaden 
service coverage, favouring the concession of these services to private enterprises. Indaqua’s main funding 
sources are the shareholders’ capital (about 20%), and debt (about 80%), including financing arrangements 
from the EIB. Indaqua and the Portuguese Association of Environmental Businesses are lobbying to exert 
pressure on the national government so as to promote a model of progressive liberalisation of the market. 
Indaqua wishes this new management model to be based on the British model with an independent regulator 
and legislation that allows for the entrance of private capital in every segment of the water systems. 
 
                                                 
59 Box 13 is based on the case-study made by University of Zaragoza in the context of the Euromarket project. 
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Medium-sized mixed operators 
Medium-sized organizations of mixed public/private capital in the UWS have emerged in 
the past decades in several countries. This, however, often happened in response to 
emergency situations, in which new control structures and private capital were needed in 
public organizations to catch up with lagging investments in the systems and weak 
operational and environmental performance.  
As ventures of public-private participation, local or regional authorities may retain 
significant amounts of shares, in addition to institutional (e.g., banks and pension funds) 
and other types of private investors (e.g., investors in the stock market) (Box 14). The 
strategy of these mixed local/regional monopolies is a combination of the orientations of 
the shareholder groups, each with its particular interest.  
Box 14 ACEA SpA60, Italy 
ACEA was established in 1909 as the electricity company supplying public and private lighting for the 
Municipality of Rome. It was only in 1937 that it became Azienda Governatoriale Elettricità e Acque 
(AGEA) with the addition of drinking water services. During the 1990s, ACEA became one of the major 
Italian utilities and, since 1999, 49% of its capital is floating on the stock exchange. Independently from this 
type of arrangement, ACEA tries to establish partnerships with local authorities based on mutual trust rather 
than mere contracted obligations. 
The Province of Rome and ACEA signed an agreement regarding management of integrated water services to 
come into effect on January 1, 2003. While acquiring the contract in its “captive” market in the area of Rome, 
ACEA started to engage in competitive bids in other regions, both as a partner in locally owned water 
operators and as a contractor. 
 
                                                 
60 Box 14 is based on the case-study made by TU Delft in the context of the Euromarket project. 
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In many cases, public authorities directly award concessions to the operators, so there is no 
competition at least in the domestic markets. Some of them compete in bidding for 
concessions outside their domestic markets mainly for two reasons: (1) they might fear to 
lose their concession contracts in the domestic market; or (2) to profit from their secure 
monopolistic position in the domestic market so as to increase their scale in new markets. 
The financial framework involves a number of elements. The operator normally operates 
on a cost-plus basis and the government refunds costs, occasionally subsidised by European 
funds. Normally, the compensation is based on reasonable shareholders’ remuneration of 
capital investments. The “plus” component is set at such a level that the financial results are 
appealing to private firms, as investors and contributors of technology and knowledge. 
In many cases, these firms may want to establish themselves as efficient, effective and 
reliable operators, rather than a governmental organisation or a pure for-profit firm. As a 
consequence of local or sector-related traditions and preferences, assets may be directly 
controlled by the operator or, in concessionary systems, by a public body. Public water 
policy, which remains exogenous to the operator, determines objectives, standards, 
guidelines and priorities. 
Whereas it is not directly engaged in political negotiations, the operator still advises on the 
technical feasibility and costs of potential measures. As its remuneration and tasks are 
linked to the politically-defined objectives, a main goal is to influence investment priorities 
and the process of standard setting in respect to environmental goals. So, eventually, 
technical reports for policy-support are an important element in the relationship with the 
government. By convincing authorities that such objectives and standards should - and 
could - be enhanced, the requirement for additional activity and investment is ascertained.  
In brief, private and public shareholders of the company have an argument to expand 
activities that are recognized as important by the public authorities, like environmental 
quality and security. They will do so by convincing authorities and the general public that 
this is feasible in an efficient manner. Outperforming existing norms may provide a 
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justification for, either, enhancing the norms further, or at least maintaining the level of 
costs allowances. 
More stringent standards are expected to increase the importance of technological 
innovations. In addition, policies with respect to River Basin Management drive the 
integration of operators into larger entities, combining water supply and sanitation activities 
together. Such changes are particularly interesting from the perspective of this type of firm. 
The need for technological developments and new management approaches to the water 
cycle stresses the importance of soft engineering techniques. In the future, small 
municipalities – lacking knowledge and access to capital - may seek recourse from such 
mixed capital regional operators. So widening the range of services offered and deepening 
their quality and impact provides the main perspective for expansion to these operators. 
These medium sized, regionally structured firms have the scale to develop and use more 
advanced technologies. Moreover, and equally important, through size they have the impact 
to be an effective, i.e. convincing, ‘partner’ to the local government in determining the 
outline of regional – or river basin level - water policies. Their size, and thus the scale at 
which technological solutions are applied, make these organizations an interesting objective 
for private technology and capital suppliers. 
These partnerships are an option for the management of the water sector, with the 
advantages of private - like technology, capital, and dynamism – as well as public 
involvement - like low cost of capital, reliance, high standards, and legitimisation. Their 
limited freedom of action (e.g., in terms of strategy formulation) is perceived as their main 
weakness. However, the main strength of the mixed approach is the ability to focus on 
technological innovation, unhampered by short-term market conditions. Moreover, unlike 
what is often suggested, these firms might deliberately choose to be inefficient by 
combining an ambitious public perspective on high environmental and security standards, 
with the appetite for the “plus” flowing from the “cost” associated (as higher standards 
drive up the “plus” component). 
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7.1.3 Large (private and mixed) operators 
Large operators are emerging as very important actors even though they only provide water 
services to about 15% of the world population. In terms of ownership, one can actually 
notice that there are no large public operators in this particular sector, and all are 
privately-owned, except one RWE, which is mixed. However, if one compares mixed and 
privately owned large operators, ownership does not seem to influence their strategy, either 
at home or abroad. Finally, in recent years there has been a trend towards the increasing 
participation of financial institutions in the ownership structure of these large operators.  
One could divide the major large operators into three markets: the French, the British, and 
the German. These large operators participate in - and, in some cases, control - several 
small and medium operators in other countries. French corporations are clearly dominating 
at the European and world levels, namely Veolia Environment, Suez Environment (Box 
15), and to a lesser extent SAUR.  
Although one can identify common characteristics in terms of strategy among these 
operators, there are also important differences most probably explained by the dominant 
management models and the water market restructuring policies in their domestic markets. 
Among the common characteristics of these operators is that they are listed in the stock 
exchange, which creates considerable pressures in terms of financial results. Indeed, all 
these operators have implemented the same type of business model pertaining to the 
provision of a public service yet remaining profitable. 
All large operators in the sector have international activities across different countries and 
even different continents. Nonetheless, for all of them, the European market remains the 
most important. Another important aspect is the prevalence in terms of importance of the 
domestic market, especially for operators created under the so-called British model. 
 
 
  
 
186
Box 15 Suez Environment, France 
Suez is owned by the Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (7.2%), employees (4%), Crédit Agricole (3.3%), CDC 
(3.2%), Cogema (2.3%), and the General Public (74.6%). It provides water services for about 125 million 
individuals daily, which makes it one of the world’s leading players in the sector.  Since 1997, Suez started as 
a conglomerate but then refocused its activities to become a global industrial group providing services in 
energy and environment for companies, individuals and municipalities.  
Suez Environment is an operational unit and its strategy corresponds to the strategy of the Suez group for the 
specific sectors of water and waste. Its main objectives are to strengthen its offer of environmental services at 
local level and to promote the public-private partnership model of delegated management, with a focus on 
operating performance and results. 
Europe is by far Suez’s most important region: in 2003, about 77% of its revenues were generated in this 
geographical area. The strategy of SE has considerably changed since 2002. The collapse of the Argentine 
economy and the international stock market crisis induced the Suez businesses to refocus on its European 
base and more stable markets. 
 
During the 1990s, large water corporations in general focused on acquiring markets in 
developing and emerging economies. This strategic geographical orientation was to a 
certain extent backed by multilateral development agencies. However, after some serious 
drawbacks, the focus of these international operators is now increasingly shifting to the 
more stable and regulated markets in developed economies, namely in Europe, where 
funding is available.  
These groups normally operate in several sectors, such as energy and the environment 
(i.e., water and waste), and are therefore able to propose specific combined solutions to 
their customers. The choice to provide multi-utility services highly depends on the 
characteristics of the markets, yet there is a general consensus that multi-utility packages 
work better for industrial clients. The combination of water services and energy (electricity 
or gas) is probably the most common type of multi-utility package. Even though the 
characteristics of the systems are very different, the commonalities lie in the similarity of 
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the service, in the advantages of a joint front office and common administration. Another 
increasingly important type of multi-utility combines water supply and wastewater services 
– although the service contracts are normally separated, the clients are the same, which 
enables interesting cost savings.  
All large operators have developed a multi-utility approach, yet the French TNCs clearly 
distinguish themselves from the British and German ones. It is only in the French case that 
water constitutes a dominant aspect in this multi-utility strategy. British operators focus on 
water, sanitation and environmental services, more than utilities in general. For German 
operators, water services represent a small share of business compared to electricity, gas, 
and environmental services. 
For large multi-utility groups, the water sector is part of a diversification strategy whose 
purpose is to lower the risk of relying too extensively on one sector. Moreover, the sector is 
also seen as more stable compared, for instance, to electricity and gas, since competition is 
less fierce, enabling long-term financial stability. 
Water markets differ considerably in terms of degree and type of competition. There is a 
general trend towards the concentration of operators, although not amongst the largest ones. 
Water supply is considered to be more competitive than sanitation. In water supply, the 
main competitive pressures emerge at the moment of the bidding procedures to get in the 
market, while in the sanitation sector the pressure comes mainly from technological and 
pricing issues. 
There is a growing belief among large operators that the reliance on the private sector is 
increasing as more rigorous environmental and public health standards are being 
established, and public sector entities reach the limits of their resources and expertise. They 
therefore argue that stricter requirements create new opportunities. In this context, 
according to their viewpoint, the European Commission should: (1) monitor compliance 
with requirements; (2) implement and monitor its competition laws and policies; and 
(3) monitor the proper application of the Rome Treaty rules of non-discrimination. 
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Large operators generally consider public-private partnerships to be the best solution to 
face the major challenges of the sector. Their preferences clearly lie on specific types of 
contracts, namely lease and operation & maintenance (O&M) contracts. However, the 
dominant model of management within the home-market of these operators again 
influences these choices.  
Large operators normally provide water services to individuals, companies, and 
municipalities. They believe water quality is the most important and valorised aspect for the 
consumer, followed by security of supply and, finally, price. 
Regarding the scope of the market, these operators consider that size only becomes 
important outside their domestic markets where they do not have a strong physical or 
economic presence. Therefore, outside their domestic market, they only consider contracts 
in large urban agglomerations because fixed costs become too expensive for small 
contracts.  
In recent years, several events have shown that citizens and civil society organisations could 
well have an important impact on these groups’ overall strategy, leading to the setting up of 
several initiatives on ethical, environmental, and social issues.  
Finally, large enterprises make it clear that they are not interested in controlling or owning 
natural resources. Differences emerge in terms of capital assets with, on the one hand, 
large operators attached to the French model arguing they don’t want to be the owners of 
the infrastructures but, for the duration of the contract, they accept to be responsible for 
their protection and maintenance. On the other hand, large operators attached to the British 
model consider the ownership of the infrastructure as beneficial because, according to their 
view, it enables higher rates of return on capital. 
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7.2. Operators’ strategies and elements at risk because of reform 
In this section, we present a comparison of strategies per type of operator (Table 16). 
Moreover, we highlight for each type, the factors related to their strategy that potentially 
affect capital investments and universal provision of the SGI. 
Table 16 Comparison of strategies per type of operator 
Small publicly owned 
 Types of strategy  Defensive in the sense of maintaining the status quo 
Political pressure for preventing liberalisation and PSP 
Enforce sense of connectedness with the population 
Long-term investment policies 
Specialised technical and local know-how 
Association with other small operators 
 Capital Investments May be at risk due to shrinking public budgets 
Increasing costs related to environment and public health standards can be a 
threat related to pressure for restructuring 
 Universal Provision of SGI The objective of these operators is to: 
- provide Public Services to citizens at a reasonable price 
- guarantee of the long-term quality of the systems 
- implement sector-related public policies 
Medium-sized publicly owned 
 Type of strategy Defensive in the sense of maintaining public management 
Implement long-term investment policies 
Efficient implementation of public policies 
Emphasize specialised technical and local know-how 
Expansion outside initial local market 
 Capital Investments More stringent standards are an opportunity if complemented with funds 
Lobbying from private operators to open up the markets may press these 
operators to invest (counter-strategy to prove their importance in the system)  
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 Universal Provision of SGI The objective of these operators is to: 
- provide Public Services to citizens 
- guarantee the long-term quality of the systems 
- implement sector-related public policies 
Medium-sized privately owned 
 Type of strategy  Aggressive: keeping captive markets through long-term contracts 
Motivate public-private partnerships 
Pressure to raise transparency in regulation and bidding 
Merging and strategy of alliances to increase scale 
Multi-utility approaches 
Emphasise specialised technical and local know-how 
Reinforce local links with population 
 Capital Investments More stringent standards are seen as an opportunity to enter new markets if non-discriminatory rules are applied 
 Universal Provision of SGI The objective of providing a public service with profit may lead to cherry-picking and to non-provision of the service to the poorest 
The effort to increase efficiency in operation and management may decrease the 
costs of providing the service 
Medium-sized mixed ownership 
 Type of strategy  Defensive in the sense of maintaining the status quo in their initial local market 
Motivate public-private partnerships 
Emphasise specialised technical and local know-how 
Reinforce local links with population 
Convincing authorities about the need to expand activities 
 Capital Investments Efforts to improve efficiency may reduce costs and increase return-on-capital 
(higher incentives to invest) 
More stringent standards are seen as an opportunity based on the operator’s 
technological and local know-how 
 Universal Provision of SGI Application of sector-related public policies 
Guarantee of the long-term quality of the systems 
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Large-sized (private and mixed ownership) 
 Type of strategy  Aggressive in the sense of obtaining captive markets through long-term 
delegated management contracts 
Motivate public-private partnerships 
Pressure to raise transparency in regulation and bidding contracts 
Long-term technological investment 
Multi-utility approaches 
Integrated (vertical and/or horizontal) contracts 
Development of international activities yet minimising financial and political 
risks (stable and regulated markets) 
 Capital Investments These type of operators have a preference for managing the system (as opposed 
to own and invest) 
More stringent standards are seen as an opportunity (in the event of limited 
public resources and expertise) 
 Universal Provision of SGI The objective of providing a public service with profit may lead to cherry-
picking and to non-provision of the service to the poorest  
Anti-globalisation and anti-privatisation civil society movements are pressing 
these operators to set up social corporate policies 
7.3. Concluding remarks 
Four main conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. The first conclusion is that the 
factors of change pushing for the reform are influencing the typology of operators in the 
sector, as well as their strategies. The traditional characterisation of operators as municipal 
non-autonomous public entities changed over the past two decades. We can identify three 
important trends that should not be ignored when regulating the sector in a context of 
reform, namely: 
1. Even though small and medium-sized public operators remain central providers, private 
and mixed-owned operators are increasingly important actors. This means that any 
policy and measure regarding capital investments and universal coverage of the SGI 
needs to consider that profit is the main motivation of private operators. 
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2. The evolution from non-autonomous to autonomous entities is a reality, in many cases 
accompanied by the delegation of management responsibilities to local or regional 
public operators, and sometimes to mixed or private companies. A higher degree of 
autonomy, including budgetary, means that new sources of finance are needed to cover 
investment needs.    
3. There is a regionalisation of operators, i.e. operators are pursuing a strategy of mergers 
and alliances to increase scale. In fact, most operators believe that the water industry is 
moving towards more concentration of operators (yet not amongst the larger ones). By 
increasing their scale, operators augment their capacity to raise funding sources for their 
projects (e.g., through municipal bonds). In terms of regulation, the complexity of 
monitoring operators’ performances and the quality of the service is lower for larger 
than for smaller and dispersed operators. 
The second conclusion acknowledges that several issues limit the efficiency and flexibility 
of the market, and strongly condition the reform of the sector as well as the operators’ 
strategies. The most significant ones are related to competition and the level of 
contestability in the market. These are: 
1. The creation of competition in the market seems rather limited due to the specificities of 
the sector and, therefore, in a context of the sector’s reform, the most common type of 
competition is competition for the market. This involves strategies that are focused on 
competing for contracts through bidding. After winning the contract, the service is still 
offered in a monopolistic way, where users are captive and regulators find it difficult to 
have access to the operators’ private information.  
2. Long-term contracts are a factor of inflexibility and inefficiency, yet they allow for 
stable planning horizons. This is essential if the responsibility to invest in the system is 
delegated to the (private) operator. However, this is not always the case, and the 
conservative strategies of operators (aiming to establish long-term relationships in the 
management of services) may not compensate for the lost flexibility and efficiency.  
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3. In many cases, competition and market options are limited to strategies of buying or 
participating in other companies. This is another strategy for the market, but in this 
case, without any competition with respect to the service itself, just a competition for 
the ownership of the operators. This creates oligopolistic structures and may open the 
ground for collusive behaviours with all its consequences, namely in terms of higher 
final prices. 
4. Over recent years, European and other public funds have highly influenced the 
management and organisation of the water sector (especially sanitation, in Europe). 
These funds have usually been managed via local or regional institutions, being an 
essential part of the public operators’ strategies (including municipal services). The 
dry-up of these funds may jeopardise the required investments in the future, and will 
certainly change the current strategies of these operators. 
The third conclusion is that important features depend upon the respective market reform 
processes. Thus, size, ownership, and the reform context in the domestic markets highly 
influence the way of operating and (re)acting in relation to other stakeholders in the sector. 
We differentiate two cases: with and without (the pressure to) reform in the sector. 
Where there are no significant reform pressures, operators have defensive strategies in 
terms of maintaining monopoly rights. They base their strategies on public service goals 
and a good relationship with their customers, but without taking into account their possible 
competitors. In fact, the perception of many of these operators is that the water sector is not 
very competitive. In the few cases operators feel some competitive pressures, they are 
mainly related to pricing and technology and not to attracting clients, nor to gain market 
share.  
It is very common that small publicly-owned operators do not face significant reform 
pressures. It is increasingly common to find them in association with other small operators. 
They tend to emphasise their specialised technical and local know-how, and to implement 
long-term investment policies. They generally exert some political pressure for maintaining 
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the status quo. One of their strong points is the flexibility of their strategies to adapt to 
changing public policies decided by local or regional authorities. 
Where there are significant reform features, public operators complement their public 
service objectives (with respect to users and local bodies) with strategies to fend off their 
competitors. For instance, small local public operators stress proximity aspects and the 
local nature of water services in order to counter the arrival of new operators. For private 
operators, their main objective is profitability in the long-term, taking into account the 
competition of other operators.  
In this context, a specific and successful strategy of many operators is the Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) strategy, based on sharing risks and liabilities with public entities. Water 
services remain under the final responsibility of public authorities yet under the effective 
management control by the operator. In certain cases, this strategy allows the allocation of 
concession contracts by direct negotiations without competition through public bidding.  
Operators in such markets are normally aggressive in terms of obtaining captive markets 
through long-term delegated management contracts. Especially the largest operators tend to 
take multi-utility approaches and to engage into long-term technological investments.  
Even in markets witnessing such reform processes, the water sector cannot be considered 
very dynamic in terms of new entrants. In Europe, there are comparatively more new 
operators in the sanitation sector than in water supply. This can probably be explained by 
the fact that there have been more new opportunities in the sanitation than in the water 
supply sector, following an increase in environmental and public health standards and 
concerns. Another reason for the lack of dynamics is the fact that competition in the water 
sector is very limited. In many cases, and due certainly to a search for stability, contract 
renewal is commonly to the advantage of the initial operator, and this is true whether one 
speaks of public or private operators. 
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Finally, the fourth conclusion relates to the contribution of these empirical findings to the 
management of reform risks. There is increasing evidence in this thesis calling for a 
systemic approach in the management of the new risks created by the reform. In this way, 
understanding the strategies of the monopolist becomes an essential condition. 
It is important to acknowledge that in the water sector, the framework and the type of 
operational decisions (e.g., on pricing and product specification), are largely fixed by a 
third entity in the form of regulation. One of the most important strategies of water 
operators hence relates to the management of regulation. In the literature, the most common 
arguments state that operators under regulated environments can either take an 
adaptative/passive attitude or attempt to influence the public policy (i.e., to capture the 
regulator). Our statement is that water operators’ strategies are being influenced and 
embedded in an interactive system, where they have an active role in defining the market 
and their business environment.  
These results should not be neglected when defining the ways to mitigate the risks created 
by the sector’s reform. In the following chapter, we propose a new role for regulation 
taking into account its function in reducing the vulnerability factors of the main elements at 
risk because of the reform, as identified in the previous chapters, taking into consideration 
the operators’ strategies identified in the current chapter. 
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PART IV. MAIN RESULTS 
The specificities of the urban water sector (UWS) hampered the liberalisation of the sector, 
at least liberalisation at the image of other network industries. However, evidence in many 
countries shows that the UWS is being reformed and some features that normally 
characterise liberalisation processes are now also present in the water sector (Chapter 6).  
The process of reforming the sector has inherent benefits and costs. Very often, these 
benefits and costs are independently pointed out as justifications or criticisms for change. 
Enthusiastic agents of reform focus on its expected benefits, while its critics centre their 
attention on disadvantages and costs. The approach taken in this thesis has been to move 
away from this dichotomy of whether reform is good or bad. The objective is to know 
reform costs better and to identify possible forms of mitigating them.  
So far in this thesis, we explained the need for regulating the sector in a context of reform 
(Chapter 2), established the link between the costs created by reform and new risks in the 
sector (Chapter 3), and presented a vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk in the 
new context (Chapter 4). Then we checked this evidence empirically (Chapters 5, 6, and 7).  
Based on these results, in Chapter 8 we will stress the importance of taking a regulatory 
governance approach before identifying mechanisms that are able to mitigate reform risks. 
These mechanisms are proposed based on their ability to tackle the vulnerability problems 
highlighted in each arrangement. To finalise, we present in Chapter 9 the main conclusions 
of this thesis and future research. 
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Chapter 8. Reform, Risk Management, and Regulatory Governance 
The most common approach to regulation in the urban water sector (UWS) is:  
1. to address specific regulatory problems rather than to take an integrated approach; 
2. to consider competition and regulation as alternative options to achieving policy 
objectives (e.g., Robinson, 2001).  
We challenge this approach by proposing a comprehensive framework for regulatory 
governance based on the results of this thesis. The main regulatory challenge is the 
definition of a regulatory strategy which takes into account market mechanisms, regulatory 
discretion, and self-regulation. The optimal regulatory strategy is about combining different 
components that align the incentive structure with the key regulatory objectives defined for 
the sector (adapted from Llewellyn, 2001), rather than deciding between regulatory 
discretion and market discipline, as well as public and private participation. 
The optimal regulatory strategy varies according to the specificities of the water systems 
(e.g. geographical and demographic characteristics) as well as according to the institutional 
environment. Moreover, it changes over time depending on the key regulatory objectives 
defined for the system. Thus, no single regulatory strategy is the best in all situations.  
The main forms of regulatory governance in the UWS are direct public management, 
regulation by contract, and the creation of a sector regulator. It is interesting to note that 
there are increasingly cases where different governance mechanisms are combined 
(e.g., Chapter 6, Ménard, 2005).  
Moreover, we have presented evidence in Part III pointing out to the fact that, in general, 
operators are actively involved in defining the regulated institutional environment. In this 
way, one can say that, in the UWS, regulatory strategies are the product of the interaction 
of several – State and non-State – actors.  
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Governance does actually stand for the involvement of several actors in collective 
problem-solving. It poses the challenges of balancing multiple (eventually conflicting) 
interests and of reaching co-operation through formal and informal institutional 
mechanisms. This is, indeed, the underlying assumption of this chapter. 
In the present chapter, we put forward a comprehensive framework for understanding 
regulatory governance in the context of reform. The reform of the sector represents a 
change in the institutional arrangement characterising a particular water system. Each 
arrangement corresponds to a different risk-sharing pattern and presents specific problems.  
We start out by focusing, in section 8.1, on regulatory governance and the sector’s reform. 
Then, in section 8.2, we identify the strategies of the main actors in the water system 
concerning the most important elements at risk created by reform. Based on these 
strategies, we propose in section 8.3 regulatory governance mechanisms that mitigate 
reform risks. Finally, in section 8.4 we conclude. 
8.1. Regulatory governance and the reform of the sector 
The main challenge in terms of regulatory governance pertains to reaching a balance 
between the partners’ strategies so that the objectives set for the system are met. In 
particular, in a context of reform, it is important to assess the adequacy of the regulatory 
governance systems to the management of the new risks.  
Regulatory governance systems need to intervene in every step of the risk management 
process, from risk identification and assessment, to prioritising and mitigation (Figure 17). 
In practice, this means that (different) actors intervene through governance mechanisms at 
each step of the risk management process. 
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Figure 17 Regulatory governance and the risk management process 
The identification of risks is a continuous process. In a context of reform, the sustainability 
of capital investment and the universal provision of the service of general interest were 
identified in Chapter 3 as being the main elements at risk and, as such, are the focus of this 
analysis.  
In order to assess the risks and prioritise the actions, there is the need to assess the 
vulnerability factors affecting the elements at risk (see Chapter 4 for more details).  
Starting with the decision to invest, it depends upon the operator’s perceptions of risk, 
which are strongly correlated to the vulnerability factors. In Table 17, we summarise these 
factors and establish some relations between them. 
Firstly, risk increases when the responsibility for investing in the infrastructure is delegated 
to an operator, and the lifetime of the investment is longer (i.e., long-term asset durability) 
than the contract duration. Secondly, the investment is at a higher risk if the operator feels 
that there is a threat of hold-up or other type of opportunistic behaviour by the regulatory 
authorities, and if there is uncertainty over asset valuation. Finally, the low availability of 
funding sources may also put investment decisions at risk. 
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Table 17 Factors affecting investment decisions 
Factors affecting investment 
decisions 
Investment at risk 
Relation between contract duration 
(Tc), and asset durability (Ta) 
Tc/Ta>1=>lower risk 
Tc/Ta<1=>higher risk 
Credibility and commitment of the 
regulatory entity and certainty over 
asset valuation 
Low => higher risk 
High => lower risk 
Availability of sources of finance 
to the operator 
Low => higher risk 
High => lower risk 
 
 
As for the universal provision of the service of general interest, there are mainly three 
factors affecting its vulnerability. In Table 18, we summarise the factors affecting service 
provision and establish some relations between them. 
Firstly, there is the operational performance of the management entity, which is directly 
related to service coverage and its quality, as well as the degree of operational 
cost-recovery via tariffs, cross-subsidies, or other social subsidies. Thus, the provision of 
the service is at a higher risk for low performing operators and low degrees of operational 
cost-recovery. Operational costs depend among others on urban density, the state of the 
network, coverage rate, raw water quality and availability, and the size of the water system. 
Secondly, there is the affordability factor, which is a function of the percentage of poor 
customers and the weight of the water bill on their total budget. Thirdly, there is the 
network capacity to provide the service. This factor is especially important in developing 
countries where an important percentage of the population is not connected to the network. 
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Table 18 Factors affecting universal  service provision 
Factors affecting universal 
service provision 
Universal service provision at  risk 
Operational performance and 
cost recovery 
Low  => higher risk 
High  => lower risk 
Affordability of the water bill Low => higher risk High => lower risk 
Capacity of the network Low  => higher risk High => lower risk  
 
There are several possible approaches for dealing with the identified and assessed risks 
(SNWSC, 2002). These approaches are: 
- avoidance (elimination of the risk issue),  
- assumption (no action is taken regarding the risk issue),  
- mitigation (some action is taken in order to moderate the risk exposure), and 
- contingency planning (preparations are made to define the actions that will be taken 
should the risk situation occur).  
The important message in this regard is that it is essential to clarify, for each regulatory 
governance form, which actors are responsible for mitigating the key risks in the system. 
Key risks are those that have high exposures in terms of impact and probability of 
occurrence. So, for each key risk, the responsible actor(s) determines what actions or 
decisions can be made that reduce its probability and/or severity of impact. 
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Finally, regular monitoring of the risk management process tracks and evaluates the 
effectiveness of risk-handling actions. It may provide the basis for defining additional 
actions or identifying new risks and, consequently, updating the risk management process.  
We use a game framework as a methodology for analysing the interactions between the 
actors in the system (yet we do not develop a theoretical game model). It is considered that 
the regulatory strategy is the result of a game played by public authorities, regulatory entity, 
management entity, and users. The outcome depends on the strategies chosen by all actors. 
The following section identifies the strategies of each actor in the regulatory system. 
8.2. The strategies of the actors 
The main actors in the regulatory system are the public authority, the regulatory entity, 
operators, and consumers/customers (Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18 Main actors in the regulatory system  
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8.2.1 Customers/consumers 
The type and degree of public participation in the UWS has changed in the past, and it 
differs significantly from case to case. Public participation can take two forms, namely: 
- passive (e.g., information about the sector, and awareness campaigns), and  
- active (e.g., consultation at policy-making and implementation levels, lobbying if 
there is a feeling of gain/lost from restructuring, and community management). 
In the UWS, consumers have evolved from tax-payers to customers and, more recently, to 
partners. In the most common regulatory systems, consumers can intervene at two levels: 
- policy-making: directly or by influencing the political authority’s decision (e.g., in 
the definition of regulatory objectives), and 
- operational: influencing the strategy of operators61, and exerting political control of 
operators (mainly through institutionalised forms for informing political authorities 
that are activated when consumers are not satisfied with the service). 
Thus, even though we acknowledge the very important role of consumers and, more 
generally, civil society in the sector, they are not organised and, therefore, are not 
considered as direct players in the regulatory game. They directly influence the decisions of 
public authorities, regulatory entities, and the strategies of operators, though. 
Using a game framework, it is reasonable to assume that the public authority moves first by 
defining the regulatory regime. Moreover, it is a repeated game that ends when regulatory 
priorities or the rules of the game change. Because it is a repeated game, reputation matters. 
Therefore, there are opportunities for cooperative behaviour. And so, even though there is 
                                                 
61 We consider community management to be residual, so direct participation in the management is excluded. 
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information asymmetry, the risk for opportunistic behaviour in a repeated game is lower 
than in a one-shot game. We start out by describing the strategies of the public authority. 
8.2.2 Public authority 
The public authority (PA) assumes the responsibility for service provision, the safeguard of 
the public interest, and the definition of regulatory objectives. The responsibility for service 
provision in the UWS normally lies at the local level, even though there are important 
competences at the national and/or regional levels, depending on the cases.  
The public authority defines the institutional framework (i.e., it sets up the legal and 
operational limits within which the management entity operates), and the type of 
relationship between the responsible (RE) and the management (ME) entities.  
Figure 19 illustrates alternative institutional arrangements, representing different trade-offs 
between the autonomy and transparency of management decisions vis-à-vis the public 
authority, as well as the degree of formal regulation. Both autonomy and formal regulation 
increase from Direct Public to Direct Private Management. 
Public 
Authority
RE ≈ ME
Direct Public Management
RE  ME
Delegated Public 
Management
RE  ME
Delegated Private 
Management
RE ≈ ME
Direct Private 
Management
Degree of separation between PA and ME
RE  ME
Investment financing: RE or ME?
REI  ME
Delegated Management 
Lease
RE  MEI
Delegated Management 
Concession
Degree of formal regulation
 
Figure 19 Alternative institutional arrangements 
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Regarding the systems’ management, the public authority has two alternative strategies:  
A. Centralisation of management (RE = ME) corresponding to direct management 
arrangements. There are two sub-strategies regarding the ownership of the operator, 
namely public and private management. 
B. Decentralisation of management (RE ≠ ME) corresponding to delegated management 
arrangements. The operator’s ownership may be defined by the public authority 
(e.g., law against private participation) or it may result from a competitive tender. 
There are two extra sub-strategies regarding investments, namely delegated 
management by: 
1. concession (the operator keeps the responsibility for investing in the systems) or  
2. lease (the responsibility for investment remains with the lessor).  
The strategy of the public authority (PA) in terms of the sector’s regulation depends on the 
degree of management centralisation, as well as on the operator’s ownership (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20 Public authority’s  possible strategies 
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Empirical evidence in the sector suggests that under centralised arrangements, a sector 
regulator is created if the operator is privately-owned. Under decentralised arrangements, 
the public authority has two alternative strategies in terms of mechanisms of regulation: 
regulation by contract, and the creation of a sector-specific regulatory agency. 
Under regulation by contract, the majority of the rules and regulations are stated in the 
contract between the parties (i.e., the public authority and the firm). The success of this 
form highly depends on the specification of performance parameters, procedures for 
renegotiation, and remedies for non-performance. 
The creation of sector-specific agencies as opposed to regulation by contract aims at 
creating stability and continuity in regulatory decision-making (Haarmeyer and Mody, 
1998a). The separation between regulation and policy-making, and a clear definition of the 
regulator’s role and responsibilities, are critical for a good regulatory design (Eberhard, 
2006). Moreover, regulators need to be made accountable for their decisions in order to 
reduce the information rents created by asymmetry of information, which arises when the 
public cannot perfectly observe the regulator’s actions (Bergman et al., 1998). 
The public authority’s strategies are related to the sector’s reform, in the sense that they 
correspond to institutional arrangements combining different types and degrees of: 
1. unbundling of functions,  
2. private sector participation, and 
3. autonomy of operators.  
The public authority bases its decisions on information about the efficiency and efficacy of 
the current management entity, the level of consumers’ satisfaction and their opinions, the 
need to upgrade infrastructure and its funding requirements, the availability of funding 
sources such as full-cost recovery, regional funds, and other subsidies, and the degree of 
private sector participation. 
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8.2.3 Regulatory entity 
The regulatory entity operates under a predetermined regulatory regime (Gilbert and 
Newbery, 1994). Depending on the mechanisms of governance, the entity responsible for 
regulation can be a sector-specific regulatory agency or the public authority.  
The definition of the regulatory entity’s strategies highly depends on the level of regulatory 
discretion, on the priorities set by the public authority for the sector, as well as on the 
regulatory instruments at the entity’s disposal.  
The most important regulatory instruments in the sector are licences, price, and quality 
standards (see Chapter 2.1.3 for more details).  
Some regulatory entities attribute licences (L) to management entities, based on their 
capacity to fulfil consumer protection requirements. In this case, only licence holders are 
authorised to operate in the sector. Licences can be revoked in the event of inadequate 
performance of the operator.  
In some cases, the regulatory entity has discretion for defining and setting tariffs (either in 
contract design or through a regulatory agency), according to the public objectives set for 
the sector. The regulatory entity’s strategy regarding pricing is essential both for capital 
investment and universal service provision. There are several pricing mechanisms, but we 
consider two of the most common ones in the UWS:  
- rate-of-return (ROR) regulation, where the established price covers the firm’s 
expenditures (including operating cost and depreciation) plus a reasonable profit on 
capital investment (i.e., a “fair” rate of return); and 
- price-cap (CAP) regulation, where the price is fixed and, therefore, the profit 
margin is variable as a function of the costs. 
For each of these strategies, there are sub-strategies related to output control (i.e., service 
quality monitoring, actual investment), cost control (especially for rate-of-return 
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regulation), reinforcement of funding sources (subsidies, higher tariffs, cross-subsidies), as 
well as warnings and sanctions.  
The decisions of the regulatory entity should be based on the system’s investment needs, 
the attractiveness of the institutional environment for investment, consumer satisfaction 
levels, and performance indicators. 
8.2.4 Management entity 
We present separately the strategies of the management entity regarding capital investments 
and the universal provision of the service of general interest. 
When it comes to capital investments, we consider the cases where the management entity 
is responsible for capital investments, i.e., direct management and delegated management 
by concession arrangements. The management entity may have a short-sighted perspective, 
where it has no incentive to invest, or a long-run perspective, where it wants to gain a 
reputation and keep the monopoly or gain the next tender. This can be related to the 
pressure the operator faces in its market as well as on its typology (see Chapter 7). 
The payoffs for the management entity depend on the actual costs of investment and the 
revenues that it is allowed to earn.  
Under ROR regulation, the operator’s payoff corresponds to the total costs of investment. 
However, regulatory entities may apply the “use-and-useful” principle for determining the 
assets to be included in the rate base (Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). This means that part of 
the capital costs may be disallowed and, therefore, the operator is only reimbursed of part 
of its costs (decreasing its rate of return on total investments). In this case, the payoff 
depends on the percentage of the capital cost that is allowed. Thus, the decision to invest 
highly depends on the operator’s expectations regarding the regulatory entities’ cost 
allowances. 
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Under price-cap regulation, the operator’s payoff is a function of the total costs and the 
fixed-price. The decision to invest depends on the price-cap, the duration of the transaction 
(the contract, when applicable), and the decision whether to bid for a new contract or not. 
The sequence of moves between the regulatory entity (RE) and the management entity 
(ME) in terms of capital investments is presented in Figure 21. 
    L = 1
ROR
CAP
Investment
No Investment
Incentives
Warning; sanctions
Assess results; control costs; define reward
Investment
No Investment
Improve conditions (institutional environment; revise cap)
Warning; sanctions
Assess results; monitor quality
    L = 0
No guarantees
Fail to meet standards
RE
RE attributes licences and 
sets tariffs
ME chooses 
investment level
RE reacts to ME 
decision  
Figure 21 Sequence of moves for capital  investment 
 
When it comes to the universal provision of the SGI, the management entity may have the 
organisational goal of providing a public service, or providing the service with a profit (see 
Chapter 7). The payoffs for the management entity depend on: 
- the operational costs (which are directly related to the operator’s performance);  
- the degree of cost-recovery through tariffs, cross-subsidies or other social 
subsidies; and  
- the capacity of the network to provide the service to the entire population.    
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The sequence of moves between the regulatory entity (RE) and the management entity 
(ME) in terms of universal provision of the SGI is presented in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22 Sequence of moves for  universal provision of the SGI 
 
Based on the main actors’ strategies identified in this section, we now propose regulatory 
governance mechanisms that tackle the problems created by the sector’s reform. 
8.3. Regulatory governance mechanisms 
In this section, we present regulatory governance mechanisms corresponding to different 
phases of the risk management process. The starting point is the results presented so far in 
terms of vulnerability of the elements at risk and actors’ strategies. Again, we present the 
results for capital investment and universal provision of the SGI separately. For each 
element at risk, we first present the rationale for intervening before identifying the 
appropriate mechanisms. 
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8.3.1 Capital investments  
Capital investment is at a higher risk, the lower the ratio between contract duration and 
asset durability, the lower the trustworthiness of the regulator (and, consequently, the 
higher the threat of hold-up), and the lower the availability of financial sources are. The 
objective is to propose mechanisms that reduce the vulnerability of these factors, i.e. that 
make us move from the centre to the exterior of the figure presented in Table 17. 
A rationale for intervention 
From the empirical results in Part III, we notice that, in practice, regulatory risk and asset 
specificity (aggravated by the long duration of the assets’ life) are of paramount importance. 
These factors were considered, on average, as more important than the lack of funding 
sources. However, we cannot ignore two things. Firstly, both regulatory risk and specificity 
have a large influence on the availability of funding sources. Secondly, the lack of funding 
sources remains very important in developing countries. As a matter of fact, the analysis in 
Chapter 5 suggested that the weight given to the factors of vulnerability differ from 
developed to developing countries (independently from the institutional arrangements). 
Regulatory risks, including the threat of opportunistic behaviour by the authorities, were 
identified in Part III as being very important. However, other issues related to informational 
hazards are also affecting transactions in the UWS. For this reason, we include regulatory 
risks in the larger category of informational hazards, which refers to: 
- asymmetry of information (e.g., when the regulator does not have access to all the 
operator’s information on costs); 
- uncertainty of information, which encompasses: 
- institutional uncertainty related to the difficulty in predicting the roles and 
actions of institutions (e.g., due to weak institutional capacities); and 
- exogenous uncertainty (e.g., natural hazards, demographic variations). 
  
 
214
Asset specificity and informational hazards have a strong influence on the duration of the 
transaction. Very often, it is given more importance to specificity than to informational 
hazards. For this reason, long-term relationships – including long-term contracts – are 
considered almost a dogma in the UWS. This is aligned with the conservative strategies of 
operators, which aim at establishing long-term relationships in the management of services 
(Chapter 7).  
According to Transaction-Cost Economics, when asset specificity is very significant, the 
parties are more likely to sign contracts with longer duration (Joskow, 1987). The reasons 
are that long-term contracts are a way of minimizing transaction costs in the event of high 
specificity (Chapter 4). This has been a reason justifying the long-duration of contracts in 
the sector. However, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that alternatives to long-
term contracts should be considered.  
Firstly, informational hazards are very important in the UWS, which can counterbalance 
the influence of asset specificity on contract duration. As a matter of fact, the duration of 
contracts tends to decrease with higher levels of uncertainty because there is a higher need 
to adapt to the changing environment.  
Secondly, the risks related to long-term contracts increase substantially when there is high 
asset specificity and high uncertainty. Some examples of contract disruption in the water 
sector prove it. So, in cases where uncertainty and asymmetry of information are high, even 
if asset specificity is equally high, long-term contracts may be too risky. 
Thirdly, some types of operators – private operators and large firms – are more motivated 
to manage than to invest in the system, i.e. they have a preference for lease over concession 
contracts (Chapter 7).  
Finally, in many cases, the concession component in so-called concession contracts is 
weak, in the sense that a significant part of the responsibility for capital investment is not 
taken by the operator (see examples in Chapter 6). This means that, in many cases, the 
reason justifying in theory the long duration of contracts – i.e., asset specificity – is not 
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valid in practice. The duration of the contracts remains long yet asset specificity related to 
the transaction is low.  
Figure 23 presents the influence of asset specificity and informational hazards on contract 
duration. We start by quadrant B, representing cases with low-levels of specificity and 
informational hazards. High levels of contestability are expected and, therefore, contracts 
should have short-durations.  
D
Low contestability
Medium-term contracts
Phased out approach
A
Medium contestability
Long-term contracts
Informational problems
Specificity
B
High contestability
Short-term contracts
C
Medium contestability
Short-term contracts
 
Figure 23 Influence of asset specificity and informational problems in duration 
Quadrant A represents cases with higher levels of specificity yet maintaining informational 
hazards low, so it is expected a decrease in the degree of contestability. This is, in fact, the 
only case where long-term contracts are justified. 
Quadrant C presents the inverse situation, where specificity is low and informational 
hazards are high, so the duration of contracts should remain short in order to enable the 
adaptation to changing environments. This is the case of many management and lease 
contracts in the UWS. 
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In the context of this thesis, the most interesting case to analyse is represented in 
quadrant D, where specificity is high and information problems are significant. Due to very 
low levels of contestability, as well as the disturbing influence of significant informational 
hazards, we recommend medium-term contracts or a phased-out approach to long-term 
contracts.  
The motivation for taking a phased-out approach is the gathering of information and the 
mutual knowledge between the partners (which, as seen in Chapter 5, are in many cases 
new partners) in an effort to decrease the level of uncertainty and other informational 
problems.  
We are therefore particularly interested in mechanisms that reduce informational 
hazards and align transaction characteristics (including specificity) with partners’ 
expectations and resources. We now turn to identifying these mechanisms.  
Regulatory governance mechanisms 
Regulatory governance mechanisms aim at tackling the problems highlighted in terms of 
capital investments in each institutional arrangement (please refer to Chapter 4.3.1), and for 
the various stages of the risk management process (Figure 24).  
There are two main propositions in terms of identification, assessment and prioritisation of 
risks. One is the establishment of institutional platforms involving all actors in order to 
guarantee a regular exchange of information and an adequate awareness in terms of factors 
of vulnerability. The agreement on regulatory goals established for the sector is particularly 
important. Such a platform has the potential to improve the knowledge about the sector, 
decreasing in this way the level of uncertainty that affects specifically concession 
arrangements. 
The other mechanism is the definition of investment plans that clearly describe the flow of 
required investments in the system for the entire duration of the transaction. The 
responsible actors for defining such plans are the public authority in direct public and 
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leasing, the partners of the contract in concessions, and the private operator (with the 
approval of the regulatory entity) in direct private arrangements. Again, investment plans 
are particularly important in concession arrangements because they contribute to decrease 
the level of uncertainty and to verify the alignment of assets’ life and contract duration. 
In terms of risk mitigation, we differentiate between propositions that are specific to the 
institutional arrangement and general ones. Specific propositions are: 
- the reinforcement of funding sources in direct public arrangements. This can 
either be done by the allocation of subsidies, the increase in tariffs so that the 
operator is closer to cost recovery, or the possibility to use cross-subsidies; 
- the establishment of dispute-resolution mechanisms, especially in concessions. 
The definition of a protocol on common vocabularies for contracts is also 
important in the sense that it clarifies the rights and responsibilities of partners, 
and avoids future misunderstandings; and 
- the allocation of adequate resources to the regulatory agency in direct private 
arrangements. Accountability and transparency of actions are also crucial to 
increase the regulator’s credibility and trustworthiness. 
As for the proposed mitigation strategies that are general to all arrangements, these are: 
- verification of the balance between required investment costs and available 
funding sources; 
- public accountability and transparency of the decisions relating to the sector; 
- definition of adequate penalties for non-compliance; 
- definition of contingency plans; and 
- creation of institutions that identify, codify and promulgate voluntary standards 
and best professional design practice. 
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Finally, in terms of monitoring two aspects are particularly important: 
- specification of performance parameters and independent monitoring of service 
quality, which is essential across all arrangements; 
- control of costs, which is especially important under rate-of-return forms of 
regulation. 
In the following section, we focus on mechanisms that decrease the vulnerability of the 
universal provision of the SGI. 
8.3.2 Universal provision of the SGI 
The provision of the service of general interest is at a higher risk, the higher the costs of 
service provision, the lower the degree of cost recovery, the higher the percentage of poor 
customers in society and the weight of their water bills, and the lower the availability of 
financial sources for covering operational costs are. Again, the objective is to propose 
mechanisms that reduce the vulnerability of these factors, i.e. that make us move from the 
centre to the exterior of the figure presented in Table 18. 
A rationale for intervention 
As we have seen in Part III, the universal provision of the SGI depends on the availability 
of infrastructure capacity and customers’ affordability of price. Figure 25 presents the 
relationship between affordability and capacity, and their influence in terms of possible 
solutions to guarantee the universal provision of the service. 
Quadrant A represents cases where affordability levels are high yet the network has no 
capacity. The provision of SGI is at risk but considering that affordability levels are high 
this should be a temporary situation. The focus is to increase network capacity while 
controlling for affordability levels (which could be endangered by higher capital costs). 
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Figure 25 Influence of affordability and capacity on the provision of SGI 
Quadrant D also represents cases with high levels of affordability but this time with high 
levels of network capacity. It does not pose major problems either. As long as the quality of 
the service is independently supervised, full-cost recovery (FCR) policies can be applied. It 
is important to stress that a cost-recovery pricing approach is against equity principles since 
low-consumption and low-income households are characterised by a more price inelastic 
water demand62.  
Quadrant C corresponds to cases with an adequate level of network capacity but low 
customers’ affordability. It calls for the use of cross-subsidies or full-cost recovery policies 
if complemented with direct (ex-post) aid to customers in need.  
Finally, quadrant B represents the most troublesome cases, where there is a lack of network 
capacity as well as significant affordability problems. This situation is common in 
                                                 
62 Similarly, a small fixed charge reflects a more socially oriented tariff policy. 
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developing regions. The solution needs to pass through the establishment of partnerships 
between all the stakeholders, including informal suppliers. Public aid (from national 
governments and international donors) is needed to tackle the more critical situations, 
where public health is in danger.  
In sum, we are particularly interested in mechanisms that are able to guarantee affordable 
tariffs for customers, as well as to balance network capacity and demand in order to 
guarantee the universal provision of the service. Operational efficiency (especially its 
consequences on costs and final prices) is particularly important for this endeavor. 
Regulatory governance mechanisms 
We propose regulatory governance mechanisms aimed at tackling the problems highlighted 
in terms of universal provision of the SGI per institutional arrangement (please refer to 
Chapter 4.3.2) and across the risk management process (Figure 26). Some of these 
mechanisms coincide with those presented in the previous section. 
In terms of risk identification, assessment and prioritization, we propose the 
implementation of an institutional platform involving all stakeholders to: 
- exchange information in a regular way, namely in terms of the vulnerability of the 
universal provision of the SGI. This is important in order to decrease 
informational hazards, in particular uncertainty of information;  
- discuss and agree on the characteristics of the SGI, namely in terms of service 
coverage and quality. This is particularly important in delegated management and 
private arrangements in general, in order to avoid the discrimination of 
non-profitable segments of the systems (i.e., to avoid “cherry-picking”). 
- prioritise areas of action. This is important for all types of institutional 
arrangements, and particularly in areas of great distress in terms of water supply. 
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In terms of mitigation, we differentiate between mechanisms that are specific to the 
institutional arrangement, and general ones. Specific mechanisms are: 
- the definition of required service and quality levels in the contract in delegated 
management arrangements; 
- the allocation of adequate capacity and resources to the regulatory agency in direct 
private arrangements, more generally in governance forms with regulatory 
agencies. Accountability and transparency of actions are also crucial to increase 
the regulator’s credibility and trustworthiness. 
As for the proposed mitigation strategies that are general to all arrangements, these are: 
- definition of criteria for the allocation of social subsidies or other mechanisms for 
the most vulnerable groups; 
- check the balance between operational costs (as well as capital costs, in situations 
where network capacity is constraining the provision of the service) and available 
funding sources; 
- definition of adequate sanctions for non-compliance; 
- public accountability and transparency of decisions relating to the sector; 
- definition of contingency plans. 
Finally, in terms of monitoring two aspects are important, particularly in delegated and 
private arrangements: 
- independent monitoring of service quality, including coverage, as well as 
operators’ performance. The standardisation of performance indicators and the use 
of benchmarks to compare operators are mechanisms that are important for 
monitoring and, at the same time, create some competitive pressures; and 
- price controls, namely in terms of impact on the customers’ affordability.   
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8.4. Conclusion 
Certain features of reform, such as unbundling of functions, delegation, and private sector 
participation, affect incentives to invest and to provide the service of general interest in the 
UWS. For this reason, the protection of capital investments and consumers become very 
important regulatory objectives in the sector.   
The reform of the sector also diffuses responsibilities through different actors in the system 
that have multiple, and potentially conflicting, interests. Therefore, reaching a balance 
between the various actors’ strategies – that is, governance – is essential so that regulatory 
objectives are met.  
The approach taken in this thesis aims at contributing to this goal in two ways. Firstly, it 
focuses on a new role for regulation that goes beyond the direct intervention of a public 
authority in the market. In the new context, regulation is the product of the interaction 
between State and non-State actors. There is a move away from command-and-control to 
incentive-based type of interventions. Secondly, it identifies mechanisms that reduce the 
vulnerability factors of the elements at risks because of reform.  
The choice of the institutional arrangement and corresponding regulatory governance 
system is part of the public-authority’s strategies. It depends on whether the management is 
centralised/direct or decentralised/delegated, as well as on the ownership of the operator. 
The strategies of the other actors largely depend on the regulatory governance system under 
which they operate.  
The importance of each vulnerability factor varies according to the institutional 
arrangement. In terms of capital investment, in delegation by concession, contract 
incompleteness and the misalignment of contract duration with asset durability have the 
highest impact in terms of vulnerability. In direct private management with a 
sector-specific regulator, the most important factor is the agency’s credibility and 
trustworthiness. In terms of the universal provision of the service, the threat of 
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opportunistic behaviour by the operator becomes particularly important, especially in 
institutional arrangements with a private operator.  
We have presented regulatory mechanisms that, in our opinion, have the potential to reduce 
the vulnerability factors of the elements at risk. Some of these forms of regulatory 
intervention are general to all the systems independently of their organisation. However, it 
is important to acknowledge that there are also specific forms of intervention that depend 
on the institutional arrangements. 
In terms of capital investment, the main concern is to reduce informational hazards and to 
align transaction characteristics with the actors’ expectations and resources. One of the 
main characteristics of the transaction is asset specificity. Even though the level of asset 
specificity is high in the UWS, it is essential to assess whether this specificity is at the core 
of the transaction. The responsibility for investments is the object of the transaction only in 
delegated management by concession and direct private arrangements. In the remainder of 
the cases, such as management and lease contracts, the levels of asset-specificity in the 
transaction are relatively low, which do not sustain per se the need for long-term contracts.   
Finally, in terms of universal provision of the SGI, the main concerns are to guarantee 
affordable tariffs (or alternative forms of access) for customers and an adequate level of 
network capacity (that does not constraint the universal provision of the SGI). It is essential 
to assess the impact of full-cost recovery policies on the affordability levels of the most 
vulnerable customers. However, this should not be an obstructing force against the 
implementation of such policies, which are important to increase efficiency levels in the 
system. 
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Chapter 9. General Conclusions and Future Research 
The reform of the water sector is an undeniable evolution. Although it cannot be called 
liberalisation because there are considerable limits to introduce competition in the market, 
significant features that normally characterise liberalisation processes in the network 
industries are also present in the urban water sector (UWS). 
While many authors argue that the introduction of private sector participation and 
competitive pressures are beneficial in terms of efficiency and attraction of capital into the 
sector, the reform also leads to criticisms from ideological (such as the loss of public 
control over an essential good) as well as from economic and managerial perspectives (such 
as the capacity of private operators to manage the systems more efficiently than public 
ones). 
This thesis has covered a number of important conceptual and empirical questions referring 
to the costs of reforming the sector. Several theories are used to analyse the issues 
presented here. We can divide them into two main groups. Firstly, in Chapter 2, we present 
an extensive literature review of the theories of economic regulation, with the aim of 
understanding the interactions between regulation and reform better. Secondly, in Chapter 
4, we use contract theories as a framework for presenting the vulnerability analysis of the 
main elements at risk because of reform. 
In the following section, we present the main conclusions of this thesis, by answering the 
research questions posed in Part I General Introduction. Suggestions for future research are 
then outlined. 
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9.1. General conclusions 
This thesis shows that regulation has an important role to play in the management of the 
risks created by the reform of the sector. In this regard, regulatory governance is presented 
as the key concept that encompasses the wide range of challenges posed to regulation in the 
new context of reform.  
There are three main threads that run throughout this thesis. The first one is the close 
relationship between reform and regulation. The literature on regulation has followed, and 
sometimes triggered, the sector’s reform. Even after reform, operators remain local 
monopolists, and therefore face no direct competition. For this reason, some type of 
regulatory intervention is needed to ensure a number of functions that still need to be 
guaranteed after reform, such as the sustainability of the network and the enforcement of 
public policy objectives. 
A second common thread is to consider transactions of (property, management, or 
investment) rights and responsibilities as the unit of analysis. Different types of transactions 
correspond to different institutional arrangements. For example, the full transfer of property 
rights to a private operator corresponds to privatisation and, thus, to direct private 
management arrangements.  
A third commonality is to consider risk as a very important component of the analysis of 
reform. As a matter of fact, the reform of the sector is creating new sources of uncertainty 
and vulnerability for the management and regulation of water utilities. We take a risk 
management approach to tackle the problems created by the reform of the sector.  
Based on the results presented throughout this thesis, we now conclude by answering the 
research questions presented in Part I General Introduction.  
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Question 1: Whether and how is the reform of the sector affecting the nature and 
intensity of risks? 
In order to address this question, we started by identifying the main features of reform and 
how they relate to the various institutional arrangements (in Chapter 1). Then we have 
made an exhaustive list of the different types of risks in the sector, and analysed their 
causes (in Chapter 3). From these results we could attest that three categories of risks, 
namely technical, regulatory and social risks, are indeed created or strongly accentuated 
by the features of reform. 
Firstly, technical risks are created by the unbundling and fragmentation of the technical 
systems, which are normally required when introducing competition. In the situations of 
structural unbundling, it must be ensured that the physical material of the system does not 
fail when exposed to external and internal stresses.  
Secondly, regulatory risks result from the unbundling of the managerial and regulatory 
functions. The separation between the management and the regulatory entities creates a 
new source of asymmetry of information, which is at the base of the potential opportunistic 
behaviour by the regulator.  
Thirdly, social risks are accentuated by the participation of private sector operators, whose 
objectives may differ from public goals. In a context of reform, the provision and funding 
of the services of general interest are no longer guaranteed by public ownership and 
management. Moreover, with the end of cross-subsidies, price equity is not guaranteed 
either.  
From the analysis of the risks created by the sector’s reform, one can identify four main 
elements at risk, namely system’s integrity, security of supply, equity of access, and 
affordability of prices. All these four elements are interrelated. Non-affordability of prices 
makes capital cost-recovery very difficult which, as a consequence, jeopardises capital 
investments. Hence, the system’s integrity and security of supply are at risk. The same 
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applies for equity of access – it is at risk if there is no security of supply or if the system’s 
integrity is not guaranteed.  
We have decided to focus on the sustainability of capital investments and the universal 
provision of the service of general interest, which are crucial components of the elements at 
risk, and are themselves at risk in the new environment. This assessment that reform was 
creating new risks in the sector led to the development of the second research question: 
Question 2: Whether and how do reform risks vary according to different institutional 
arrangements? 
The first step taken in answering this question was to analyse how risks are shared between 
the parties in the various institutional arrangements. We started by grounding the analysis 
on the definition of each institutional arrangement (Chapter 3). We noticed that risk-
sharing patterns do vary across arrangements. Under direct management arrangements, 
all the risks are taken by the operator (being it public or private). Under delegated 
management arrangements, all depends on the type (and degree) of rights and 
responsibilities that are transferred. Focusing specifically on reform risks, we could notice 
that both the allocation of technical and social risks differ significantly across institutional 
arrangements. 
The empirical evidence on risk-sharing presented in Chapters 5 and 6 confirms that 
risk-sharing patterns differ across institutional arrangements. However, patterns are not as 
clear as those resulting from the analysis based on the conceptual definitions. Firstly, the 
weight of regulatory risks in direct private arrangements is more evident in the empirical 
analysis than it was in Chapter 3. Secondly, when the management is delegated through a 
contract, it is quite clear that partners share the majority of the risks. However, problems 
arise when unpredictable or uncontrollable events jeopardize the established balance 
between the partners and put capital investments and universal service provision at risk.  
The second step was to build a framework based on Contract Theories to develop a 
vulnerability analysis of the main elements at risk because of reform (Chapter 4).These 
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theories also suggest that the allocation of reform risks between the parties depends on the 
characteristics of the transaction, the costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing the 
contract, and the threat of opportunistic behaviour from the parties of the contractual 
relationship. The results of the vulnerability analysis reiterate that the vulnerability factors 
affect the elements at risk in different ways and degrees, depending on the institutional 
arrangement and development context.  
In terms of capital investments, several factors are considered. Firstly, asset specificity and 
durability, as well as opportunistic behaviour by the operator are particularly relevant in 
delegation by concession. Secondly, operators are exposed to opportunistic behaviour by 
the regulator in delegation by concession and direct private arrangements. Thirdly, 
uncertainty over the state of the network may render asset valuation difficult, which is 
significant mainly in delegation by concession and direct private arrangements. Finally, the 
lack of funding sources is also important. 
Theoretical and empirical analyses show that, in a context of reform, asset specificity and 
informational hazards (for example, the threat of opportunistic behaviours and uncertainty 
over the state of the network) are the most important factors increasing the vulnerability of 
capital investments. The lack of funding sources is also highlighted, specifically in 
developing countries.  
As for the universal provision of the SGI, the main factors affecting its vulnerability are the 
nature of the service, the threat of opportunistic behaviour, and financial constraints. 
Firstly, the nature of the service is particularly important when the operator is private 
because a private operator does not enter non-profitable segments nor provide a public 
service without a profit, unless it is compensated for its loss. Secondly, for the same reason, 
a private operator may incur in opportunistic behaviours, either by only choosing profitable 
segments or by increasing tariffs to socially unacceptable levels. Finally, the pressure to 
end cross-subsidies increases the vulnerability of universal provision by constraining the 
financial options of operators. This is very relevant in the direct public arrangement.  
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 It became clear from the empirical evidence that non-provision of the service may result 
from non-capacity of the system (calling for a need to expand the system) or to 
non-affordability of the service. Of course, the situation is more acute when there are both 
affordability and capacity problems, such as is the case in many developing countries.  
The identification of the vulnerability factors of the main elements at risk because of reform 
led to the third question related to possible solutions.  
Question 3: Can regulation be a tool for reform risk management? If yes, how? 
After acknowledging that regulation has a very important role to play in the UWS (Chapter 
2), namely in terms of investment and consumer protection, it became clear that it can be 
seen as a tool in reform risk management. In this way, we proposed a new role for 
regulation taking into account its functions in reducing the vulnerability factors of the main 
elements at risk because of the reform.  
In terms of capital investment, the main concerns are to reduce informational hazards and 
to align transaction characteristics - namely specificity – with the actors’ expectations and 
resources. Even though the level of sector-specific investment is high in the UWS, it is 
essential to assess whether this asset-specificity is at the core of the transaction.  
In terms of universal provision of the SGI, the main concerns are to guarantee affordable 
tariffs for customers (or alternative mechanisms for the poorest consumers) and an adequate 
level of network capacity (that does not constraint the universal provision of the SGI).  
Along these lines, we propose regulatory mechanisms adapted to each institutional 
arrangement, involving different actors, for every step of the reform risk management 
process. In our opinion, this integrated approach of risk and regulatory governance is the 
only one adapted to the new context in the UWS. 
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9.2. Future research 
The areas recommended for future research are extensions of the current work. These 
developments relate to additional empirical analyses with de facto concessions, where the 
risks related to investing into the infrastructure are indeed transferred to the operator. The 
cases of the concessions analysed in this thesis are at best lease contracts with some 
concession clauses. Completing the analysis with de facto concessions would allow more 
robust conclusions regarding the comparison across institutional arrangements, as well as 
the actual importance of contract duration on the incentives to invest in specific capital in 
the sector.   
It would also be extremely interesting to organise workshops gathering all the relevant 
actors in each system in order to confront their views in terms of risk-sharing patterns and 
vulnerability factors of the main elements at risk because of reform. This could actually be 
included in the institutional platform involving all stakeholders, which is proposed as a 
mechanism for identifying and assessing the new risks.  
Follow-up studies on the impact of the regulatory mechanisms presented in Chapter 8 
would allows us to verify the efficacy of those mechanisms in managing the reform risks 
and could be understood as a complementary approach to the results presented in this 
thesis. In the empirical analyses presented herein we focused on risk-sharing partners and 
the identification of the vulnerability factors, and not on the regulatory mechanisms. Such 
an extension would analyse the regulatory mechanisms that are already implemented. 
Clearly, the analysis would be greatly enriched if it included the implementation of new 
mechanisms as well as their evaluation. This new study would allow making adjustments 
on the mechanisms and, eventually, propose new ones adapted to specific circumstances.  
However, extending the empirical work may be particularly difficult since risk-sharing 
issues and capital investments are extremely sensitive issues and the stakeholders are not 
willing to share their views and information with researchers. This is exacerbated by the 
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fact that we are referring to the urban water sector, where the debates are easily 
highly-politicised. 
 235 
REFERENCES 
AFFUSO, L. & NEWBERY, D. M. (2002) The Impact of Structural and Contractual Arrangements 
on a Vertically Separated Railway. The Economic and Social Review, 33, 83-92. 
ALEXANDER, I. & HARRIS, C. (2005) The Regulation of Investment in Utilities. World Bank 
Working Paper. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. 
ALLOUCHE, J., LUÍS-MANSO, P. & FINGER, M. (2002) Water resources management in a 
globalised economy: towards a multi-level regulatory approach. Economia e Politica 
Industriale, 116, 217-232. 
ARMSTRONG, M. (2003) Privatisation, Regulation and Competition. Competition and 
Development Conference. South Africa. 
ARMSTRONG, M., COWAN, S. & VICKERS, J. (1994) Regulatory Reform - Economic Analysis 
and UK Experience, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
AVERCH, H. & JOHNSON, L. (1962) Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint. 
American Economic Review, 52, 1053-1069. 
BAERT (1999) Quelle Régulation pour l'Eau et les Services Urbains? , Haut Conseil du Secteur 
Public. 
BAIETTI, A. & RAYMOND, P. (2005) Financing Water Supply and Sanitation Investments: 
Utilizing Risk Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing Gap. IN GROUP, T. W. B. 
(Ed.) Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series. Washington, DC, 
The World Bank. 
BAJARI, P. & TADELIS, S. (2001) Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement 
Contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 287-307. 
BAKOVIC, T., TENENBAUM, B. & WOOLF, F. (2003) Regulation by Contract: A New Way to 
Privatize Electricity distribution? Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper. 
Washington DC, World Bank. 
BALDWIN, R. & CAVE, M. (1999) Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
BAUMOL, W. (1982) Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure. 
American Economic Review, 72, 1-15. 
BAUMOL, W., PANZAR, J. C. & WILLIG, R. D. (1982) Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
BAUMOL, W. & SIDAK, G. (1994) The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors. Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 171. 
  
 
236
BAUMOL, W. J. & WILLIG, R. D. (1986) Contestability: Developments since the Book. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 38, 9-36. 
BAZILLIAN, M., LEARY, F. O., GALLACHÓIR, B. Ó. & HOWLEY, M. (2006) Security of 
Supply Metrics. Sustainable Energy Ireland. 
BECKER, G. (1983) A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371-400. 
BERGMAN, L., DOYLE, C., GUAL, J., HULTKRANTZ, L., NEVEN, D., RÖLLER, L.-H. & 
WAVERMAN, L. (1998) Europe's Network Industries: Conflicting Priorities, Monitoring 
European Deregulation 1: Telecommunications, London, CEPR. 
BILTRÁN, G. & ARELLANO, P. (2005) Regulating Water Services. Sending the Right Signal to 
Utilities in Chile. Public Policy for the Private Sector. 
BLACK, J. (1996) An Economic Analysis of Regulation: One View of the Cathedral. Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 16, 699-711. 
BOITEAUX, M. (1949) La tarification des demandes en point: application de la théorie de la vente 
au coût marginal. Revue Général de l'Electricité, 58, 321-40. 
BOYER, M. & GARCIA, S. (2002) Organisation et réglementation des services publics d'eau 
potable et d'assainissement en France. Rapport de Projet. Montréal, CIRANO. 
BROUSSEAU, É. & GLACHANT, J. M. (2002) Contract Economics and the Renewal of 
Economics. IN BROUSSEAU, É. & GLACHANT, J. M. (Eds.) The Economics of 
Contracts: Theories and Applications. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
BURNS, P., TURVEY, R. & WEYMAN-JONES, T. (1995) Sliding Scale Regulation of Monopoly 
Enterprises. London, Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries. 
CARPENTIER, A., NAUGES, C., REYNAUD, A. & THOMAS, A. (2006) Effets de la délégation 
sur le prix de l'eau potable en France. Une analyse à partir de la littérature sur les "effets de 
traitement". Economie et Prévision, 174. 
CHONG, E., HUET, F., SAUSSIER, S. & STEINER, F. (2006) Public-Private Partnerships and 
Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France. Review of Industrial Organization, 29, 
149-169. 
CHRISTIANSEN, H. (2006) International Investor Participation in Infrastructures: Challenges for 
Policy Makers. International Investment Perspectives. OECD. 
COASE, R. (1937) The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4, 386-405. 
COWEN, P. (1997) The Private Sector in Water and Sanitation - How to Get Started. World Bank 
Public Policy Journal, 126. 
  
237
DEFRA (2007) Review of Existing Private Sewers and Drains in England and Wales - Regulatory 
Impact Assessment. 
DEMSETZ, H. (1968) Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of Law and Economics, 11, 55-66. 
EBERHARD, A. (2006) Infrastructure regulation in developing countries: an exploration of hybrid 
and transitional models. African Forum of Utility Regulators, 3rd Annual Conference. 
Windhoek. 
EC (2003) Guidelines for successful public-private partnerships. Brussels, European Commission 
DG Regional Policy. 
ECONOMIDES, N. & WHITE, L. (1995) Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the 
"Efficient Component Pricing Rule"? Antitrust Bulletin, XL, 557-579. 
ELNABOULSI, J. (2001) Organization, management and delegation in the French water industry. 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 72, 507-547. 
ENGREF (2001) Impact des renégociations des contrats de délégation dans les services d’eau et 
d’assainissement en 2000. MATE. 
EUROMARKET (2004) Deliverable 3_Analysis of the Strategies of Water Supply and Sanitation 
Operators in Europe. 
FINGER, M. & ALLOUCHE, J. (2002) Water Privatisation: Trans-National Corporations and the 
Re-Regulation of the Water Industry, London, Spon Press. 
FINGER, M., ALLOUCHE, J. & LUÍS-MANSO, P. (Eds.) (2007) Water and Liberalisation: 
European Water Scenarios, London, IWA Publishing. 
GARCIA, S., GUÉRIN-SCHNEIDER, L. & BREUIL, L. (2007) Analysis of the European Union 
Explicit and Implicit Policies and Approaches in the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector. 
IN FINGER, M., ALLOUCHE, J. & LUÍS-MANSO, P. (Eds.) Water and Liberalisation: 
European Water Scenarios. London, IWA Publishing. 
GEE, A. (2004) Competition and the water sector. EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2, 38-40. 
GILBERT, R. & NEWBERY, D. (1994) The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Contitutions. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 538-554. 
GLACHANT, J.-M. (2002) Why Regulate Deregulated Network Industries? Journal of Network 
Industries, 3, 297-311. 
GOLDBERG, V. (1976) Regulation and Administered Contracts. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 
426-448. 
GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, J. (2003) Regulating Infrastructure: monopoly, contracts, and discretion 
Cambrige, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
  
 
238
GORDON-WALKER, S. & MARR, S. (2002) Study on the application of the competition rules to 
the water sector in the European community. Brussels, Competition Directorate-General. 
GREEN, C. (2003) Handbook of Water Economics: Principles and Practice Chichester, John 
Willey & Sons. 
GUÉRIN-SCHNEIDER, L. & LORRAIN, D. (2003) Note de recherche sur une question sensible. 
Les relations puissance publique-firmes dans le secteur de l'eau et de l'assainissement Flux, 
52-53. 
GUTHRIE, G. (2006) Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 44, 925-972. 
GWI (2006) World Bank embraces new water operators as Europeans step back. Global Water 
Intelligence. 
HAARMEYER, D. & MODY, A. (1998a) Competition, Contracts, and Regulation in Water and 
Sanitation: Lessons from recent experience. 
HAARMEYER, D. & MODY, A. (1998b) Tapping the Private Sector: Approaches to Managing 
Risk in Water and Sanitation The Journal of Project Finance, 4, 1-28. 
HART, O. & MOORE, J. (1988) Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, 56, 755-
785. 
HART, O., SCHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. (1997) The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and 
an Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1126-1161. 
HIRSCHHAUSEN, C. V., BECKERS, T. & BRENCK, A. (2004) Infrastructure regulation and 
investment for the long-term—an introduction. Utilities Policy, 12, 203-210. 
HOLMSTROM, B. & MILGROM, P. (1991) Multi-task Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
7, 24-52. 
HUBBARD, T. (2001) Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 32, 369-386. 
IMF (1998) Mozambique: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policies Framework Paper for 
April 1998-March 2000. 
IPCC (2007) Climate Change 2007: the physical science basis. IPCC. 
JENSEN, P. (2004) The Impact of Incentives, Uncertainty and Transaction Costs on the Efficiency 
of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts. Australian Graduate School of Management. 
Sydney, University of Sydney and New South Wales. 
JOSKOW, P. (1987) Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships. Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 4, 95-177. 
  
239
JOSKOW, P. (2005) Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and 
Transmission Networks. National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Economic 
Regulation. Cambridge, MA. 
KAHN, A. (1970) The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, New York, John 
Wiley & Sons. 
KESSIDES, I. (2004) Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition. World 
Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC, The World Bank. 
KLEIN, M. (1996) Economic Regulation of Water Companies. Policy Research Working Papers. 
Washington D.C., World Bank. 
LAFFONT, J.-J. & TIROLE, J. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. 
LITTLECHILD, S. (1983) Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability: Report to the 
Secretary of State. London, Department of Industry. 
LLEWELLYN, D. (2001) Alternative approaches to financial regulation. IN ROBINSON, C. (Ed.) 
Regulating Utilities: new issues, new solutions. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
LUÍS-MANSO, P. & FELISBERTO, C. (2006) Economic Regulation in the Network Industries: 
where does it stand? CDM Working Papers 2006-010. Lausanne, EPFL. 
LUÍS-MANSO, P. & FINGER, M. (forthcoming) The challenges of regulating the drinking water 
sector under delegated management: lessons from Mozambique. Water International. 
LUÍS-MANSO, P., FINGER, M. & ALLOUCHE, J. (2007a) Analysis of the Strategies of the Water 
Supply and Sanitation Operators in Europe. IN FINGER, M., ALLOUCHE, J. & LUÍS-
MANSO, P. (Eds.) Water and Liberalisation: European Water Scenarios. London, IWA 
Publishing. 
LUÍS-MANSO, P., MÉNARD, C. & FINGER, M. (2007b) Reform, Risk Management, and 
Regulatory Governance: the case of Specific Investment in the UWS. 6th Conference on 
Applied Infrastructure Research. Berlin. 
MARTINS, R. & FORTUNATO, A. (2002) Regulatory Framework in Water Supply and Sewerage 
Services in Portugal. VI Annual Conference of the European Network in Industrial Policy. 
University of Abo/Turku. 
MARVIN, S., GRAHAM, S. & GUY, S. (1999) Cities, regions and privatised utilities. Progress in 
Planning, 51, 91-169. 
MAYER, C. (2001) Water: the 1999 price review. IN ROBINSON, C. (Ed.) Regulating Utilities: 
new issues, new solutions. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
MÉNARD, C. (2005) A New Institutional Approach to Organization. IN MÉNARD, C. & 
SHIRLEY, M. (Eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Dordrecht, Springer. 
  
 
240
MÉNARD, C. & CLARKE, G. (2002) A Transatory Regime: Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea. IN 
SHIRLEY, M. (Ed.) Thirsting for Efficiency: The Economics and Politics of Urban Water 
System Reform. Washington, D.C., Pergamon/ Elsevier. 
MILLER, K. & YATES, D. (2005) Climate Change and Water Resources: A Primer for Municipal 
Water Providers, Denver. 
NAUGES, C. & THOMAS, A. (2000) Privately-operated Water Utilities, Municipal Price 
Negotiation, and Estimation of Residential Water Demand: The case of France. Land 
Economics, 76, 68-85. 
NEWBERY, D. (1999) Privatization, Restrucutring, and Regulation of Network Utilities, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
NEWBERY, D. (2001) Regulating Unbundling Network Utilities. European Association for 
Reseach in Industrial Economics. Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. 
NEWBERY, D. (2002) Regulating Unbundled Network Utilities. The Economic and Social Review, 
33, 23-41. 
NEWBERY, D. (2004) Privatising Network Industries CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1132. 
NOLL, R., SHIRLEY, M. & COWAN, S. (2000) Reforming Urban Water Systems in Developing 
Countries. IN KRUEGER, A. O. (Ed.) Economic Policy Reform:  The Second Stage. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
OECD (2004a) Access pricing in Telecommunications. Paris. 
OECD (2004b) Financing Water and Environmental Infrastructure for All. OECD Global Forum on 
Sustainable Development. Paris, OECD. 
OECD (2006) Guidelines for Performance Based Contracts between Municipalities and Water 
Utilities in EECCA. Paris. 
OGUS, A. (2004) Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Portland, Hart Publishing. 
PELTZMAN, S. (1976) Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 19, 211-240. 
POSNER, R. (1971) Taxation by regulation. Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science, 2, 
22-50. 
POSNER, R. (1974) Theories of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 5, 335-358. 
PRASAD, N. (2006) Privatisation Results: Private Sector Participation in Water Services After 15 
Years Development Policy Review, 24, 669-692. 
  
241
RENZETTI, S. & DUPONT, D. P. (2003) Ownership and Performance of Water Utilities. Greener 
Management International, 42, 9-19. 
RICKETSON, C. (1998) A Case History: Mozambique Five Cities Water Project. Halcrow 
Management Sciences Limited. 
RIVIERE, V. (2003) Approche Globale d'un Grand Project: le Point de Vue et les Expériences de 
l'Assureur. AMRAE 2003. Strasbourg. 
ROBINSON, C. (2001) Chairman's comments to Water: the 1999 price review. IN ROBINSON, C. 
(Ed.) Regulating Utilities: new issues, new solutions. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
SCHOUTEN, M. & DIJK, M. P. V. (2005) Regulatory impositions posed upon strategic actions of 
publicly and privately owned water companies, in respectively the Netherlands and England 
and Wales. Colloque international: Formes de concurrence et enjeux de régulation des 
services d'intérêt général. Université Paris 8 - Saint-Denis. 
SHELANSKI, H. & KLEIN, P. (1995) Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A 
Review and Assessment. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11, 335-361. 
SHIRLEY, M., XU, L. C. & ZULUAGA, A. (2000) Reforming Urban Water Supply: The Case of 
Chile. Policy Research Working Papers. Washington D.C., World Bank. 
SNWSC (2002) Risk Management Process. San Diego, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center. 
SPILLER, P. & TOMMASI, M. (2005) The Institutions of Regulation. IN MENARD, C. & 
SHIRLEY, M. M. (Eds.) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer. 
STIGLER, G. (1971) The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economic and 
Management Science, 2, 3-21. 
TRAIN, K. (1997) Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge, 
MIT Press. 
TRÉMOLET, S., SHUKLA, P. & VENTON, C. (2004) Contracting Out Utility Regulatory 
Functions. Final Report for the World Bank. Environment Resources Management. 
UNCED (1992) Agenda 21. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth 
Summit). Rio de Janeiro. 
UNDP (2006) Human Development Report. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water 
crisis. New York, United Nations Development Programme. 
UNFPA (2007) State of World Population 2007. Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth. New 
York. 
UNGERN-STERNBERG, T. V. (2004) Efficient Monopolies: the Limits of Competition in the 
European Property Market, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
  
 
242
VICKERS, J. & YARROW, G. (1988) Privatization: an Economic Analysis, Cambridge, MA, The 
MIT Press. 
VICKERS, J. & YARROW, G. (1991) Economic Perspectives on Privatization. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5, 111-132. 
VOGELSANG, I. (2002) Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-
Year Perspective Journal of Regulatory Economics, 22, 5-27. 
WILLIAMSON, O. (1973) Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. American 
Economic Review, 316-325. 
WILLIAMSON, O. (1976) Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with respect 
to CATV. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 73-104. 
WILLIAMSON, O. (1979) Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relations. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-261. 
WILLIAMSON, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press. 
WILLIAMSON, O. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, New York, Oxford University Press. 
WILLS-JOHNSON, N., LOWDON, A. & BELL, H. (2003) Access and competition in the water 
industry. Water Policy, 5, 101-114. 
WMO (1992) The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development. Dublin International 
Conference on Water and the Environment. Geneva, World Meteorogical Organisation. 
YVRANDE-BILLON, A. (2006) The attribution Process of Delegation Contracts in the French 
Urban Public Transport Sector: Why Competitive Tendering is a Myth. Annals of Public 
and Cooperative Economics, 77, 453-478. 
YVRANDE-BILLON, A. & MÉNARD, C. (2005) Institutional constraints and organizational 
changes: the case of the British rail reform. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 56, 675-699. 
 
 
 243 
ANNEX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON RISK-SHARING AND ELEMENTS AT RISK 
1. Please identify the institutional arrangement that best matches the conditions 
 under which your company provides urban water services  
 (only one possible option). 
  Direct public management 
  Delegated public management (autonomous entity) 
  Management contract 
  Lease / affermage contract 
  Concession contract 
  Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
  Full privatization 
2. In case there is a contract governing the relationship between your organization and 
 the responsible entity for water services provision: 
 2A. The attribution process was (only one possible option): 
  Competitive / Public tender 
  Direct negotiation 
  Negotiation after competitive selection of a shortlist of operators 
 2B. Contract duration: ______years.  
  Please identify the beginning and ending years of the contract 
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           YES NO 
 2C. Was there any unanticipated renegotiation of the contract? 
  If yes, please state the year(s) of renegotiation ______________________ 
           YES NO 
 2D. Is it the first contract signed with this partner? 
           YES NO 
3. Does your organization own the infrastructure? 
           YES NO 
4. Does your company benefit from any subsidy? 
 If yes, please specify the reason(s) (several possible options): 
  Cover part of capital costs 
  Investments for environmental improvements 
  Investments for service quality improvements 
  Provision of water services to low-income customers 
  Other reasons, such as _______________________________ 
5A. Has your organisation made any important capital investment (i.e., investment on a 
 fixed asset such as in the infrastructure) in the past 5 years? 
  Yes 
  No, yet we are responsible for investing in capital equipment 
  No, it is not our responsibility to invest in capital equipments 
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           YES NO In part 
5B. Were these investments made to meet contract requirements? 
5C. What are the reasons justifying capital investments? (Several possible options) 
  Capacity expansion 
  Modernisation 
  Environmental standards 
  Quality of the service standards (other than environment) 
  Reduction of operating costs 
  Others. Please specify: ________________________________ 
5D. What are the sources of financing for capital investment? (Several possible options) 
  Revenue 
  Equity finance 
  Bond finance 
  Loan 
  Subsidise loan 
  Public subsidy 
  European Funds 
  Project Finance 
  Others. Please specify __________________________ 
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5F. Decisions to invest in capital (equipment, infrastructure) involve risk. Please mark 
 in order of importance, what you consider the most important factors increasing risk 
 to be (1=very important, 2=important, 3=of some relevance, 4=irrelevant) 
  Long amortization periods 
  Short duration of the contract 
  Risk that authorities change rules, prices, or cost allowances 
  Difficulty in assessing real conditions of underground assets 
  Lack of financial resources 
  Other. Please specify _______________________________ 
6. How does your company cover operational costs (e.g., employment, energy, 
 materials)? (Several possible options) 
  Revenue (tariffs) covers all operational costs 
  Revenue (tariffs) partially covers operational costs 
  Cross-subsidies 
   Block tariffs (depending on consumption) 
   Type of consumers (domestic, industrial) 
   Regional (urban subsidise rural consumers) 
   Other business segments subsidise water business 
  Public subsidies 
  Other. Please specify _______________________________ 
  
247
7. Which of the following factors are, in your opinion, important to guaranteeing the 
 provision of water services to low-income customers?  
 (1=very important, 2=important, 3=of some relevance, 4=irrelevant) 
  Existence of subsidies to cover service provision to the poorer 
  Possibility to use cross-subsidies 
  Prohibition to cut off service provision due to non-payment 
  Flexibility in terms of service quality (e.g., in terms of hours) 
  Other. Please specify ________________________________ 
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ANNEX 2 
PROJECT FINANCE 
"Project Finance" generally refers to non-recourse finance based on the merits of a project 
rather than on the credit of the project's sponsor, which significantly reduces their financial 
exposure. Project sponsors (i.e., owners) usually create an independent juridical and 
economic entity called a special purpose company. This company’s main goal is to create 
an organisational structure and obtain the necessary financial resources from lenders in 
order to develop and manage a specific project.  
In a project finance transaction, lenders devote particular attention to the revenue-producing 
contracts and the underlying cash-flow from the project. A detailed review (Riviere, 2003) 
is made of: 
1. the development and construction risks (in what refers to development and project 
conception, implementation and licensing, and construction);  
2. the operation and maintenance risks (with a special focus on the sponsors 
experience and track record, as well as the qualification of the personnel, and the 
maintenance quality);  
3. the political risks; and  
4. the environmental and force-majeure risks.  
However, water projects tend to be less attractive for project finance than in other network 
industries. The reason is that they are often relatively small and, therefore, they do not 
compensate for the high threshold costs that are typically required in this type of finance 
(OECD, 2004b).  
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ANNEX 3 
TYPOLOGY AND MAP OF OPERATORS ACROSS EUROPE63 
In order to come up with a possible generalisation of the strategies of WSS operators, the 
first step is to establish a general typology of operators rather than doing an individual case-
to-case analysis. The typology of operators is defined according to four major 
characteristics, namely:  
(1) Ownership: operators can be public, private or mix; 
(2) Size: it is used the variable “served population by operator” to classify operators as 
small (serving a population below 100,000 inhabitants), medium (serving between 
100,000 and 10,000,000 inhabitants), and large64 operators (serving more than 
10,000,000 inhabitants); 
(3) Scope of the market: it defines whether the operator works on a regional, national, or 
international level; and 
(4) Segments of the market: it relates to the types of services provided by the operator, 
namely water supply, sanitation or multi-utility (e.g., water, waste, energy) services. 
                                                 
63 The material presented in this Annex was published in Luís-Manso et al. (2007). Europe in the scope of this 
report comprises EU-15 and Switzerland. We acknowledge the contribution of the partners in the Euromarket 
project. 
64 Large operators participate in the ownership structure of other operators. Nonetheless, we consider local 
operators as the reference in calculating these figures, which means, for example, that even if a medium sized 
operator is owned up to 50% by a large operator, the operator is aggregated in the medium-sized category. 
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This typology is based on the assumption that the strategy of operators is mainly influenced 
by physical and business characteristics. It therefore does not consider geographical, 
cultural or historical factors that may shape the formulation of business strategies. 
The next step aims at providing a general picture on the distribution of the different types of 
water operators across Europe. Considering the fact that different sources were used, as 
well as the lack of detailed data for some countries and typologies, the data presented in 
this section is just an estimation of the European map of water operators.  
Traditionally water services were directly provided by local public entities. This type of 
operator is still dominant across Europe however other typologies have emerged in the past 
twenty years. Today there are more than 30’000 water operators in Europe. At a first glance 
on the data (Figure 27 and Figure 28), some first conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in 
terms of water services provision, the majority of European population (about 55 per cent) 
is supplied by public operators, followed by private (about 35 per cent) and mixed owned 
(almost 10 per cent) ones. 
Figure 27 Type of ownership of operators per population supplied, 2003 
 
Secondly, regarding the size of operators providing water services, medium-sized operators 
supply almost 50 per cent of the population. This result is not very significant because, 
according to the defined typology, medium operators are those supplying between 100’000 
and 10’000’000 inhabitants, which is a very large interval. Small ones that are the majority 
Public Private 
Mix 
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in nominal terms supply about 35 per cent of the population and, finally, large operators 
account for approximately 15 per cent of the inhabitants. 
Figure 28 Size of operators per population supplied, 2003 
 
 
 
 
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the data (Figure 29) is that there are 
no “public-large” water operators. All public operators are small and medium. Another 
conclusion is that small public operators account individually for the biggest share in terms 
of population supplied (about one third), followed by medium public and medium private 
operators (about 20% each). Yet probably the most interesting conclusion is that the 
participation of the private sector through medium sized operators is very significant 
(approximately the same as through large sized ones), which is especially due to England & 
Wales. This is especially true for water supply operators. It is nonetheless important to state 
that large private operators participate in the ownership of several small and medium 
private and mixed operators, and thus their influence needs to be analysed accordingly. 
Figure 29 Partition of types of water operators in Europe, 2003 
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Clustering of the 16 countries 
The analysis presented so far relates to a general picture of Europe in terms of operators’ 
typology. It is important at this moment to present a more detailed illustration, namely with 
the aim of clustering some countries based on common characteristics (i.e., with respect to 
ownership and size). The first cluster that has been made is based on ownership, the second 
is based on size, and the third and final cluster is a combination of these two. 
In terms of population served per type of ownership, public operators are providing water 
services to the majority of the population in 14 out of 16 countries. Only in France and in 
England and Wales is the majority of the population served by private operators (although 
under very different institutional arrangements). Private ownership is also considerably 
important in Spain, Denmark (due to private cooperatives supplying water especially in 
rural areas) and Italy. In contrast, private participation is almost non-existent in 
Switzerland, and it is even zero in Luxembourg and the Netherlands (although not for 
wastewater). Finally, in every country except for Spain, Italy and Greece, one form of 
ownership (almost always public) is dominant. 
In terms of size, small and medium sized operators provide water services to the majority of 
the population. Only in France large operators are dominant in terms of population served, 
which can be seen as a result of the local model of delegated management to (private) 
companies. Apart from France, large operators are also present in the England and Wales, 
and Germany (although not in a dominant position). 
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Clustering based on ownership 
Four clusters can be identified on the basis of operators’ distribution in terms of ownership: 
1. France and England & Wales form the first cluster, because they are the only 
countries where private ownership is the dominant type (even though under 
different modes of management); 
 
2. The second cluster is the mix cluster. This cluster is not based on mixed ownership, 
but based on the fact that these countries do not have a (real) dominant ownership 
structure. This cluster is formed by Italy, Spain and Greece; 
 
3. The third cluster is formed by Denmark and Germany. These two countries have a 
dominant public ownership (i.e., public operators provide water services to about 
two thirds of the population), but less dominant than the countries in cluster 4; 
 
4. The last cluster is the cluster where public ownership is dominant (i.e., it provides 
water services to more than 90% of the population), and it contains the following 
countries: Sweden, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium65, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal.  
                                                 
65 Belgium is considered in this cluster even if in terms of sanitation about 30% of population is served by 
mixed owned operators. 
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Clustering based on size 
Four clusters can be identified on the basis of operators’ distribution in terms of size: 
1. France forms a cluster by itself, because it is the only country in Europe, where 
large operators are providing water services to the large majority of the population; 
 
2. The second cluster is formed by Spain, England & Wales, Italy, Greece and the 
Netherlands where medium-sized operators are dominant; 
 
3. The third cluster is formed by countries where medium-sized operators provide 
water services to (more or less) the same share of population as small-sized 
operators. This cluster is formed by Austria, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium 
and Luxembourg; 
 
4. The last cluster is the cluster where the small sized operators are dominant. Ireland, 
Germany, Denmark and Switzerland form this cluster. 
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Clustering based on ownership and size 
Finally, it is possible to group the 16 countries into six different clusters combining these 
two typologies, i.e. ownership and size (Figure 30). The ordering of the clusters 
corresponds to their importance in terms of population, with the first cluster representing 
more population than the sixth. 
Figure 30  Clustering of countries according to operators’  typology, 2003 
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First cluster: France and England & Wales, the only countries with the majority of the 
population being served by privately-owned operators, form the first cluster. Furthermore, 
the major water-related TNCs (Suez, Veolia, Thames Water) have in England and France 
their main domestic markets.  
 
Second cluster: The second (largest) cluster is formed by Italy, Greece and Spain. Their 
water operators have many different forms, structures and sizes, but in general the majority 
of the population is served by publicly-owned medium sized operators. 
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Third cluster: Germany and Denmark form the third cluster with dominant public 
ownership, but less dominant than the countries in the remaining clusters. Small and 
medium are the dominant size of operators.   
 
Fourth cluster: The fourth cluster is formed by countries where the majority of the 
population is served by operators publicly owned, but equally divided into small and 
medium sized. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland form this 
cluster. 
 
Fifth cluster: The fifth cluster corresponds to the Netherlands, which is the only country 
where medium-sized publicly owned operators provide water services to the majority of the 
population. 
 
Sixth cluster: Finally, Ireland and Switzerland form the sixth cluster, where small publicly 
owned operators dominate. 
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